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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s 
Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had 
warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. 
Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military 
presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of 
New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China. 
The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised 
the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand 
relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from 
the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat 
during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New 
Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported 
revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or 
American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand 
war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to 
withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to 
reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought 
possible. 
The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a 
growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to 
dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This 
perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand 
officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged 
established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct command of the 
revolution and was placing limits on it. The revolution destroyed the notion that China was a 
growing power bent on external expansion. As Mao moved to dampen the revolution, Beijing 
moved to re-establish its foreign policy and improve its links with the outside world. 
Both the means and ends of New Zealand’s grand strategy changed at the same time. New 
Zealand and its great power allies abandoned the containment project just as views on China 
shifted. From the end of the 1960s, New Zealand’s Forward Defence efforts ceased to be 
focused on the containment of China and moved to achieving much more limited goals. New 
security arrangements were developed to replace the AMDA, ANZAM, and SEATO pacts. 
The Five Power Defence Arrangements would provide the basis of New Zealand’s defence 
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commitment to South East Asia with only limited assistance from Britain and without China 
as a significant threat. 
It is in this context that New Zealand made the decision to recognise China. New Zealand 
Prime Minister Keith Holyoake long maintained the view that the PRC should enter the 
United Nations and be recognised by New Zealand, provided the position of Taiwan was 
preserved. Once the effort to keep Taiwan in the UN was lost, New Zealand moved slowly 
toward recognition. However, it would take the election of the Third Labour Government for 
recognition to occur. This move was part of an international trend towards official relations 
with Beijing, but for New Zealand, the shift was greater as Wellington had moved from 
seeing China as a growing military threat to a state with which New Zealand could have an 
official dialogue.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
…there is a new note of reality in [New Zealand’s] consideration of the 
Pacific. More and more New Zealanders talk and write as if events in Asia 
were of serious concern to them and matters on which their country should 
have a policy – F.L.W. Wood, Pacific Affairs, 22:1, 1949 
In the longer term (the 1970s and beyond) the greatest threat to New 
Zealand’s interests and to our own security comes from the growing power 
of an uncompromising Communist China – Review of Defence Policy 
1966, Vol. 1, AJHR, 1966 
One of the great events of our lifetime has been the re-emergence of China 
on the world scene. After a century of weakness and passivity, it has 
regained strength and begun to exert influence on others. This has changed 
the complexion of international politics and made the question of relations 
with China one of the chief issues of the day for governments all over the 
world. It has special importance for countries like New Zealand that are 
located in the Pacific area and are, actually or potentially, within the reach 
of China’s power. – Keith Holyoake, New Zealand and China, pamphlet, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 28 May 1971, p. 3 
“I don’t see any threat from China” – Robert Muldoon, Christchurch Star, 
7 May 1976.  
 
New Zealand’s foreign and defence policies changed radically between the creation of the 
Ministry of Defence in 1964 and Norman Kirk’s recognition of China in 1972. During this 
period a number of forces reshaped New Zealand’s grand strategy and the assumptions that 
drove that strategy. Central to this change in strategy was a reshaping of New Zealand’s 
assumptions about the People’s Republic of China, the threat that it posed to New Zealand’s 
interests in South East Asia, and the willingness of New Zealand’s great power allies to 
assist in securing those interests. This thesis examines how New Zealand policymakers1 and 
defence officials2 assessed China as an international actor between the years 1965 and 1972. 
This period represents a change from the high water mark of China being viewed as a threat 
to New Zealand’s interests in South East Asia, through to the end of Forward Defence as a 
                                                 
1  ‘Policymakers’ in this work describes those at all levels in the policymaking apparatus from civil servants 
to cabinet-level decision makers. However, the emphasis in this work will be on those providing advice and 
information to the top levels of bureaucracy and government.  
2  ‘Defence officials’ in this work includes civil servants and the top levels of the military such as the Chiefs 
of Defence Staff. 
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strategy for the containment of China, and to the view that diplomatic engagement with 
China best served New Zealand’s interests in the region.  
From the end of the Second World War New Zealand began to search for new sources of 
security.3 The war demonstrated that Britain and the system of Imperial Defence were no 
longer reliable and new security arrangements had to be found.4 The experience of Japanese 
aggression in the Pacific, New Zealand’s small size, limited industrial capacity, and 
dependence on Britain, were the driving factors in a rejection of isolationism and a search 
for security partners. This was pursued initially through commitments to multilateralism, 
Commonwealth defence, and, later, defence ties with the United States. This strategy came 
from cultural, economic, and governmental ties that demanded continued access to Britain 
and its market. With the Communist victory in China, the Cold War moved eastward. The 
Pacific once again came to dominate New Zealand’s security interests as China and 
communism displaced Japan as New Zealand’s primary strategic concerns. 
While direct threats to New Zealand would remain low throughout the Cold War, New 
Zealand joined military alliances such as ANZUS and SEATO, made numerous defence 
agreements, and fought in conflicts in Korea,5 Malaya,6 and Vietnam.7 Those organisations 
and conflicts were designed to prevent communist expansion and to contain Communist 
Chinese power.8 The 1950s saw numerous crises that involved China, not least in the Taiwan 
Straits9 and Indo-China.10 With these threats New Zealand developed a strategy of Forward 
Defence which permanently deployed New Zealand forces to South East Asia in order to 
help defend Singapore and Malaysia specifically (and South East Asia more generally) from 
                                                 
3  Brook Barrington, ‘New Zealand and the search for security 1944-1954: "a modest and moderate 
collaboration"’, PhD Thesis, University of Auckland, 1993 
4  Jim Rolfe, ‘New Zealand Defence Policy During the Cold War’, in Trapeznik and Fox (eds.) Lenin’s 
Legacy Down Under: New Zealand’s Cold War, Oxford University Press, Dunedin, 2005, pp. 35-57 
5  Ian McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War Volume I, OUP and NZ Dept. of Internal Affairs, 
Auckland, 1992 
6  Christopher Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and 
Borneo 1949-1966, OUP, Auckland, 2003 
7  Ian McGibbon’s New Zealand's Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment and Controversy, Exisle, 
Auckland, 2010; Roberto Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy, Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 2005 
8  W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55, St 
Martin’s & CUP, Christchurch, 1995, p. 400; Mark Pearson, Paper Tiger: New Zealand’s Part in SEATO, 
1954-1977, NZIIA, Wellington, 1989, pp. 14-15 
9  For New Zealand’s files on the first two Taiwan Straits Crises see: EAW2619 163 264/3/2 Vol. 1-6, 
Individual Countries – China – Political Affairs – Outlying Islands 1954-1956 
10  For China’s role in the Geneva Conference of 1954 see: Zhai Qiang, ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 
1954’, The China Quarterly, No. 129, March 1992, pp. 103-122 
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China and Chinese-inspired communist revolutionary groups.11 This policy required the 
day-to-day support of Australia and the United Kingdom, with the ANZUS alliance 
providing an ultimate security guarantee from the United States.12  
The 1960s brought the Sino-Soviet split, Confrontation with Indonesia, the Cultural 
Revolution, and New Zealand’s participation in the Vietnam War. New Zealand viewed 
these events as a member of Western alliances and through military involvement. Early 1965 
saw a period where Wellington officials believed there was a considerable risk of New 
Zealand being drawn into significant simultaneous conflicts against Indonesia and North 
Vietnam, with the latter conflict having significant risk of escalating into a limited war with 
China.13 
These fears eased quickly, but the systems that provided for New Zealand’s interests in 
South East Asian security would break down over the second half of the 1960s. The British 
decision to withdraw its forces from South East Asia challenged New Zealand’s ability to 
contribute to the defence of South East Asia and the containment of China. New Zealand 
and Australia had to ascertain quickly whether their presences in Malaysia and Singapore 
were viable without British assistance. Facing a military quagmire in Vietnam, the United 
States sought to limit its own involvement in South East Asia, undermining SEATO and 
further damaging New Zealand’s confidence in the containment of China. While New 
Zealand’s alliance relations continued, the detailed structures that had served Wellington’s 
desire for South East Asia to be defended from China fell apart. New defence arrangements 
had to be agreed upon if New Zealand was to remain in South East Asia after British 
withdrawal and peace in Vietnam. However, those new structures would not have the direct 
involvement of the US or UK and as a result could not be realistically designed to contain 
China. 
As New Zealand’s great power partners began to lose interest in military entanglements in 
South East Asia, China threw itself into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This 
revolution would challenge the view among New Zealand officials that China was a 
growing threat to South East Asia. As China emerged from the Cultural Revolution in 
                                                 
11  Michael Stenson, ‘Forward Defence in Asia’ in New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 1: 1945-1957, Price 
Milburn, Wellington, 2nd Edition, 1991, p. 177-199; and Ian McGibbon, ‘Forward Defence: The South East 
Asian Commitment’ in Malcolm McKinnon (ed.) New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 2: 1957-1972, 
NZIIA, Wellington, 1991, pp. 9-40 
12  For the formation of ANZUS see: W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, 
Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55, St Martin’s & CUP, Christchurch, 1995 
13  This is covered in Chapter 2. 
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196914 it looked to repair its foreign policy and seek more constructive relations with the 
outside world. Beijing’s15 displacement of Taipei from China’s seat at the United Nations 
would be the watershed moment. Beijing’s legitimacy in the international community 
reached a tipping point where significant numbers of countries began establishing relations 
with Beijing instead of Taipei. Nevertheless, it would take the election of Norman Kirk’s 
Third Labour Government in 1972 for New Zealand to recognise and establish relations 
with the PRC. By that time, the experience of Vietnam, détente, and generational change 
was also changing the way New Zealand understood the Cold War. 
This research finds that the basis of New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy changed 
radically with the loss of active British and American military support in South East Asia 
and perceptions of a declining threat from China. This thesis argues that New Zealand’s 
grand strategy was upended by the loss of both the means and ends of its strategic equation. 
New Zealand lost both the means of helping to contain China and the reasons to do so. 
The period from the creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1964 through to the 
establishment of official relations with Beijing in 1972 represents the most dramatic 
transition in the history of New Zealand’s policies on China. In less than seven years, New 
Zealand’s China policy moved from the PRC being described in the Review of Defence 
Policy 1966 as the greatest long-term threat to New Zealand’s interests and security, to the 
establishment of official relations.16 Just ten years after the Review of Defence Policy 1966 
was presented to Parliament, Robert Muldoon met the ailing Mao Zedong and afterwards 
declared that he saw no threat to New Zealand from China.17 The forces that drove this 
change, the opinions of policymakers, their assumptions, and their assessments on China are 
the subject of this thesis. 
While the literature on New Zealand’s search for security and participation in Cold War 
conflicts is well developed, very little academic attention has been paid to how China was 
assessed and understood by New Zealand officials. Much of the existing research did not 
have complete access to documents and there has been little examination of the strategic 
aspects of New Zealand’s assessment of China. Taking an active role in Asia-Pacific 
                                                 
14  The Cultural Revolution is usually considered to span from 1966 to 1976, but this work is most concerned 
with the early and most violent phase of the revolution which lasted from 1966 to 1968. 
15  This thesis uses the modern Pinyin system for transliterating Chinese characters into Roman script. For 
much of the twentieth century the Wade-Giles method was the standard practice. Chinese words quoted in 
this thesis have been changed to their modern Pinyin equivalent. Hard brackets indicate the change.   
16  Review of Defence Policy 1966, AJHR, A. 8, Vol. 1, 1966  
17  Christchurch Star, 7 May 1976 
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security required New Zealand to make assessments on global security and the risks posed 
by China to New Zealand’s interests and the interests of its defence partners. This thesis will 
try to bring together the assessments of New Zealand’s diplomatic and military officials to 
demonstrate how China was understood as an international actor and how it influenced New 
Zealand’s strategic policy. In the 21st century China has arguably become the most powerful 
state in the Western Pacific. Fresh research on how New Zealand interpreted China in the 
past will also be timely as it will assist in managing New Zealand’s relations with China in 
the future. 
 PRIMARY WORKING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How did New Zealand policymakers and defence officials assess the People’s 
Republic of China between 1965 and 1972? 
 How did China influence New Zealand’s grand strategy during this period? 
 GRAND STRATEGY 
Strategy not simply having a policy. A policy is a set of ideas or instructions which attempt 
to cover a certain issue or problem faced by government. Strategy, especially grand strategy, 
is much broader. In this sense, strategy is about the meeting of political ends with practical 
means.18 A strategy identifies the ultimate goal of policymakers, identifies the threats to that 
goal, and brings together the available means to achieve that goal. Yet this definition is 
incomplete as strategy must be able to adapt. The field of international relations consists of 
multiple actors in an environment that is continually being reshaped by the interactions 
between those actors. To be effective in this environment, strategy must be dynamic. That is 
to say, it must adjust to the moves of other actors, each trying to achieve their own goals and 
adapt to the situation as it changes. This research attempts to understand New Zealand’s 
foreign and defence policy in this wider context as it attempted to achieve its wider goals 
with the resources at its disposal. 
Strategy as a concept has shifted over time. Coming from the Greek στρατηγία (stratēgia) 
meaning ‘art of the general’, the word has long been associated with the craft of the general. 
Many of basic concepts of strategic thought – movement, terrain, espionage, and offensive 
and defensive manoeuvres – have been written about since antiquity. Sun Tzu’s 6th Century 
                                                 
18  Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 18 
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BC work The Art of War19 and the ancient Indian political text Arthashastra20 detail the 
challenges of warfighting and remain influential texts today. However, as warfare grew in 
complexity, the art of the battlefield has become more synonymous with tactics.  
Meanwhile, strategy has come to be associated with the use of military to achieve political 
aims. In the 19th Century, Prussian general Karl von Clausewitz argued that war was a 
political act. War, is in his words, ‘is a mere continuation of policy21 by other means’.22 
Lawrence Freedman has noted that Clausewitz’s dictum is not simply a reminder about the 
interconnection between political and military aims. To Freedman, Clausewitz was also 
warning about the emotional problems of warfare – ‘primordial violence, hatred, and 
enmity’23 – and how they might pose a challenge to the rational goals of state.24 The lesson 
being that military objectives are political objectives, but the unpleasant realities of warfare 
can feedback into the calculations of political leaders. 
Clausewitz’s Prussian approach to warfare was not universally accepted. Writing between 
the First and Second World Wars, Basil Liddell Hart advanced an ‘indirect method’ as an 
attempt to move away from Clausewitz’s ideas on mass armies.25 Liddell Hart’s naval-based 
prescription for Britain was at odds with the continentally minded Prussian thinkers like 
Clausewitz.26 Writers like Paul Kennedy have noted that Liddle Hart’s strategic vision was 
one built on his own personal experiences of battle in the First World War and Britain’s 
particular strategic situation.27 Regardless of Liddle Hart’s particular strategic prescriptions, 
he provided a clear picture of grand strategy as sitting above the particular needs of a 
conflict and to the peace that follows. Grand strategy attempts to bring together all the tools 
of state to achieve a political objective.  
…fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which 
should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of 
                                                 
19  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, John Minford (translator), Penguin, London, 2002 
20  Kautilya (traditionally), Arthashastra, R. Shamasastry (translator), Government Press, Bangalore, 1915 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Arthashastra 
21  The German word politik can also be translated as ‘politics’  
22  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, J.J. Graham (translator), Revised by F.N. Maude & Louise Willmot, 
Wordsworth Editions, Ware, 1997, p. 22 
23  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1, Book 1, 89. As quoted in Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A 
History, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, p. 87 
24  Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 86-87 
25  B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd edition, Faber & Faber, London, 1991. 
26  H. Rothfels, ‘Clausewitz’ in (Edward Mead Earle ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1971, p. 94 
27  Paul Kennedy ‘Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition’ in Grand Strategy in War 
and Peace, Paul Kennedy (ed.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991, p. 3 
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diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical 
pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will.28 
It is in this sense that military force (or the threat of military force) is but one tool at the 
disposal of states in formulating their grand strategies. Grand strategy, therefore, does not 
necessitate war and can involve the avoidance of it. The practical means available to a state 
could be utilised to convince an adversary to take another course of action, to maintain an 
alliance, or to improve relations with another state in order to bring peace. As Edward Mead 
Earl noted: 
Strategy… is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element 
of statecraft... In the present-day world, then, strategy is the art of 
controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation – or a coalition of 
nations – including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall 
be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or 
merely presumed. The highest type of strategy – sometimes called grand 
strategy – is that which integrates the policies and armaments of the nation 
that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with 
the maximum chance of victory.29 
The ‘grand’ in this sense refers to the overarching nature of this strategy. Grand strategy is 
defined here as what New Zealand determined to be the relationship between its main 
foreign policy goals and how it would accomplish those goals. New Zealand may have had 
strategies in specific areas such as the Vietnam War or its relations with the United States, 
but ‘grand strategy’ implies overarching foreign policy goals (ends) and the methods for 
achieving those goals (means). The only limitation to the use of this definition here is that 
trade is excluded from the analysis. This is due to that fact trade strategies were not linked to 
security by New Zealand policymakers during the period being examined. The files of the 
Ministry of Defence make very few references to trade issues. Expanding exports was a 
significant goal during this period, but for the purposes of this thesis, grand strategy will be 
limited to its more traditional space of external defence and security. 
 PRE-1965 DEFENCE AGREEMENTS 
By 1965 New Zealand had already joined a patchwork of defence agreements necessitated 
by the decline of Britain as a security guarantor during the Second World War. The various 
and sometimes conflicting pressures caused by these agreements is a major theme of this 
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research. The first such agreement was the 1944 Canberra Pact between New Zealand and 
Australia. While not a military alliance, it was a pact to work together on issues of mutual 
interest such as security in the Pacific. After the Second World War, discussions between 
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand led to the development of Australia-New Zealand-and-
Malaya (ANZAM). While a vague, informal, and initially secret agreement, ANZAM 
formed the basis of Commonwealth service-level military planning for the defence of the 
South East Asia and the South Pacific.30  
The need for an American security guarantee became a major policy goal after the Second 
World War. The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty of 1951 
provided Australia and New Zealand with that guarantee, but meant little in the way of day-
to-day military planning with the United States. Planning with the Americans came through 
the creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Made up of the US, UK, 
France, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Philippines, and Pakistan, it was the main body 
through which the US planned for the defence of South East Asia. It also provided New 
Zealand with its closest military links to the United States between the Korean and Vietnam 
wars.  
However, day-to-day operations were still centred around cooperation with Commonwealth 
allies. From the mid-1950s this was done through the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve 
(CSR). The CSR attempted to revitalise the ANZAM agreement and give Australia and New 
Zealand greater responsibility for the defence of Malaya.31 This collage of security 
agreements was not ideal for New Zealand planners, but it did provide a set of commitments 
by the English speaking powers to defend South East Asia and provided New Zealand with 
a say in how that defence was conducted.  
 LITERATURE 
The existing research on New Zealand’s Cold War focuses on New Zealand’s relationship 
with the Western powers and the conflicts in which New Zealand forces served. The history 
of New Zealand's foreign policy has been driven by the problems of a small, geographically 
isolated state seeking to ensure its security and economic viability. Isolation has limited 
New Zealand’s security risks but exacerbated the problems of distant markets and distant 
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protectors. Having a small population and industrial base, New Zealand lacked the power to 
influence the communist powers and sought to preserve its own security through alliances. 
New Zealand’s strategic focus was directed towards the larger Western powers that provided 
security, rather than the communist powers who posed the largest threats to Western 
interests. 
It is unsurprising then that the literature has focused on the relationship with those states that 
have provided either security or a market for our exports. The Second World War saw the 
end of Britain as a reliable security guarantor and the Cold War saw the emergence of new 
threats to New Zealand’s interests. Events like the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China and, more importantly, the Korean War32 kept the United States engaged in East Asia 
and allowed New Zealand to obtain a security guarantee from the US.33 Managing the US 
and UK relationship would dominate New Zealand’s experience of the early Cold War as 
those powers provided the support New Zealand’s interests required.34 The importance of 
these friendly relationships produced a large body of archival material that researchers were 
drawn to. Conversely, New Zealand’s adversarial relationships have been relatively ignored 
by scholars. Writing since the end of the Cold War has highlighted the independence of New 
Zealand’s thinking on foreign policy,35 yet New Zealand’s analysis of China has yet to be 
truly examined against this perspective. While New Zealand’s diplomatic and military 
establishments were small, this thesis will argue they were able to produce independent 
analysis on Chinese intentions. 
The development of New Zealand's diplomatic apparatus,36 the general trends in foreign 
policy,37 the development of alliances,38 and the details of New Zealand's military 
adventures39 are well developed in the literature. However, literature that directly focuses on 
New Zealand's official understanding of China during the Cold War is limited, and is largely 
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in the form of chapters,40 articles,41 and theses.42 Most of the established research 
concentrates on the debate over official recognition of the Communist Government in 
Beijing. Since the mid-1980s political and economic changes in both New Zealand and 
China have prompted a large amount of contemporary and future focused research.43 
However, these works do not try to assess earlier perspectives. 
The cultural and ethnic elements of New Zealand’s relationship with Chinese people 
(especially Chinese-New Zealanders) have been explored in a range of publications.44 
Notable person-to-person links were built and maintained during the Cold War while New 
Zealand had no official relations with the Beijing government. These have attracted the 
attention of some scholars, but this material often lacks an exploration of the New Zealand 
government’s position especially in regards to security policy. The somewhat relaxed 
attitude of the New Zealand Government to New Zealand communists and sinophiles is 
puzzling when compared to the grand strategy employed by Wellington during the Cold 
War. The literature is yet to properly compare these two threads of New Zealand’s 
assessment of China.45 
1.4.1 Contemporary Literature 
The general New Zealand foreign policy literature on the period 1949-1972 can be divided 
between contemporary texts and histories produced since the end of the Cold War. The 
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contemporary security literature is limited in size and says little about the PRC. Hampered 
by limited access to official sources, some, like W.T. Roy, questioned the extent to which 
New Zealand’s policy was simply dictated by Washington, London, and Canberra.46 The 
academic community was small and so research output came in waves as new authors 
emerged. Writers were constrained by a high level of secrecy on the part of the country’s 
diplomatic community. In a 1970 text for high school students Keith Sinclair noted the 
challenges of detailing New Zealand's policy at the time. 
We have little detailed knowledge of New Zealand's role or contributions. 
Diplomats and politicians are usually secretive, and ours unusually and 
unnecessarily so. We have no books like those by the Australians Sir Perry 
Spencer and Sir Alan Watt…47 
As a result of this secrecy, some of the best writing from this period came from senior 
officials who understood the debates occurring inside government.48 Despite the limitations 
of the time, good analysis of New Zealand’s foreign policy did occur. The edited volume 
New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 149 stands out, as does Richard Kennaway’s New 
Zealand Foreign Policy 1951-1971,50 but only the latter provides detailed discussion of New 
Zealand's attitudes to Communist China.51 
Even for the best informed, the level of independence a small country could possess in its 
foreign relations remained an on-going question. Independence can be divided between 
independence of information, independence of analysis, independence of position, and 
independence of action. New Zealand’s independence of action has always been limited by 
its size, but its ability to collect information, generate independent analysis, and take 
independent positions has grown over time and was greater than it may have appeared 
during the Cold War. New Zealand governments had long formed independent opinions on 
international affairs and security within the framework of Empire Defence,52 but the 
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country’s influence on imperial foreign policy was minimal.53 Bennett argued that 
independent positions in foreign policy began in 1935 with the First Labour Government.54 
However, Templeton has argued that genuine external relations only began after Britain’s 
acknowledgement in 1942 that only the US could defend New Zealand from Japan.55  
During the Second World War New Zealand sent envoys to Canberra, Ottawa, Washington, 
and Moscow. These were New Zealand’s first official representatives outside of London and 
the League of Nations and so signified the beginnings of independent representation and 
sources of information. These representations necessitated a much larger and sophisticated 
diplomatic apparatus,56 specially to engage with the challenges of post-war Asia.57 
How quickly the sophistication of that apparatus developed was not easily apparent during 
the early Cold War as governments were sparing in their criticisms of friendly countries. 
The impetus for independent diplomatic relations was the need for new security guarantees 
during and after the Second World War, but once these guarantees had been achieved New 
Zealand’s subservience to its allies came into question. Wood58 and Gordon59 both saw New 
Zealand policy of the late 1940s as having to take much greater notice of Asia than prior to 
the war, but assumed any involvement would be limited by New Zealand’s size. Wood noted 
that New Zealand favoured multilateralism but described this as being at least partially due 
to physical isolation from centres of conflict.  
Western security concerns moved eastward with the Communist victory in China, the start 
of the Korean War, and the emergence of communist insurgencies in South East Asia. These 
events brought security concerns closer to New Zealand’s shores, fostering ANZUS, 
SEATO, and ANZAM. Such initiatives confirmed New Zealand’s support for containing 
communist expansion while solidifying New Zealand’s security guarantee. J.F. Northey 
considered security to be the main driver of New Zealand foreign policy in the early 1950s, 
with Japan still the primary strategic concern.60 Gordon61, Kennaway,62 and later McIntyre63 
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argued that New Zealand and Australia accepted a ‘soft peace’ with Japan in exchange for a 
formal defence agreement with the United States. Communism would be opposed but 
alliances with Asian states were not considered desirable. Enthusiasm for multilateralism 
and the UN was hedged with commitment to the Western Powers and the containment of 
communist expansion.64  
By the early 1950s Wood65 and W.F. Monk66 were seeing New Zealand policy as having to 
balance multilateralist values with the need for greater defence commitments. Both Wood 
and Monk defended the ANZUS pact as part of a struggle to maintain ties with Britain while 
forging new ones with the United States. New Zealand would be best served by the 
continuance of the Anglo-American partnership, with Britain’s decision to recognise Beijing 
in early 195067 an issue of divergence and a concern.68 Monk emphasised New Zealand’s 
fears of communism and a resurgent Japan pushing Wellington into the American camp 
rather than adhering to a universal approach to security. He made the point that while action 
in the Middle East could still have been envisioned without US assistance, any action in the 
Pacific had become unthinkable without American involvement.69 American policy toward 
China was the crucial factor in the maintenance of Pacific security. 
It would be hard to say whether the effect of the Anzus Pact has been to 
decrease or to increase New Zealand's sense of security... In the Two-
Power world pattern there is no place for the individual Japanese 
aggression [sic], in the contemplation of which New Zealanders are still 
apt to be absorbed. Most criticism, therefore, has tended to be misplaced. 
Where, before the Anzus Pact, there was strong criticism on general 
grounds of the MacArthur policies first in Japan and then in Korea, 
including the crossing of the 38th parallel, subsequently similar criticism 
of the Yalu bombings and of the Eisenhower de- neutralization policy 
towards the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Formosa has tended to be linked 
emotionally with the Pact. All such criticism, in any case, springs 
fundamentally from the same motive: not so much from dissatisfaction at 
the supposed commitments and policies associated with the Pact as from 
frustration at New Zealand's and, indeed, everybody else's helplessness to 
deflect the policies of a too-powerful friend - a friend without whom it 
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would be impossible to get on at all, but alongside whom one might one 
day find oneself fighting in a last convulsive Armageddon.70 
With this passage Monk encapsulated the issue of the day. The Cold War had removed the 
threat of Japanese aggression but China and Soviet Union were now serious challenges in 
the Pacific. ANZUS had created a new security dilemma for Wellington as it needed 
American protection but could have little impact on how Washington managed the 
communist threat. Looking back at the 1950s Gordon saw New Zealand ‘totally dependent 
on the good will of the United States’ for its security.71  
Academic interest in New Zealand security policy was renewed in the 1970s as the Vietnam 
War broke down the foreign policy consensus of the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s.72 The 
rapid pace of change in international relations during the early 1970s produced an increase 
in research on foreign and strategic policy in New Zealand.73 However, this scholarship 
would still be hampered by much of the same restrictions as earlier writers. It would not be 
until after the breakdown of ANZUS, the end of the Cold War, and the opening of archives, 
that New Zealand’s Cold War foreign policy could be fairly assessed in light of access to 
government documents.  
1.4.2 Post-Cold War Literature 
Armed with better access to documents, more recent accounts have placed stronger 
emphasis on the ability of New Zealand’s diplomatic apparatus to generate independent 
analysis or at least build this ability during the Cold War period. Malcolm McKinnon’s 
Independence and Foreign Policy explored directly these tensions in New Zealand's 
international relations.74 At the same time, several other texts explored New Zealand’s post-
war diplomatic and strategic efforts.75 These texts provided a depth of detail on foreign 
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policy that had been previously unavailable and showed the strength of the analysis 
generated by New Zealand officials. Unsurprisingly, research has focused on the pressures 
of the alliance relationships or war-fighting as these were the major elements of New 
Zealand’s Cold War experience. This trend has continued into the 21st century.76 
Perspectives on China are largely absent from these texts, although works on cultural and 
people-to-people elements have been produced in recent years and have provided some 
extra context.77 
Post-Cold War authors began to see the early Cold War period as the ‘Search for Security’.78 
In the second half of the 1940s New Zealand remained committed to the concept of 
Commonwealth defence backed with collective security.79 W. David McIntyre’s Background 
to the Anzus Pact devoted a chapter to New Zealand’s strategic planning in the immediate 
post-war period.80 The book not only explored the diplomatic exchanges, it also sought to 
understand the strategies and uncertainties of New Zealand and Australia during the 
formation of the pact. Ian McGibbon’s New Zealand and the Korean War Volume I is similar 
in this regard.81 Like McIntyre, McGibbon brought together the diplomatic, strategic, and 
domestic political elements of New Zealand’s involvement in the Korean War, and this 
thesis tries to do the same with respect to China policy. 
1.4.3 Containment and Forward Defence 
Shared with Australia, Forward Defence was a strategy to permanently forward deploy 
forces in order to defend the air and sea approaches to Australia and New Zealand. Forward 
Defence put forces in the most unstable but still friendly parts of the region to defend those 
parts from communist and anti-Western forces, be they state or non-state based threats. 
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Damon Bristow has argued – without mentioning China – that it was the threat posed by 
Indonesia to its neighbours that brought about Forward Defence and later the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements.82 But as we will see for New Zealand planners in 1965, Communist 
China presented the biggest long term threat to the security of South East Asia, with 
Indonesia determined to be a shorter-term problem.  
The Forward Defence strategy was to a large extent based on the experience of Japan’s rapid 
domination of South East Asia.83 Writing in 1977 Michael Stenson saw Forward Defence as 
a strategy that had long roots in Imperial Defence and racial fears of New Zealand being 
overrun by alien peoples from Asia which almost manifested itself in 1942: 
The Japanese advance to the very borders of Australasia in 1942 played 
out a recurrent nightmare – the irresistible move south of land hungry 
Asian hordes.84  
In Stenson’s view Forward Defence was part of a longer project in containment, one that 
predated Communist China. Prior to the 1950s the ‘containment’ was based on racial fears 
and after the Second World War those fears became more ideological. As Stenson points out, 
these kinds of fears were more on the right of the political spectrum whereas, for those on 
the left, defence lay in collective security arrangements.85 Left-wing views saw Western-led 
containment-based arrangements as a second-best substitute made necessary by the 
deadlock in the UN. Stenson argued that, regardless of ideological differences, ignorance of 
Asia hampered New Zealand thinking on security problems on both sides of the 
parliamentary aisle during the post-war period.86 
During the 1950s, Forward Defence was part of a wider Commonwealth defence effort to 
protect the British colonial possessions of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei. 
Communist insurgency was a significant threat in the 1950s with the mainly ethnic-Chinese 
Malayan Races Liberation Army fighting a significant guerrilla war which lasted until 
1960.87 With the beginnings of independence in 1957 and the formation of Malaysia in 
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1963, the policy shifted to supporting these new states so that they could eventually defend 
themselves from China and communist insurgencies. This goal became more pressing as the 
UK announced its plans to withdraw from the region in 1966. British withdrawal from the 
region challenged New Zealand and Australia’s ability to maintain their Forward Defence 
policies as British bases in Malaysia and Singapore provided the crucial platform for the 
containment of China.  
As noted in the chapters below, the concept of Forward Defence shifted over time. As the 
threat from China began to wane in the late 1960s, the role of New Zealand forces changed 
again. The goal of Forward Defence became less about holding back China and more about 
helping Malaysia and Singapore enhance their own security with benefits in training and 
development for New Zealand forces. Ultimately, the goal was the creation of friendly, 
stable, buffer states between China and Australasia.88 
This thesis argues that Forward Defence was a regional level implementation of George 
Kennan’s policy of containment. Kennan became influential during the Truman 
Administration and his writing became the basis of the American strategy of containment.89 
Kennan’s ideas were broadened with the policy statement NSC-6890 which became the basis 
of American policy towards the Communist powers until the Nixon Administration.91 
Containment aimed to maintain a balance of power which would halt Soviet and Chinese 
expansion while not attempting to ‘roll back’ communist gains in Europe.  
For New Zealand, Forward Defence was based on the same principles articulated by 
Kennan. Chinese power needed to be stopped from spreading further into South East Asia 
and thus potentially threatening Australia. This strategy required the assistance of great 
powers, as New Zealand and Australia could not provide the military effort required to 
contain China. The maintenance of active alliances was crucial to the project. SEATO 
provided the link to the Americans, but it was the British that provided the logistics, 
administration, bases, and that ensured the Australasian presence. Keeping the British and 
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Americans involved in the region was therefore a major goal of New Zealand defence 
policy. 
1.4.4 SEATO 
There have been surprisingly few studies of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation. 
SEATO represented New Zealand’s biggest connection to American military planning for 
South East Asia as ANZUS provided little in the way of military coordination. The Manila 
Pact, as it was also known, was designed to contain Chinese expansion in South East Asia.92 
SEATO created a number of war plans that involved New Zealand. The largest was Plan 4 
which was designed to repel a significant Chinese invasion of South East Asia.93 Having 
only one member on the Asian mainland (Thailand) was problematic in an era of 
decolonisation, especially as the treaty also aimed to protect the non-member ‘protocol 
states’ of Laos and South Vietnam. By the mid-1960s France and Pakistan had effectively 
left the organisation and it slowly faded from relevance as the US acted outside the treaty in 
its pursuit of the Vietnam War.  
Leszek Buszynski’s 1983 SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy, was highly critical of 
SEATO and points to its failure to address Vietnam which led the US to act outside the 
bounds of the treaty in its conduct of the war.94 Mark Pearson’s analysis of New Zealand’s 
involvement in SEATO, Paper Tiger, outlined many of the diplomatic exchanges and 
organisational issues within SEATO, but spent little time on the threat perceptions that 
precipitated its creation. The chapter titled ‘Meeting the Threat (1) New Zealand’s Part in 
SEATO Strategies’ devoted many of its pages to questions of economic assistance but only a 
few to plans for counter-insurgency and scenarios for region-wide conflict with North 
Vietnam or China. Pearson noted that New Zealand was not in a strong position to criticise 
the US defence planners nor was it privy to nuclear targeting information.95 Damien 
Fenton’s To Cage the Red Dragon was less critical of the alliance. Fenton described the 
significant disagreements between the alliance members over the formation of the war 
plans, especially Plan 4.96 
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1.4.5 Confrontation and Vietnam 
Confrontation with Indonesia has received relatively little examination from New Zealand 
scholars. Sukarno’s opposition to the creation of Malaysia led to a policy of Konfrontasi or 
Confrontation from 1963. What resulted was three-and-a-half years of quasi-war where the 
Indonesian army initiated a series of skirmishes and raids with Commonwealth forces in 
Borneo. The conflict ended with Sukarno’s replacement by Suharto in an anti-communist 
coup in September 1965 and this eventually led to the end of Confrontation the following 
year. Christopher Pugsley’s From Emergency to Confrontation tracked the history of New 
Zealand’s involvement in Malaysia from the start of the Malayan Emergency to the end of 
Confrontation. Its focus was squarely on the detail of the conflict on the ground.97 John 
Subritzky’s Confronting Sukarno covered the diplomacy between New Zealand, Australia, 
the UK, and the US during the Confrontation.98 It covered New Zealand’s views and 
positions well. Subritzky noted Holyoake’s unwillingness to spend heavily on defence and 
reluctance to commit significant forces to Asian conflicts, despite pressure from New 
Zealand’s larger allies to do both.99 He also noted that China was the primary security 
concern of New Zealand officials in 1965.100  
Two extensive studies on New Zealand’s role in the Vietnam War have been released in 
recent years. Roberto Rabel’s New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy101 
and Ian McGibbon’s New Zealand's Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment and 
Controversy are good companions as they each look at different aspects of New Zealand’s 
involvement in the conflict.102 McGibbon’s book details the operational and tactical aspects 
of the conflict and writes on the experience of soldiers on the ground. Rabel meanwhile 
explored the diplomatic and domestic politics of New Zealand’s involvement. These two 
books are exhaustive in their detail but also reflect the sharp separation between diplomacy 
and defence in the scholarly literature.  
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While Rabel made the point that New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam was in part due to 
the need for American support for the containment of China,103 this argument was made 
more strongly in David Dickens’ 1995 thesis on official advice to government on the 
Vietnam War.104 While Dickens’ work was focused on Vietnam, it does attempt to look at 
how the war fitted with New Zealand’s wider strategic goals during the period. 
Nevertheless, one of the issues with the existing research is that it looks at New Zealand’s 
military experience in South East Asia in isolation. Rabel,105 Dickens,106 McGibbon107 and 
Pugsley108 have all provided detailed examinations of New Zealand’s involvement in 
Confrontation and Vietnam but their focus on individual conflicts washes out New 
Zealand’s overarching strategy during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Barry Gustafson’s biography of Keith Holyoake, Kiwi Keith, provides several useful 
chapters on the prime minister’s involvement in Forward Defence, Vietnam, and China. 
Importantly it provides a good detail on Holyoake’s attitude and approaches towards these 
problems. It argued Holyoake’s distrust of the vested interests of the military was a reason 
for his reluctance to fully fund the programmes developed by the defence establishment.109 
It also goes into some detail about Holyoake’s reluctance to have New Zealand involved in 
Confrontation and then Vietnam.110 The prime minister’s two-China policy and unsuccessful 
efforts at diplomatic engagement with Beijing also receive considerable attention.111    
1.4.6 NZ-China Literature 
The shift to more nuanced perspectives due to new information is reflected in some of the 
more recent literature on New Zealand’s China policy. New Zealand’s lack of official 
relations with Beijing between 1949 and 1972 provided little publicly available data for 
contemporary researchers to work from. During these years Wellington recognised the 
Nationalist Government in Taipei as the legitimate rulers of China rather than the 
Communists in Beijing. The question of whether to recognise and establish relations with 
the PRC dominated New Zealand's policy debate on China and is reflected in the little direct 
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literature available. The establishment of diplomatic relations is an area where New Zealand 
was able to act independently, although the level of consideration given to the views of 
allies is debated. Moreover, the existing research fails to place the debate in a strategic 
context or compare it with PRC recognition debates of other states. 
The direct academic scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War relationships with the 
communist powers is largely made up of three books. Trapeznik and Fox’s Lenin’s Legacy 
Down Under112 provided Brady’s chapter on China, but mostly focused its attention on the 
Soviet Union.113 Seeing Red, edited by Ian McGibbon and John Crawford, took a broad 
perspective on New Zealand’s Cold War, but did not include a chapter on China.114 Work on 
New Zealand’s Cold War policy toward the PRC is largely represented by a small number of 
theses,115 book chapters,116 articles,117 and conference papers.118  
Several authors have explored the recognition question, but the issue has never been 
explored in a substantial published volume. The earliest work comes from a 1971 Master’s 
thesis by Roy Gordon Shuker119 and a PhD by David John McCraw in 1978.120 McCraw and 
Shuker worked primarily from press statements, speeches and Parliamentary documents, 
and appear to have had little-to-no access to government files. For these writers the creation 
of relations with Beijing was still a live issue. Similarly, Richard Kennaway discussed 
relations with China in a chapter in his book New Zealand Foreign Policy, published after 
Richard Nixon’s Beijing visit but before the incoming Third Labour Government’s decision 
to establish relations at the end of that year.121 In 1988 Beihua Zhang produced a master’s 
thesis that covered New Zealand-Chinese relations from 1792-1988, but again without much 
access to official records.122  
By 1997 many of the files from the 1950s which dealt with recognition of Beijing from the 
Department of External Affairs had been declassified. Taking advantage of this resource, 
Daiman Smith wrote a master’s thesis examining non-recognition by the First Labour and 
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First National Governments.123 Smith’s thesis is the most detailed and well-resourced 
examination of New Zealand’s non-recognition policy. However, his work only examines 
the period to 1957 and is light on the strategic elements of New Zealand’s China policy. 
Unfortunately, a detailed description of Kirk’s decision to recognise and establish relations 
with the PRC is still difficult, as much of the file material is still restricted. Former diplomat 
Gerald Hensley provides some detail in his memoir Final Approaches,124 as does David 
Grant’s biography of Kirk, The Mighty Totara.125 
To a large extent the issue of recognition has been treated separately to the question of 
Beijing's admission to the United Nations. One exception is John Scott’s chapter 
‘Recognising China’ which focuses on Beijing's UN admission.126 It is written from his 
perspective as a participant in New Zealand's UN delegation at the time of Beijing’s 
admission. Writers focusing on other topics127 have mentioned the issue but China’s UN 
representation has been largely ignored by New Zealand authors. However, the recognition 
and UN admission of Beijing were significant issues for Keith Holyoake. In May 1971 the 
prime minister published a pamphlet, New Zealand and China, where he advocated a policy 
of recognising both Beijing and Taiwan.128 
Shuker, Smith, Kennaway, McGibbon, and Zhang all saw New Zealand as having a largely 
negative view of China’s Communist Government during the Cold War. However, in her 
book chapter129 and in an article,130 Anne-Marie Brady has argued that New Zealand’s Cold 
War with China was ‘The War that Never Was’. In Brady’s view New Zealand’s perspective 
on China was largely friendly and non-recognition was purely a function of New Zealand’s 
alliance with the US.131 While this argument is unconvincing in the context of New 
Zealand’s strategic policy, Brady examined elements of New Zealand’s perspective that 
other authors have failed to explore and noted in some detail that Wellington's response to 
communism was not as severe as that of Australia or the United States. 
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While other authors have examined the experience of Chinese in New Zealand prior to the 
Second World War, Brady sought to explore New Zealand’s position based on the 
experiences of influential New Zealanders in China such as Rewi Alley.132 She argued that 
while New Zealand long had policies restricting Chinese emigration to New Zealand, the 
relaxed attitude of various New Zealand Governments to person-to-person contacts shows 
that Wellington did not perceive the PRC as hostile during the Cold War period.133 This 
research demonstrates that Brady’s conclusion does not hold when examined against 
defence policy. Nevertheless, Brady provided a distinct data set providing an important 
counter-narrative about New Zealand’s internal security during the Cold War. 
More recent explorations of New Zealand’s understanding of China have linked the cultural 
elements with the diplomatic, such as Chris Elder’s edited volumes New Zealand's China 
Experience134 and Forty Years On.135 The former book is a wide collection of material 
covering cultural, economic, and political ties with China, but does not include a section on 
the years immediately preceding recognition or the strategic element of New Zealand’s 
experience of China in that time period. Forty Years On examines Sino-New Zealand 
relations since recognition but not before. 
As a whole, the literature on New Zealand’s China policy during the Cold War is notable for 
the narrowness of its treatment of the subject, as recognition dominates the literature.  
However, no author has compared New Zealand’s debates on recognition with those in other 
Western countries, with the exception of Britain which chose to recognise Beijing soon after 
Mao’s victory. Several have pointed out the British decision to recognise China was 
influenced by its significant investments in China and the need to defend the status of Hong 
Kong.136 There is literature on the processes taken towards the recognition of the PRC by 
Australia,137 Canada,138 India,139 the United Kingdom140 and the United States,141 but these 
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texts were not explored by those who have written on New Zealand’s China policy. The 
existing literature has also not examined New Zealand’s decision to recognise the PRC 
against the international law literature on the topic.142 However, there does not appear to 
have been a strong engagement with the details of international law by New Zealand 
officials, as they appear to have taken the approach that recognition was a political rather 
than legal act. This work will not provide a definitive analysis of New Zealand’s decision to 
recognise Beijing but it will provide the strategic policy context for that decision which has 
been missing from the literature. 
1.4.7 New Zealand and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
No specific work on New Zealand’s official views on the Cultural Revolution has been 
found for this research. However, there is significant scholarship on the revolution itself. 
The most prominent writer in the English language is Roderick MacFarquhar whose 
journalism on the revolution was popular amongst New Zealand officials at the time.143 
MacFarquhar went on to write numerous texts including a three volume set on the Origins 
of the Cultural Revolution144 and, more recently, Mao’s Last Revolution.145 Another 
important text is Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen’s examination of Chinese foreign 
policy during the revolution.146 They argued it was a great achievement by the Chinese 
leadership to separate domestic politics from foreign policy in moving to establish relations 
with the West during the revolution, but Sino-American relations did not really improve 
until the ascendency of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s.  
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One place where New Zealand officials witnessed the violence of the Cultural Revolution 
was Hong Kong. The riots there in 1967 have received some examination by scholars, most 
notably by Ray Yep and Robert Bickers in their edited volume May Days in Hong Kong: 
Riot and Emergency in 1967.147 However, all these texts fail to show the extreme confusion 
experienced by Western diplomatic observers, let alone the experience of New Zealand 
officials during this period. 
1.4.8 Cultural Factors 
Whereas the direct literature on New Zealand foreign policy on China in the Cold War is 
relatively limited, there is a wealth of literature on cultural and ethnic aspects of New 
Zealand-Chinese relations.148 This is on top of the literature published by New Zealanders 
on their experiences travelling in China. The most influential and prolific of these being 
Rewi Alley who has 191 publications in the New Zealand National Library.149 
Victoria University Press itself has produced a large volume on Australasian cultural 
perspectives on China.150 This research described a cultural imagination, focused on the 
experience of ethnic Chinese in Australasia, and literary depictions of Chinese people in 
Australasian writing, including a chapter on Australian Cold War fears of China in popular 
culture.151 This thesis will not attempt any major analysis of intercultural aspects of New 
Zealand’s understanding of China as the purpose of the thesis is to understand the opinions 
of policymakers. 
New Zealand’s experience of China during this time also includes stories from individual 
New Zealanders such as Rewi Alley who lived in China and wrote on life in Communist 
China. However, this research has found no evidence that those figures influenced New 
Zealand government policy during the period examined, with the exception of a small 
number of business people trading with China and providing information to the NZ 
Commission in Hong Kong.152 
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 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
Very little high level academic research has been done on New Zealand’s official 
understanding of China between 1965 and 1972, and none that emphasizes the strategic 
elements of New Zealand policy. The work that has been done either had little access to 
official records; did not explore the entire period covered in this research; or ignored the 
wider alliance system. Much of the focus has been on the issue of recognition but none have 
placed recognition in a strategic context. Writing on New Zealand’s cultural relations with 
China and on post-recognition relations is extremely well developed when compared to the 
1965-1972 literature. Defence, alliance, and war literature is well developed but tends to 
avoid discussing China in favour of armed conflict issues in South East Asia or US-NZ 
relations. Similarly, writing on New Zealand individuals who travelled to communist 
countries or espoused communist beliefs lacks a wider strategic or foreign policy context. 
The literature on New Zealand and the Soviet Union is also weak with only two major 
volumes, but this research shows that China was much more important to defence 
policymakers than the Soviet Union during the period examined.153  
This research looks directly at the assessments generated by New Zealand’s diplomatic and 
defence apparatuses. It brings those assessments together to build a picture of what New 
Zealand understood about Beijing’s intentions as an international actor and what influenced 
New Zealand’s outlook on China. The change of opinion on recognition is part of this story 
but the reasons for the change in policy and the forces that influenced New Zealand 
assessments is far more important than the act of recognition itself. New Zealand did not 
possess (like the UK),154 nor (like the US)155 could it build, a large academic and 
bureaucratic base to study states deemed to be threats. This has meant that there is not an 
obvious New Zealand literature on China as a potential threat in the same way that existed 
in the UK or the US. Yet, while New Zealand officials did not have the same capacity to 
collect or analyse intelligence on the communist powers, New Zealand governments 
nevertheless still had to make assessments on these countries as part of a strategy of 
engagements in alliances and multilateral institutions. New Zealand had its own diplomats 
and defence officials who had to make these assessments and then make recommendations 
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to their ministers. Now that most of these files have been released and China is again 
becoming the focus of Asian security, it is timely that the construction of New Zealand's 
Cold War China policy is examined properly. 
 TIME PERIOD 
The time period being examined starts soon after the Ministry of Defence was created 
officially by the Defence Act 1964156 and continues through to Wellington’s official 
recognition of the PRC in 1972. The opening year was chosen as it was the first year that the 
separate Ministry of Defence was in full operation; the start of a new defence review 
process began early that year, and it represented the cross-over of Confrontation and the 
American military build-up in Vietnam. The year 1972 provides a logical end-point for two 
reasons. That year saw the release of the Review of Defence Policy 1972, the first since the 
1966 review which the Ministry of Defence had begun work on in 1965. The 1972 review is 
notable for the dramatic change from the previous review as China was no longer referred to 
as a central threat, Britain and the US were making a military exit from mainland South East 
Asia, and the purpose of New Zealand’s role in South East Asia had changed dramatically. 
The other important event in 1972 is the Third Labour Government establishing official 
relations with Beijing upon entering office at the end of that year. The time period from 
1965 to 1972 therefore represents the peak and fall of New Zealand's Cold War security 
concerns from China. It is also the period that has been least explored by New Zealand 
scholars.  
 METHOD AND SOURCES 
This work uses the historical method. While diplomacy and defence are the subjects of the 
research here, this work is not a diplomatic history in the traditional sense, as that implies a 
transactional relationship which was not present during the period examined. The level of 
government-to-government contact between China and New Zealand was extremely limited. 
For this reason, this work focuses on New Zealand’s perception of China and how New 
Zealand officials assessed the information on the PRC that was available to them. The 
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primary data set for this research is archival material from the Department of External 
Affairs (and its successor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the Ministry of Defence. 
This thesis targets the groups providing information to the Government and forming military 
strategy. While Cabinet made the ultimate decisions on military spending and use of military 
force overseas, senior officials were the ones that designed the detail of New Zealand’s 
foreign and defence policy. The reviews of defence policy were written by senior military 
and civilian officials and then approved (but not always funded) by Cabinet. The defence 
review process provides the best insight into the formulation of New Zealand’s grand 
strategy. The review process involved a reassessment of the assumptions that underlay New 
Zealand defence policy from first principles. Defence reviews involved input from the 
Ministry of Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, External Affairs, and the Joint Intelligence 
Committee. It is this nexus between the military leadership, the civilian bureaucratic 
leadership, and the elected leadership in Cabinet that is important for understanding the full 
complexity of New Zealand strategy.  
The key, newly available, sources are the files relating to the defence review process 
beginning in early 1965 and continuing through 1969. Later defence policy documents have 
been examined but China ceases to be a major factor in defence policy-making from 1969. 
These files provide insight into what these organisations thought the threats to New Zealand 
were and what was necessary to meet them. These files provide important findings about 
official attitudes towards China that were not available publicly before 2012. China is 
identified as the most important long-term threat to New Zealand’s interests between 1965 
and 1968. From this point onwards the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs become more 
important as China policy becomes an issue more for diplomats than defence officials. 
As New Zealand had no official relations with the PRC until 1972, information from China 
was handled by New Zealand posts outside Communist China. The New Zealand 
Commission in Hong Kong was by far the most active China watcher of New Zealand’s 
diplomatic missions. The embassy in Washington and the permanent mission to the United 
Nations were also very active in providing information on China and the China policies of 
New Zealand’s partners, but it was the commission in Hong Kong that provided the clearest 
opinions on events in China. The commission had a good relationship with the British 
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Embassy in Beijing157 which passed on significant amounts of information. Not all the files 
of the commission are available but much of their material can be found in files of other 
missions. 
By bringing together the most recently available archival material this research goes beyond 
New Zealand’s search for security in the Cold War and investigates the assumptions that 
were made about Communist China during this period. This does not mean narrowly 
investigating policy on China, but looking at the wider strategic picture and finding how 
China fitted into New Zealand’s wider grand strategy. Previous research looked at specific 
conflicts or specific alliances. This work improves on previous research by having access to 
previously closed defence files allowing an examination of the broad sweep of New Zealand 
defence strategy and China’s place in it. 
 INTERVIEWS 
A small number of interviews were attempted for this research, but few senior officials from 
this time remain alive and in good health. Those interviews provided no significant 
additional information and have not been included in the text here.  
 ORGANISATIONS EXPLORED 
The defence policymaking process involved a number of organisations that will be explored 
in this work. However, the overall policymaking community was small. Staff were regularly 
seconded between departments and staff from the Ministry of External Affairs often had a 
hand in defence planning at the Ministry of Defence. The role of Assistant Secretary 
(Policy) at the Ministry of Defence was typically held by a staff member from External 
Affairs during the time period being explored in this work. For example, Paul Edmonds and 
Norman Farrell both held this post and both served as New Zealand’s ambassador to South 
Vietnam. Edmonds played a significant role in the creation of the Review of Defence Policy 
1972. Of particular importance is Ralph Mullins who served as both head of the Defence 
Division at the Ministry of External Affairs and as chairman of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee. As the following chapters describe, Mullins was instrumental in shifting the 
defence establishment’s view on China during the late 1960s.  
                                                 
157 During this period, the British diplomatic mission in Beijing is sometimes referred to as a legation rather 
than an embassy as the PRC refused to an exchange of ambassadors with the UK until 1972. However, New 
Zealand and UK diplomats referred to it an embassy prior to 1972, so this thesis will refer to it as such. 
  
38 
 
Despite the close relationship between the two departments, institutional forces and interests 
were major factors. Staff may have worked across departments but the self-interest of the 
individual services, the military as a whole, and the individual civilian departments is still 
evident in their assessments of military need and external threat. The policymaking process 
evolved over time and each defence review was developed differently. Nevertheless, the 
process was typically bottom-up with officials at the Ministry of Defence creating a basic 
outline of New Zealand’s defence needs which was then augmented with intelligence 
assessments, foreign policy goals, the views of the Chiefs of Staff, and then the spending 
needs of the individual services. Once spending needs had been developed they were 
examined by Treasury which had significant influence over the financial implications of the 
reviews.  
The Defence Council was New Zealand’s primary defence policymaking body. It was made 
up of the Minister of Defence (who acted as chair), the Chiefs of Staff (who also had their 
own committee and met regularly), and the Secretary of Defence. The council could co-opt 
other members and this meant the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of the 
Treasury were usually present at Defence Council meetings.158 
More secretive was the Joint Intelligence Committee which provided reports on the military 
threats New Zealand could face over the next few years. There were also Joint Intelligence 
Committees in Australia, Canada, and the UK with whom the New Zealand JIC shared 
information. The British committee was broken into regional bodies with the Far East 
division handling China and New Zealand. The reports of the JIC provide the clearest 
picture of New Zealand’s view of China and the extent to which it was perceived as a threat 
to New Zealand interests. As China changed during the Cultural Revolution so did the JIC 
assessment of the threat. The JIC presented its findings to the Defence Council and while 
the council would not reject findings of the JIC it disagreed with, it would ask for greater 
detail if it found a JIC report contentious. 
Sitting above the Defence Council was the Cabinet Defence Committee which existed as a 
Cabinet sub-committee. Its role in policy and strategy formation was relatively small despite 
having the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister as members. Much of the discussion 
recorded in the CDC relates to confirming elements of the defence reviews or discussing 
defence financing. 
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External Affairs and Treasury were the outside departments with the most influence on 
defence policy. External Affairs provided the foreign policy goals that defence policy was 
required to meet and Treasury would examine the cost of defence expenditure. Occasionally 
these pressures come up against the institutional interests of the military. Much of the time 
in the review process was spent establishing the quantum of the defence vote. 
External Affairs was the primary conduit of information on China. As noted, its commission 
in Hong Kong provided the greatest collector and analyser of information on events in 
China. Other missions provided information in their dealings with their host countries, but 
were less forthcoming with their own opinions than their colleagues in Hong Kong. As 
China policy moved from the military to the diplomatic sphere, External Affairs became the 
lead agency. This became especially important as China entered the UN and Wellington 
moved towards recognition. 
 LIMITATIONS 
As the data set comes primarily from archival material it will have many of the same 
limitations of archival research in general. Much of the file material for the period from the 
Ministry of Defence was declassified in 2012. However, a researcher can never be sure of 
what remains classified, has been destroyed, or was never committed to paper in the first 
place. Many of the Joint Intelligence Committee reports have been declassified either 
individually or as parts of other files, but the minutes of the JIC’s meetings remain 
classified. Similarly, very little from the Joint Intelligence Bureau (the forerunner to the 
National Assessments Bureau) is available publicly at the time of writing. Restrictions also 
exist on files relating to the recognition of China in 1972, but this has not affected the 
quality of the thesis as it is the files covering the previous eight years that provide the real 
context for understanding the decision. 
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2 THE DEFENCE REVIEW PROCESS OF 1965 
 INTRODUCTION 
This conviction that the Chinese and their allies must be shown that they 
cannot win permeates American thinking on negotiations, pauses in their 
bombing activities, dealings with the Viet Cong [sic]. They are determined 
to turn the tide in Vietnam not solely “to prevent South-east Asia going 
Communist” but because they are convinced that the Vietnam war [sic] has 
become the key to the whole global balance of power. If escalation reached 
this point where the Chinese (with 700 million people) intervened with 
massive land forces, the United States (with 190 million people) could not 
be expected to confine its reaction to conventional forces as it had in 
Korea, at a cost of 100,000 casualties.159 – Holyoake's report to cabinet on 
the ANZUS Council meeting 28 June 1965. 
The prospect is therefore for a disturbed and unstable South-east Asia, 
overshadowed by the power of a militant and expansionist Communist 
China which is hostile to our way of life, and at the same time a 
withdrawal of British power from this vital area. The combination of these 
two factors (coupled of course with the major American confrontation with 
Communist power in Vietnam) will present us with defence problems of a 
type we have not had to consider at any previous stage in our history.160 – 
Draft Cabinet Paper, November 1965. 
The end of 1964 saw the culmination of several converging pressures for New Zealand's 
foreign policy makers. These pressures represented both short and long-term problems 
requiring Cabinet to make decisions on the direction of New Zealand's strategic position in 
Asia. The Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation was continuing and the situation in Vietnam 
was worsening. These problems were seen in the context of an increasing risk of limited war 
with China. While the risk of global war was receding, New Zealand was finding itself in a 
position where its defence forces could be fully deployed to conflicts in South East Asia, 
conflicts which could escalate into direct but limited war with China. In December of 1964 
the Defence Council warned that New Zealand could be at war with both Indonesia and 
China within six months.161 Much of the country's military equipment was obsolete and 
there was a new sense of urgency in the upgrading of the services. New Zealand's limited 
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resources necessitated careful decisions on both acquisition and deployment. The defence 
community believed a decision needed to be made quickly as to whether the American effort 
in Vietnam or the defence of Malaysia and Singapore should be the focus of New Zealand's 
efforts.  
Even if escalation did not occur, both conflicts were seen as having longer term implications 
for the containment of China. New Zealand's Forward Defence strategy was dependent on 
British bases in South East Asia. As Britain prepared to draw down its involvement in Asia, 
New Zealand's ability to forward deploy forces in Asia became less secure. New Zealand 
and Australia were not certain their presence would remain welcome in their host nations 
but they were certain China could not be contained without a British or American presence 
on the Asian mainland. Evaporating British interest necessitated greater American 
cooperation with which New Zealand still had little practical experience. This would mean 
support for the endeavour in Vietnam despite reservations about the South Vietnamese 
regime, the risk of Chinese intervention, and the limits of domestic approval.162 The divorce 
of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965 added an extra level of complexity to an 
increasingly difficult situation. The need to keep the British and Americans on the ground in 
South East Asia was reinforced by a lack of confidence in the sustainability of Malaysia and 
Singapore as political units, let alone their ability to defend themselves from Chinese 
Communist aggression or subversion.  
These challenges came just as a single civilian Ministry of Defence was created to oversee 
the planning of New Zealand’s three military services. As part of this reform a complete 
review of defence policy was undertaken. New Zealand's defence policy had already seen 
reviews and white papers in 1957, 1961, and again in 1963. This review would be different. 
While those earlier reviews were essentially white papers reporting on the decisions made 
by Cabinet, this review was to be a complete re-examination of New Zealand's strategic 
outlook and the forces required to meet New Zealand's policy goals. Such a revaluation 
from first principles required the report to be a highly classified New Zealand-eyes-only 
exercise which could be then transformed into a public document justifying the decisions 
once they had been made.163 The classified versions of the review provide a clear 
demonstration of the defence establishment's thinking on the wider strategic environment 
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and future developments to the year 1970. The newly established coordination of the 
defence vote meant that an integrated approach to strategic analysis and defence acquisition 
could be undertaken for the first time. The review began in haste but slowed considerably, 
partly due to the parallel decision to commit forces to Vietnam and partly due to Treasury’s 
opposition to the spending implications of the review. 
Institutional politics would play out in the guise of strategic analysis as the Secretary of 
Defence Jack Hunn argued unsuccessfully for the integration of the three services as part of 
the defence review. Hunn argued against participation in the Vietnam War, seeing the 
conflicts of South East Asia as being driven primarily by the forces of decolonisation rather 
than communist ideology. Such a view led him to make strategic arguments that grossly 
overestimated the future of Chinese power in South East Asia. Hunn favoured a defence 
structure that would emphasise home defence over limited warfare in Asia, yet was still 
capable of assisting major allies in foreign conflicts. Hunn's lack of success in implementing 
his vision stemmed from institutional opposition from the three services but also from the 
easy rebuttal of his strategic arguments. The year would end with a review of defence policy 
that was nearly complete but had been overshadowed by the commitment in Vietnam, the 
opposition of Treasury to the Ministry’s spending requests, and the resignation of Jack 
Hunn. 
 A FRESH DEFENCE REVIEW 
The endeavour that became the Review of Defence Policy 1966 did not begin in optimistic 
circumstances. A review had been planned as part of the merger of the Air, Naval, and Army 
departments,164 but it was made a priority after a Defence Council report which declared 
that New Zealand could be 'at war' with China and/or Indonesia within six months.165 In 
December 1964, the Defence Minister, Dean Eyre, called for a new review including a 
finance programme to be produced for consideration by the Defence Council by February 
1965.166 While the important first draft would appear quickly, the review would take over a 
year, by which time the strategic circumstances had begun to change and the 1966 review 
would become the basis for a period of near constant re-evaluation which lasted into the 
1970s. 
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The process was slowed by disagreements with Treasury and by Cabinet which deferred 
several decisions. Disagreements would also come from within as the chiefs of the three 
services argued with each other over their share of the newly combined defence vote, while 
together they argued with the Secretary of Defence to keep their individual organisational 
independence. Yet, there was largely agreement on the overall strategic situation and the 
centrality of China to that outlook. The bigger challenges were deciding on the force 
structure that would best serve New Zealand’s participation in low intensity conflicts and 
limited wars in South East Asia and how that structure could be financed. 
Fears of escalation in Vietnam or Borneo came as a major modernisation programme was 
being implemented, but this did not represent a major expansion in New Zealand’s 
capability. In December 1964, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice Admiral Peter Phipps, 
warned the Minister that the existing re-equipment programme, which had begun in 1963, 
would bring the services up only to their 'immediate minimum needs'.167 The existing plan 
was to be completed in 1968 and thus there was suddenly a sense of urgency in expanding 
the programme. Phipps argued a crash programme should be avoided, but a new defence 
review was required to try and re-equip the services faster and avoid deferring decisions 
which would create delays.168  
The first draft of the strategic arguments for the review was produced by the Ministry of 
Defence in a little over a week during January 1965. This draft was supplemented with two 
paragraphs by the Joint Intelligence Committee the following month.169 This was more than 
a rough first step in a long process. This early version was designed to be secret statement 
which laid out the threats and pressures faced by New Zealand’s interests and military. This 
highly classified draft then formed the basis of capability planning for the final version of 
the review. The final public statement was, as originally intended, washed of its blunter 
statements of threat.170 Therefore, the January 1965 draft provides a detailed snapshot of the 
views of the new Ministry of Defence and New Zealand’s strategic direction. 
As well as the JIC, the Defence Council, and the Chiefs of Staff would make amendments as 
the review developed. The attempt was to write a review that would see the military through 
to 1970. This time-frame was also the longest the JIC was willing to accept as it felt it was 
impossible to make predictions more than five years out. The JIC pointed to several aspects 
                                                 
167 Chief of Defence Staff to MinDef, 11 December 1964, MoD 1/1/1 Part 1 
168 Chief of Defence Staff to MinDef, 11 December 1964, MoD 1/1/1 Part 1 
169 JIC Meeting, (JIC(65)M.3), 3 February 1965, MoD 1/1/2 Part 1 
170  Hunn, SecDef, to Chiefs, 22 January 1965, MoD 1/1/2 Vol. 1 
  
45 
 
that would have an effect on New Zealand's interests that were difficult to predict: the 
outcome of the Vietnam War, Konfrontasi, the power struggle in Indonesia, and the effect of 
China's scientific developments.171 
Some of the details on the wider strategic picture would be removed before the final draft 
could be given a public release, but the early draft represented the strategic picture that was 
presented to Cabinet and underpinned the force structure recommended to the Defence 
Minister and Treasury. The services all drafted their own reports on the size and shape of the 
forces required and then these were reviewed by the other bodies.172 However, the changes 
recommended by those bodies were fairly minor and the overall assessment did not change 
through the reviews of the draft, as New Zealand's defence community was largely in 
agreement with the overall strategic picture. 
 STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS 
While the objective of the review exercise was a complete reassessment of the assumptions 
of New Zealand's defence, the Ministry was quick to dismiss a radical move away from 
active or passive participation in Western alliances and towards neutrality. Collective 
defence – either through the UN or through Western alliances – had been the basis of the 
bipartisan defence consensus since the end of the Second World War.173 New Zealand was 
not seen as having the population or the industrial base to ever be able to defend itself from 
a power that was capable of crossing the oceans and landing a force on New Zealand shores. 
Associated with the assumption of commitment to collective defence was the assumption 
that communist governments would pose the core security challenge. 
Given the nature of the Communist threat to South East Asia... our 
relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union, and any 
Communist-orientated governments in the area, must at best be wary and 
suspicious and at worst frankly hostile.174  
New Zealand's security would still be obtained through commitment to alliances but the 
focus would remain on South East Asia and not Europe or the Middle East which had been 
part of New Zealand military planning until the early 1950s.175 This was partly due to 
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changes in military technology but it was primarily due to New Zealand's proximity to the 
relative instability of South East Asia. New Zealand's interests were not limited to South 
East Asia, but the South Pacific and Antarctica presented comparatively few challenges.  
Given these core assumptions, the objectives of New Zealand's defence forces were defined 
as: 
 contributing to the security of New Zealand and its territories;  
 to back New Zealand's political objectives through collective security at 
the level of the UN or regional agreements thus allowing small states to 
deter larger aggressors; 
 establishing a claim to protection in the event of a major conflict from 
allies by demonstrating a willingness to assist them in pursing their 
national interests; 
 have the ability to deploy armed force in the South Pacific in situations 
that affect New Zealand's interests but not those of its allies;  
 and ensuring the best use of the limited resources available.176 
By the time of the review the global geo-strategic position was considered stable by the 
Ministry of Defence as the US and the USSR were expected to act carefully in their 
relations. The need for great power stability brought on by the Cuban Missile Crisis had 
reduced risks – if not tensions – in the Western Hemisphere but for officials in Wellington 
this also highlighted the comparative lack of stability in South East Asia. There the forces of 
decolonisation would continue to cause instability and as new powers jostled with one 
another, possibly even causing the breakdown of the bipolar model. 
As the reluctance of the major powers to exercise their full military 
capabilities has become more evident, both the eastern and western blocs 
have shown increasing signs of disintegration. This fact, coupled with the 
emergence of a large number of newly independent states, has given 
secondary powers such as Indonesia the opportunity to become more 
unrestrained in pursuit of their regional ambitions. In consequence there is 
a general trend in the undeveloped areas of the world towards increasing 
diversity and disorder.177 
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Therefore, while the risk of a global conflict involving nuclear weapons was considered 
quite low, the threat of a major 'limited' conflict that necessitated a major military 
contribution by New Zealand was thought to be rising: '[The] possibility that NZ could be 
involved in hostilities requiring the participation of most or all of our defence forces has 
substantially increased.'178 The maintenance of Forward Defence was considered crucial to 
meeting the threats created by this instability. This meant the active and continued 
cooperation of the major Western powers in the region which, in itself, was a challenge to 
the forces of decolonisation. 
While in the period under review there is a risk of loss of the Malaysian 
bases, a development which would make a defence posture forward of the 
Australian mainland almost impossible to sustain; the forward defence 
concept is still viable as the best means of ensuring the effective defence of 
New Zealand during the period up to 1970. However this concept depends 
entirely on the maintenance of a United States presence in mainland South 
East Asia, and a major British commitment in Malaysia. We must take 
every step possible to sustain the resolve of our two major allies to 
maintain these commitments in South East Asia.179 
The draft review had a particularly pessimistic tone. It noted the difficulties in keeping the 
UK and US interested in the region, the short-term challenges of stabilising the new states of 
the region, and the longer term problems of China's growing military strength and the 
pressure of decolonisation pushing New Zealand out of the region. 
Looking beyond the immediate period to 1970, it must be recognized that 
the longer term prospects are similarly darker. There is a real possibility 
that the combined or separate results of Asian Communist pressure and 
Indonesian enmity will virtually bring a completely hostile 'front line' over 
a thousand miles closer to Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, 
either within the five-year period or soon after. Furthermore, well within 
the next ten years it may be expected that our potential enemies, besides 
being closer, will be much more effective in all forms of, at least 
conventional, warfare.180 
Despite the attempt at a clean slate for New Zealand's defence thinking, the basic policy 
goal was only expressed implicitly. New Zealand wanted to avoid all of South East Asia 
being controlled by a hostile power as Japan had achieved between 1942 and 1945. A hostile 
'front line' set at Australia's coast was not acceptable to Wellington. South East Asia 
represented both a buffer and forward platform of operations. New Zealand's defence policy 
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had to preserve both those elements through active participation in conflicts, diplomatic 
efforts with Western and Asian allies, and the development of forces that complimented 
allied efforts while making the best use of New Zealand's limited resources. The extent of 
the effort required by New Zealand would be dependent on the kind of conflict that emerged 
in Asia and consequently making such predictions was a major aspect of the defence review. 
 THE CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT 
New Zealand defence planners divided potential conflicts into three distinct categories: 
global war, limited war, and operations below limited war. Global war was envisioned as a 
conflict that would involve both superpowers in direct conflict with one another in multiple 
theatres across the world. It was assumed that such a conflict would involve the use of 
nuclear weapons, but those weapons would probably not be used against the New Zealand 
area. A limited war would be restricted to the South East Asian region but would involve the 
use of large numbers of conventional forces including naval and air power. Such a conflict 
would be akin to the Korean War but would take into account the technological 
developments since then. A limited war was assumed to involve either PRC or Indonesia as 
North Vietnam was not considered in 1965 to be able to sustain a limited war against the 
US.181 It is unclear whether New Zealand defence planners expected the use of nuclear 
weapons in a limited war in South East Asia but they did not appear to rule out the use of 
nuclear weapons by Western powers in either a tactical or strategic application. It is 
certainly clear that New Zealand's military planners thought it was possible that New 
Zealand could be involved in a nuclear conflict involving China. As a 1966 paper put it: 
Although China will have a limited nuclear capability by 1970, it is 
unlikely that the Chinese will have sufficient means of delivery in this time 
frame to use nuclear weapons in a limited war situation. However, in the 
event of a major Chinese attack in the SEATO area, the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons by our allies remains a possibility, although any decision 
to use nuclear [weapons] will be made at the highest political level. New 
Zealand forces must therefore be capable of operating in a nuclear and 
CW/BW [Chemical Warfare/Biological Warfare] environment.182 
Conflicts below the level of limited war were not categorised as clearly by defence officials. 
They were referred to regularly with terms such as insurgency, subversion, guerrilla warfare 
and, occasionally, terrorism which all seem to be used interchangeably. For the purposes of 
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this research such conflict will be referred to as low intensity warfare. This form of warfare 
implied the avoidance of outright belligerency but it was seen as part of a continuum of 
violence that flowed into limited war as the use of regular military units and heavy weapons 
increased. Despite being poorly defined, it was low intensity conflict that was considered to 
be the type of conflict New Zealand forces were most likely to face from Indonesia, North 
Vietnam, or even China. New Zealand was already involved in this kind of conflict in 
Borneo fighting small units of the Indonesian military involved in the incursions into 
Malaysia.183 However, the conflicts in Vietnam and Malaysia also had the potential to 
escalate and thus require greater participation by New Zealand. Planners felt the upsurge in 
violence in Borneo and Vietnam over the previous two years had greatly increased the 
likelihood that New Zealand could find itself involved in a limited war with China.184 The 
two conflicts were similar in their potential for increased New Zealand participation but 
were treated differently in their connections to New Zealand's interests and New Zealand's 
alliance relationships. 
 INDONESIA AND KONFRONTASI 
Indonesia's policy of confrontation with Malaysia had been running for nearly two years by 
the time of the early drafts of the defence review. Malaysia was home to the Commonwealth 
Strategic Reserve and thus its defence was a priority for New Zealand, Australia, and the 
UK. The emergence of Konfrontasi and its threat of escalation into a high-intensity limited 
war had not been foreseen in the Defence White Paper of 1961.185 By early 1965 planners 
saw little prospect of Indonesia moving away from confrontation with Malaysia, even if a 
change of leadership were to occur in Djakarta. Sukarno's thinking was poorly understood in 
Wellington but officials believed, correctly, that Konfrontasi was driven largely by his need 
to balance the division between the military and the Chinese supported Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI).186 Indonesia’s relationship with the UK was known by planners to 
be extremely poor but the direction of Djakarta’s relationship with China was less clear due 
to the hostility of the Indonesian military to Beijing. Australia's proximity to Indonesia made 
Konfrontasi a priority for Canberra but for Wellington it was an ongoing distraction from the 
longer term threat from China. Thus Indonesia was considered by defence planners to be an 
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extra problem compounding existing problems. Yet in 1965 it seemed like a problem that 
would not go away. New Zealand planners believed Indonesian hostility would remain 
through the period to 1970 regardless of whether the PKI was able to take control of the 
country.  
[Konfrontasi] is a development which could involve New Zealand at any 
time during the period 1965-1970 in either localised fighting requiring the 
sustained employment of NZ units or in full-scale hostilities. Perhaps the 
most serious consequence for NZ defence planning, however, is that NZ 
and her allies in the South-East Asian area may become involved 
simultaneously in hostilities with Indonesia and Communist China.187 
The defence of Malaysia was a problem that affected ANZAM specifically and attracted 
little interest from SEATO or the United States. The threat from Indonesia was compounded 
by the fragility of Malaysia. Wellington planners were not convinced that Malaysia would 
survive as a single political entity to the year 1970, regardless of how much support was 
provided by its ANZAM partners. The breakup of Malaysia was considered a disastrous 
prospect for New Zealand as that would imperil its bases in Malaysia.188 Assuming it was 
possible for Malaysia to survive until at least 1970, the review called for the acceleration of 
Malaysia's integration into ANZAM planning. Malaysia was not considered likely to join 
SEATO but the growth of Malaysian military capabilities into the late 1960s still 
necessitated its closer integration with Commonwealth defence planning with benefits for 
SEATO defensive preparations.189 The development of Malaysia's military into a force that 
could defend itself was the ideal, despite scepticism from New Zealand planners.   
British interests in the Far East were fading as the costs of its global capabilities were 
growing beyond its economic resources, but it remained committed to the defence of 
Malaysia. This declining interest was a major concern to New Zealand planners. British 
disengagement was being limited by residual colonial responsibility for the defence of its 
empire, including New Zealand and Australia, but the UK also remained committed to 
protecting its oil interests in Brunei.190 The US was much less interested in the problems 
faced by Malaysia as it was less receptive to British colonial interests and more concerned 
with preventing the spread of communism. American diplomacy with Indonesia was delicate 
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as Washington had tried to engage with Djakarta while trying not to involve itself in 
Sukarno's post-colonial ambitions.191 Obtaining greater American interest in the security of 
Malaysia and Singapore would be one of the great aims, and great failures, of New Zealand 
policy throughout the Forward Defence era.  
New Zealand planners did not want to see a revitalisation of the concept of Maphilindo – a 
union of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines proposed in 1963 – even if that would help 
bring an end to Konfrontasi.192 If Maphilindo were to be resurrected the Ministry of Defence 
believed it would inevitably become dominated by Indonesia and thus would lead to 
abrogation of the Anglo-Malysian Defence Agreement. Yet Maphilindo was seen as having 
advantages in terms of creating a forum for the resolution of the hostility towards Malaysia 
or even as a future counterweight to China. As it stood Beijing was seen as having an 
incentive to encourage Indonesian hostility toward Malaysia even if Chinese communist and 
Indonesian nationalist interests were unlikely to stay aligned for long. However, both 
Chinese influence and peace driven by Indonesian nationalism would be at the cost of 
Western interests in the region.  
…there is little short-term comfort to the West in speculating whether the 
interests of an expansionist nationalist Indonesia and those of Communist 
China are really compatible in the longer term.193 
If Maphilindo were to re-emerge and was dominated by Djakarta, then New Zealand and 
Australia would likely lose their basing rights in Malaysia and the degree of influence they 
had over Malaysia and the region generally. In short, Malaysia was considered a weak but 
vital ally by Wellington. Its British bases were New Zealand's platform for the containment 
of China which New Zealand had a vital interest in maintaining regardless of the future 
direction of Indonesia-Malaysian relations. The loss of those bases would mean the end of 
Forward Defence.  
It was Britain’s involvement in South East Asia that was the practical basis of Australia and 
New Zealand's military presence in South East Asia. SEATO may have been the 
organisation that coordinated and legitimised New Zealand's part in the containment of 
China, but New Zealand's logistical capacity was almost completely dependent on the other 
ANZAM nations meeting their commitments to SEATO plans. Coordinating with the UK 
                                                 
191 Damien Fenton, To Cage the Red Dragon, NUS Press, Singapore, 2012, p. 225 
192 Draft 'Review of New Zealand Defence policy up to 1970', January 1965, MoD 1/1/2 Part 1 
193 Draft 'Review of New Zealand Defence policy up to 1970', January 1965, MoD 1/1/2 Part 1 
  
52 
 
and Australia was simpler and had direct spin-offs for SEATO planning. The 
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve was therefore not perfectly compatible with SEATO but 
the overlap was significant enough to suit New Zealand. New Zealand's military hardware, 
systems, and personnel easily operated within the CSR framework but the political goals of 
Malaysia and the UK were secondary to the containment of China in the eyes of New 
Zealand planners. As the January draft review noted: 
Up to the Malaysian crisis, the planning done by Britain, Australia and 
New Zealand in ANZAM made excellent military sense in terms of 
coordinating Commonwealth participation in SEATO operations, but 
politically – for Australia and New Zealand at least – its objectives became 
purely secondary to broader SEATO interests.194 
Those broader SEATO interests were the plans that prepared for war with China and/or a 
large-scale communist insurgency. The decline in British military interest in Asia was 
therefore a significant problem for New Zealand's interest in maintaining its place in Asia 
and the containment of China generally. Kronfrontasi presented New Zealand with a strange 
perverse incentive as it had renewed British interest in South East Asia and delayed the 
withdrawal of British forces from the region. Battling Confrontation could be seen as being 
part of New Zealand's general ongoing military assistance to Malaysia although it was not in 
New Zealand’s interest to let the conflict escalate. There was significant pessimism about 
the fight against Confrontation amongst New Zealand officials when compared to their 
British counterparts in discussions in early 1966.195 New Zealand's isolation from Indonesia 
was also a factor when comparing Australia's much greater concern with the immediate 
defence of Papua New Guinea and the Australian mainland. Australia was looking in vain 
for assurances from the US should it find itself in a major conflict with Indonesia.196 
The Confrontation represented one of two serious short-term problems faced by defence 
planners in early 1965.  It was in many ways the easier problem for New Zealand. Indonesia 
did not pose the same threat as China, but it did have the potential to dominate Malaysia and 
force the withdrawal of the Western forces that New Zealand considered necessary for the 
containment of China. Confrontation was a problem shared with New Zealand's two closest 
alliance partners, Australia and the United Kingdom. New Zealand could operate out of 
British bases in Malaysia supported by British and Australian logistical capabilities. Yet 
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Australia and the UK were not New Zealand's ultimate security guarantors. The US had 
shown a consistent lack of interest in Malaysia’s security and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident 
had increased their focus on Vietnam, an area of limited British interest. Despite a decade of 
SEATO planning and the experience of the Second World War, the United States was still, in 
operational terms, a distant ally. The challenge for New Zealand was avoiding being 
dragged awkwardly into two simultaneous conflicts led by different allies. The review 
highlighted this dilemma: 
...the basic dichotomy in our alliances – which we have since 1954 
attempted to overcome by emphasising the essential unity of British and 
American policies in South East Asia – could lead to our being militarily 
involved in two areas at once. In one of these (Malaysia) NZ might have to 
fight alongside her Commonwealth partners with no more than the 
sympathy of our major ally, the United States; in the other (Vietnam, or 
any hostilities arising from escalation there) we might be asked to 
contribute forces where the British, on whose logistic support any NZ 
ground force larger than a battalion would be dependent were not present 
because of their pre-occupations with Malaysia.197 
The challenges would be deciding which of these two conflicts should receive the full 
weight of New Zealand's limited military means, how New Zealand should equip its forces 
for these conflicts, and how to prepare for the longer term threat of limited war with China.  
 THE VIETNAM ESCALATION AND CHINA  
In December 1964 US President Lyndon Johnson renewed the call for a greater New 
Zealand contribution to the Vietnam war.198 This was not unexpected. The aftermath of the 
Gulf of Tonkin Incident made it clear that the US would increase its military commitment to 
Vietnam and that US allies in the region would be asked to contribute combat forces to 
shore up South Vietnam's defence against the conventional and irregular forces of its 
northern neighbour.199 Holyoake's reluctant combat contribution to the Vietnam War would 
be New Zealand’s most controversial decision of the Forward Defence era. However, for 
planners it was a challenge that needed to be balanced against other pressures in the region. 
While public opinion was obviously a major consideration of Cabinet, there were major 
practical, strategic, and financial considerations in deciding on the size and shape of New 
Zealand's participation.  
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When looking at the longer term strategic picture, planners had to question whether the 
American escalation would precipitate a Chinese intervention in the conflict. Planners had a 
highly pessimistic attitude towards the strategic outlook for South Vietnam and Laos, but 
thought it was unlikely, though far from impossible, that China would resort to outright 
belligerency in the period to 1970.200 That is to say they considered the pressure from China 
to be in the form of low intensity warfare rather than limited warfare. Regardless of whether 
limited war with China was to occur, planners saw China as the principle destabilising actor 
in the region.201 
There was significant internal debate amongst senior civil servants, with the majority giving 
cautious support for New Zealand combat participation in Vietnam. Chief among the 
reluctant supporters was Secretary of External Affairs, Alister McIntosh, who argued that a 
failure to take part might result in the withdrawal of American interest in the region.202 At 
the same time, he had little faith in a positive outcome in Vietnam and also warned against 
building too close relations with the ROC as 'sooner or later we have got to sell them down 
the river' to establish better relations with Beijing.203 The New Zealand Ambassador to the 
US, George Laking, also supported greater participation. In late 1964 he saw a significant 
change in US policy and recommended that New Zealand support the internationalisation of 
the war.204 The major opponent was Defence Secretary, Jack Hunn, but others in External 
Affairs and the military leadership had serious misgivings about intervention in Vietnam and 
the desirability of New Zealand’s participation.205 The analysis in the January draft defence 
review shows significant concerns about the risk of the conflict escalating further, thus 
necessitating even greater New Zealand involvement.206  
In early 1965 New Zealand had already made several civilian and non-combat military 
contributions to South Vietnam. A detachment of Royal New Zealand Engineers – dubbed 
New Zealand Army Detachment Vietnam (NEWZAD) – and a surgical team had been in 
South Vietnam since 1963, as the Government had resisted sending combat forces. The 
detachment would be increased in 1965, but in May of that year the government would 
agree to replace them with combat forces in the form of the 161 Battery of the Royal New 
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Zealand Artillery.207 While direct contributions to Vietnam would be small, New Zealand 
still declared a number of forces as part of SEATO planning for a limited war with North 
Vietnam or China. As of 1965 these included 3 frigates (or one cruiser and two frigates), one 
infantry battalion, one infantry brigade group, one medium range transport squadron, and 
one light bomber squadron.208 While New Zealand's commitment to the unilateral American 
escalation in Vietnam was limited, New Zealand remained committed to the SEATO plans 
for wider conflict. The American decision to act unilaterally and not utilise SEATO as the 
conduit (albeit still using its Manila Treaty obligations as causa belli)209 for the escalation in 
South Vietnam, did not seem to concern New Zealand defence planners in early 1965. 
While it was clear that the US would escalate the conflict in Vietnam, less clear was whether 
China would intervene as it had done in the Korean conflict. There was a fear in Wellington 
that the American escalation would provoke direct conflict with China. If the war was 
extended to North Vietnam then there would be significant risks for escalation and Chinese 
intervention.210 Intervention was thought possible in the form of indirect action such as 
improving the Vietnamese People's Air Force, or through increased guerrilla activity in 
Laos. There was a high degree of pessimism in the report. On the future of Vietnam and 
Laos the report was blunt: 'from the viewpoint of New Zealand's interests the outlook in 
Vietnam and Laos is disturbing'.211 Those countries were considered militarily important for 
the defence of Thailand and a US failure in Vietnam would be disastrous to Thai morale and 
the credibility of American and SEATO guarantees. Thailand was the only SEATO member 
on the South East Asian mainland and thus was crucial to the maintenance of the alliance. 
This placed New Zealand in a 'painful dilemma of defence policy'.212 New Zealand had a 
shortage of suitable forces and was reluctant to provide more than token support for 
American activities in Vietnam. Yet a political settlement that favoured the communist states 
would cause increased instability. The most feared possibilities were the hostilities 
envisioned in SEATO Plan 6 (a significant attack by North Vietnam on the rest of 
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Indochina),213 Plan 7 (a major insurgency in South Vietnam), or a limited, high intensity war 
with China along the lines of SEATO Plan 4.214 
While limited war was the unlikely worst case scenario, the Ministry of Defence believed 
that China would continue to exert a significant amount of political pressure on South East 
Asia over the next five years. China's nuclear test in 1964 would be exploited to its full and 
there was little faith that Western nuclear guarantees would be given much credence in 
Asian capitals. However, its nuclear and conventional capabilities would not be advanced to 
the point China could wage 'general war.'215 The pressure would be applied in the form of 
subversion and support for insurgent movements, and China was seen as unlikely to seek to 
initiate a limited war in South East Asia.216 However, limited war was possible through an 
accident or miscalculation. 
China's already formidable military capabilities will also increase 
substantially by 1970, although not to the point where she would be 
capable of engaging in general war. She is unlikely to seek to initiate a 
limited war in South East Asia. It is clear however that in the long term 
Communist China will remain the greatest threat to the security of New 
Zealand and Australia.217 
Pressure from China was not likely, in the view of New Zealand officials, to be affected by 
Sino-Soviet relations. The Sino-Soviet split was thought by the Ministry to be confirmed as 
tensions had continued after Brezhnev's replacement of Khrushchev as Soviet leader.218 
Moscow was seen as treading carefully at the time but its level of influence on Chinese 
behaviour in South East Asia was seen as extremely limited. Beijing and Moscow were 
competing for influence in the region and the Ministry thought Moscow would not be able 
to moderate China’s behaviour. Therefore, the Chinese would not 'be deterred from politico-
military adventures on a scale below the point at which their own national security might be 
endangered by US counter-action'.219 In this view China had significant room to destabilise 
South East Asia without worrying about American response or Russian disapproval.  In this 
sense the Sino-Soviet split had no real effect on New Zealand's security perspective. The 
communist world was no longer seen as monolithic but with New Zealand's security 
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interests so heavily focused on South East Asia, the Chinese threat was pre-eminent and 
Beijing’s disagreement with Moscow made little difference. 
The bleak pictures painted by New Zealand officials in 1965 were not limited to the areas 
around Vietnam. China had become influential in the other parts of Asia as planners saw 
increasing levels of instability in the wider region. Pakistan had effectively removed itself 
from SEATO and developed a close relationship with China as a counterweight to India. 
However, India had not recovered from its defeat by China in the war of 1962 and had not 
been able to establish itself as an alternative leader of Asia. Cambodia was becoming 
increasingly anti-Western and an alliance with China was possible depending on events in 
Vietnam.220 
 THE EFFECT OF ALLIES 
As the smallest of the Western powers with interests in South East Asia, New Zealand was 
completely reliant on its allies to maintain its presence in South East Asia. Cooperation was 
therefore necessary but New Zealand’s small size meant it was particularly susceptible to 
differing interests and approaches amongst its allies. The complex web of defence 
relationships – SEATO, ANZAM, ANZUS, CSR – did not make it easy to reach agreement 
on a course of action. Differing relationships had differing benefits and problems. The 
defence review had to try to predict the future actions of all the major allies and how to best 
place New Zealand within that alliance structure to serve its interests. 
In 1965 New Zealand was still more involved with Commonwealth defence commitments 
than with SEATO. Planning with the US outside of SEATO was limited.221 However, this 
does not mean that the Commonwealth was considered of the greatest strategic importance. 
The Ministry thought ANZUS was the agreement that guaranteed New Zealand security but 
it did not provide New Zealand and Australia any additional input in American defence 
planning. The January draft noted the problem of the detached American attitude. 
ANZUS military planning has in recent years been dormant only, and four 
power planning (with the United Kingdom) has never become a working 
reality. By and large we are left to our bilateral contacts to obtain anything 
more that the American thinking fed into the SEATO planning machine... 
From the American point of view, ANZUS is simply one of the chain of 
alliances, of varying strength and reliability, that the United States 
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maintains around the world... …the ANZUS link is valuable and important 
to NZ simply because it exists, but we cannot take it as either an 
unqualified underwriting of security or (at this time at least) as the 
instrument of working out a detailed basis of defence cooperation with the 
Americans.222 
Unlike ANZUS, SEATO was, despite its limitations, a forum for defence cooperation with 
the United States. Yet, by the mid-1960s SEATO had its problems. Its importance came 
from the fact it was the structure the Americans preferred to use to consult and cooperate 
with allies likely to contribute to a South East Asian war. However, the organisation was 
suffering due to the unofficial defection of France (due to disagreements over American 
policy) and Pakistan (due to closer relations with China). SEATO was facing the difficulty 
of being a military alliance largely made up of Western countries from outside the region, 
something that did not square with anti-colonial sentiment. Despite these problems, it was 
still useful to New Zealand as it both legitimised the Western military presence in the region 
and brought the UK and US together for the containment of China. 
The rather rickety and unreal political superstructure of economic and 
cultural projects erected over the fundamental military guarantees in the 
Treaty should not obscure the usefulness of the latter. Despite the security 
problems within SEATO, it remains the one place in which all the allies 
with whom NZ would be fighting on the mainland of South East Asia are 
undertaking at least partial joint preparation.223 
While New Zealand's interests were most closely aligned to those of Australia, the review 
makes several complaints about Canberra’s attitudes and approaches. Australia was in a 
similar but not identical position to New Zealand. It was also reliant on British and 
American presence in South East Asia to maintain Forward Defence and it also had to 
balance its close but uncertain relationship with the UK against building an active defence 
relationship with the less familiar but more powerful United States. While the basic issues 
were similar, Australia's greater proximity to South East Asia made threats seem more acute 
to Canberra than they may have seemed to Wellington. At the same time New Zealand 
officials did not think the Australians had come to terms with the possibility of having to 
fight on two fronts at once.224 Australia was still committed to only making one major war 
fighting effort in the region. A major problem for better trans-Tasman defence cooperation 
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was Australia's earlier and greater adoption of American military equipment and methods.225 
However, even this did not translate into significantly greater planning opportunities for 
Australia with the US.  
 BALANCING THE TWO CONFLICTS 
While it may have been possible for Australia to fight in two parts of the region at once, for 
Wellington planners it was clear New Zealand could only make a genuine contribution to 
one conflict at a time. This posed the question as to whether a conflict originating from 
Indonesia or North Vietnam would be the priority for New Zealand forces and whether allies 
should be informed of that decision prior to major hostilities breaking out.226 The Joint 
Intelligence Committee was more pointed in its assessment than the Ministry of Defence 
which did not make a clear preference in the January draft. The JIC considered the 
Confrontation likely to continue but not last as long as the threat from China. 
Our present preoccupation with the problems brought about by Indonesian 
confrontation undoubtedly justify a concentration of effort in the short 
term on this area. It is likely that confrontation activity will continue and 
increase in the period [to 1970], and we must be prepared for it to 
continue. It is, however... essentially adventurism, and could be called off 
if circumstances changed inside Indonesia. The long-term threat to the 
security of New Zealand presented by the emergence of Communist China 
will... undoubtedly remain with us for a long time.227  
By the end of February, the Ministry had come to a conclusion on the respective weights of 
these threats in an updated draft with China dominating the threat profile in the longer term. 
...the major and continuing threat to New Zealand's national interests will 
remain the ambitions of Communist China, and this is even more clearly 
the case in the long-term beyond 1970... The general slow deterioration in 
the stability and security of the South-East Asian area during the next five 
years is likely to lead to the increasing involvement of New Zealand in 
commitments ranging from further token contributions to participation in a 
major limited war with China. The most substantial problem in the short-
term, however, is posed by Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia...228 
Since the initiative and tempo of activity are in Indonesian hands, there is a 
real possibility that the Commonwealth may be required to sustain 
indefinitely a level of military effort which will place great strains on our 
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resolution and resources and seriously complicate the long term 
preparation of defences against Chinese pressures.229 
The JIC had made the call that Indonesia was the bigger short-term problem, but that this 
may have a negative effect on New Zealand's ability to both organise its military forces and 
position itself amongst its allies for the best defence against the longer-term threat of war 
with China. The Indonesian threat kept Britain involved in the region but it also meant a 
potentially perpetual state of low intensity conflict with Indonesia and the accompanying 
threat of escalation.  
The ultimate guarantor of NZ's security is privately and publicly 
recognised to be the United States; yet apart from SEATO planning our 
defence coordination with the Americans has barely developed. Similarly, 
it is a political fact of life (although the process is one which our interests 
require NZ should attempt [sic] to slow down as long as possible) that 
British interest and power in South East Asia will steadily decline; yet the 
Malaysian crisis has temporarily reversed this historical process, and 
indeed if NZ is involved in war during the period [to 1970] it could well be 
in conjunction with the British and not with the United States.230 (original 
emphasis) 
Confrontation also created wider problems. Poor relations with Indonesia were beginning to 
have an effect on New Zealand's ability to operate in the region. The South China Sea was 
becoming increasingly unfriendly and a block on New Zealand's air/sea routes. Warships 
and aircraft were already having to go around Indonesia and increased hostilities would pose 
a significant challenge to control of air and sea communication to the area.231 
 THREAT TO THE NEW ZEALAND AREA 
Even though the threat of New Zealand being drawn into one or two major conflicts in Asia 
was growing, the threat to the New Zealand area was seen as decreasing through the decline 
in likelihood of a global conflict. Even in a 'general war' – a global war involving both the 
superpowers, or a similar level conflict involving other powers – the direct threat to New 
Zealand was still considered slight. A small number of submarines laying mines or attacking 
surface ships was the worst the Joint Intelligence Committee expected. Missile firing 
submarines were likely to be reserved for higher value targets than the New Zealand area. 
Attacks from surface ships, aircraft, and land forces were considered impossible while allied 
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nations controlled the sea approaches to New Zealand. In a limited (regional high intensity) 
conflict with Indonesia or China only submarine attacks were considered possible but even 
they were still extremely unlikely.232 
[The] increased possibility of New Zealand being actively engaged with its 
allies in war with Indonesia and Communist China within the next five 
years does not, however, entail any apparent change in the nature of the 
military threat to New Zealand in the period to 1970. Neither China or 
Indonesia will have the means to wage general war in that time. In limited 
war, distance and lack of the necessary means, either alone or together, 
would prevent Indonesia or Communist China from making a direct attack 
upon New Zealand itself.233 
ICBM attacks were considered feasible but extremely unlikely. There was an outside 
possibility that Indonesia could acquire long range aircraft in this time period but the risk of 
attack was again considered to be extremely low.234 Given this low likelihood, the Ministry 
placed little importance on homeland defence. The force structure that was recommended by 
the review would focus on making the best use of New Zealand resources for conflicts in 
Asia and not at home. 
 EQUIPPING THE THREE SERVICES 
With the strategic picture and potential threats described, the review had to build a 
programme to re-equip New Zealand's forces to match the strategic vision that had been 
agreed upon. The review was predicated on the assumptions that alone New Zealand was 
not capable of repelling an invasion from a major power; that the cost of modern weapons 
systems meant that New Zealand was only capable of fulfilling certain roles and equipping 
itself for certain missions; that New Zealand's forces were so close to the minimum level 
viable that any decrease in the size of certain capabilities could force the complete 
elimination of an entire service; and that defence capabilities should focus on those that 
would be useful in the kind of hostilities that New Zealand was envisioned participating 
in.235 A limited war in South East Asia was the greatest likely danger but it was certain that 
New Zealand would receive calls to supply forces for lower intensity conflicts and 
peacekeeping. This meant that New Zealand needed to reshape its forces so that those 
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requests could be met without harming their ability to respond to a major conflict.236 The 
three services prepared their own reports detailing their needs and these were brought 
together by the Defence Council.  
The establishment of a combined Ministry of Defence was designed to remove much of the 
conflict between the services, but this did not mean that the services lost their individual 
identities, nor did it mean that their forces could be built from scratch.  Much of this process 
was a re-evaluation of the upgrade programme that had already begun in 1962. Like the 
strategic problems, the equipment problems were divided into short and long term 
categories. The weight to be placed on these depended on how serious the immediate 
strategic challenges were to become. There were significant deficiencies that needed to be 
addressed if a limited war was to occur in the next five years. If weight was to be placed on 
the longer-term, then emphasis needed to be on creating lower levels of capability which 
could be built on for a conflict that emerged past 1970.237 The combined process still drew 
complaints from the individual services. The Navy238 and the Air Force239 felt their needs 
had not been adequately addressed. Despite their complaints, the process would involve the 
procurement of advanced ships and aircraft, some of which would be still in service at the 
turn of the 21st Century. 
One of the goals of the review was improving the New Zealand logistics capacity to make it 
less reliant on the British. The acquisition of a logistics support ship that could carry stores 
was considered necessary to speed up the deployment time of the Army. Extra support 
would have to come from the US or Australia.240 However, New Zealand was struggling 
with the increasing cost of buying into the Australian logistical system.241 New Zealand's 
isolation from the theatre of conflict stressed resources, as planners had to balance combat 
capabilities with the need for a reliable logistical system that was sustainable as British 
involvement in the region shrank.   
By the mid-1960s New Zealand's military equipment was under significant pressure from 
the need for growth and rapid technological change bringing rapid obsolescence. The 
RNZAF was particularly outdated. During the early 1960s the air force was still operating 
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de Havilland Vampires and Short Sunderlands which were already obsolete. The RNZAF 
was the last remaining user of the Sunderland which was a 1930s design. The English 
Electric Canberra bombers were still useful and it was planned to keep them in service until 
1971/2.242 During the early 1960s the transport role had been provided by DC-6s acquired 
from a defunct Australian airline, Handley Page Hastings, and Bristol Freighters. During the 
1960s the air force received new helicopters, transport planes, long range patrol, and strike 
aircraft. The new purchases would primarily be of American aircraft. Three Lockheed C-
130Hs were purchased in 1965243 and the Lockheed P3 Orions arrived in 1966 replacing 
Short Sunderlands. Confrontation had meant the temporary retention of the DC-6s and the 
Hastings. A further two C-130Hs were already expected to be ordered as the Bristol 
Freighters no longer met the requirements for close air support in jungle conditions.244 By 
the time of the 1965 review the remaining major purchase yet to be decided upon was the 
replacement of the Vampires. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal I.G. Morrison, 
advocated the General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark to replace the Vampires and Canberras but 
accepted that it would be fiscally infeasible until prices fell after the aircraft went into mass 
production.245 
The navy was experiencing significant problems with the shift from a blue water force of six 
Loch-class frigates and one cruiser to a modern all-frigate fleet. The replacement 
programme had begun in the mid-1950s and had suffered long delays. This meant that the 
navy was predicting that it would have a 3-month period between 1966-1967 where it would 
have only two modern frigates available, putting it in breach of its SEATO declarations.246 
The, then, three frigate programme was not sufficient to replace the outgoing ships. To fill 
this need the RNZN recommended leasing a fourth frigate from the Royal Navy and 
ordering a permanent Leander-class replacement.247 The longer term goal was an 
operational fleet of 6 Leander class ships and 6 coastal patrol/mine countermeasure 
vessels.248 The Defence Council agreed to order a fourth frigate with a leased ship in the 
interim, but it did not agree to the six frigate goal. Other capital items agreed to by the 
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Council included four minesweepers (rather than the six requested), a replenishment ship, 
improvements in logistical lift capacity, a new survey tender and research vessel, weapons 
for the Wasp helicopters, and the completion of works projects.249 The Chief of the Naval 
Staff, Rear Admiral R. E. Washbourn, protested at what he saw as the effective reduction of 
the Navy's capabilities, describing a four frigate fleet as 'minimum' and six frigates as 
'highly desirable'.250 
The army was to continue with similar main components: a ground force contribution to the 
CSR; a field force comprised of a Combat Brigade Group and a Logistic Support Group 
designed for major operations in South East Asia and both supported in New Zealand by a 
Reserve Brigade Group; a small unit for Service with UN peacekeeping forces; and a static 
force for command, training, and administration of the army. The strength of the force was 
expected as follows:251 
 
These numbers represented an increase of 100 in the regular force and 1000 in the territorial 
force.252 The UN force was new. The goal was to create a design that allowed the rapid 
enlargement and deployment of the field force in an emergency.  
The army was also in the middle of a long term purchasing programme which had started in 
1958. The review identified a number of areas for further development. The army was to 
receive new helicopters (as part of RNZAF purchases), new equipment for training in New 
Zealand (armoured vehicles, transport, engineering equipment, radios, and weapons), the 
replacement of obsolete and worn out equipment, the development of war reserves, and 
capital projects to improve accommodation. The significant problem for the army was less 
obsolescence as a shortage of professional manpower. The reintroduction of Compulsory 
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  Regular Territorial 
Strategic Reserve   1275  
Field Force     
 Combat Brigade Group 868 5344 
 Logistic Support Group 1150 2420 
 Reserve Brigade Group 54 3080 
UN Ready Force  3 137 
Static Force  3000 19 
Total  6350 11000 
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Military Training had meant no shortages for the territorial force but the government was 
committed to only forward deploying full-time volunteers. While the army was confident it 
could meet its manpower goals by the time new equipment arrived in 1967, its regular 
manpower situation in 1965 'could only be described as unsatisfactory'.253 Recruitment 
would have to be stepped up and the current purchasing programme expanded to be 
completed in 1967 rather than 1968 as had originally been planned.  
The upgrades requested by the three services were the result of the increased threat of war in 
the short term but also due to the pressures of the rapid technological changes that were 
occurring in the 1960s. World War Two-era frigates, 1950s fighters, 1930s patrol planes, and 
a motley array of transport craft were no longer acceptable. The attempt at combined 
planning had achieved a blueprint for the future development of the armed services, despite 
complaints from the RNZAF and the RNZN that they were being under-equipped. However, 
the review process, and its expression of heightened fear of Indonesia and China, expanded 
and accelerated the existing procurement programmes rather than called for radical change. 
While completed in only a few months, the recommendation of the review still had two 
significant obstacles to overcome: the desires of the Secretary of Defence and the opposition 
of Treasury. 
 PERSONAL ASSESSMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE 
Jack Hunn was appointed as the first secretary of the new Ministry of Defence. He had been 
a senior public servant for some time and had already led organisations including the 
Ministry of Maori Affairs, Internal Affairs, and the Public Service Commission. Hunn took 
the position reluctantly as he was concerned that coordinating the three services would not 
involve the freedom he had experienced running other departments.254 Hunn admired the 
Canadian model255 which was moving toward a single service integration during the early 
1960s, but this was not completed until 1968.256 This reform was an economising measure 
by Lester Pearson’s Liberal Government which went much further than the defence reforms 
of Holyoake's government. The amalgamation of New Zealand’s Air, Navy, and Army 
departments made the new Secretary of Defence the most powerful civil servant in charge of 
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the military but, unlike his counterpart in Ottawa, Hunn still had to contend with the 
comparative independence of the services over other government agencies. Hunn's 
challenge to the existing organisational structure would put him odds with the Chiefs of 
Staff on both organisational views and on analytical grounds that centred on differing 
perspectives on China.  
Unlike many other senior officials of the time, Hunn was far less convinced of the need for 
intervention in the conflicts of South East Asia. In April 1964 he warned of the danger of 
New Zealand becoming too involved in the conflicts of Asia, pointing to decolonisation 
rather than communist ideology as the primary drivers of these conflicts.257 In March 1965, 
Hunn offered his own view of the challenges for New Zealand's security and an outline for 
reforming the services in a way that met those challenges given rising costs. It called for 
slow but radical reform and integration of all three services to meet the challenge faced by 
China's rising militarily strength. Hunn's views came from a longer term perspective than 
the official analysis. That perspective was as optimistic about Chinese technological 
development as it was pessimistic about China's territorial ambitions.   
...A retaliatory strike against New Zealand by air or submarine would at 
the moment be within the capability of Russia alone and consequently 
improbable, as she would hardly be disposed to administer it... Ones sees 
China acquiring the same competence, perhaps within ten years, and 
having no scruples about using it. Without [an] radar early warning device 
or anti-missile missiles, our only defence could be maritime air and strike 
air. Even those would be so limited in such circumstances as to be almost 
negligible. The risk of a retaliatory strike is one we probably have to 
accept and try to ward off by our political posture rather than by military 
counter measures. 
In the end New Zealand may have to face an invasion by China herself and 
with auspices much more in favour of China than they were for Japan 23 
years ago. This would be the ultimate test of our defences. The long sea 
and air haul would render an assault on New Zealand unlikely until China 
had taken over Indonesia as she seems destined to do. By the time China is 
ready to think about Australia and New Zealand she may be a regenerate 
“peaceful co-existence” nation like Russia. She may no longer want to 
export Communism for its own sake. Such a change of heart would, 
however, afford us little consolation as she will be forced to expand for 
other reasons. China's prime needs are land, rice and oil. With her vast 
population proliferating at the regions in the course of time. Sooner or later 
she will look covetously at Australia and New Zealand. Then a process of 
intimidation may be our first warning – a demand perhaps for abolition of 
the “white Australia policy” as an offence against “human rights”, and for 
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free immigration into Australia and New Zealand. If political and 
psychological tactics fail she may rattle her rockets preparatory to full-
scale invasion by air and sea.258  
These comments came from a desire to reform the three services into a smaller number of 
combined services such as an air fleet arm, air force paratroopers, or marines.259 However, 
Hunn's strategic assumption was that the future for South East Asia would be one of Chinese 
communist domination and that New Zealand needed to refocus its defence posture to one 
that was of use in home defence – to the extent that would be possible – and would be useful 
to our allies in the meantime. New Zealand's effort would go into defending the approaches 
to the country until the US could come to New Zealand's defence. This vision was opposed 
to the Forward Defence model which prepared for a limited war while trying to make those 
forces as useful in lower intensity operations. Hunn's vision of China was one of an 
expansionist power, but that expansionism was not necessarily driven by its communist 
ideology. Hunn saw China as needing to expand in search of resources as he believed Japan 
had done and as likely to pose a significant threat through its own necessity.  
Hunn's views were not supported by other leaders in the defence community. There was 
opposition to the reorganisation of the services but also to Hunn's strategic logic. The Chief 
of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Leonard W. Thornton, tried to counter Hunn's 
reasoning and calls for reform.260 Thornton pointed out China's military capacity was still 
many years from developing the capability to take South East Asia directly and then 
subduing Australia. Such an invasion of the region would result in major conflicts with the 
SEATO powers including the US and UK. If China prevailed in such a conflict, then no 
amount of domestic effort would prevent New Zealand's domination. The logic of Hunn's 
limited home defence was lost if the US was already unwilling or unable to come to New 
Zealand's rescue. Thornton saw little need for a change of approach unless the alliance 
structures of ANZAM, SEATO, and ANZUS broke down irrevocably and the US retreated 
to isolationist policies. Prudence was on the side of preparation for fighting the limited war 
that would defend the countries between New Zealand and China while maintaining the 
assistance of the allied powers.  
Maintaining the Forward Defence model would preserve the three-service model which 
would come up against significant institutional inertia as each service tried to maintain its 
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own independence. As Thornton was preparing to defend the existing order, he was being 
attacked by the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral R. E. Washbourn, for favouring the 
Army and the Air Force in the current review.261 The three services worked together to 
preserve their own independence which they put to use in arguing for a greater share of the 
defence vote. Hunn had tried to bolster his argument for service integration with a very 
different strategic vision to that which had already been developed by his own ministry. That 
vision was unlikely to win favour with the chiefs or with a naturally cautious government 
that was unlikely to want to renegotiate New Zealand's position in the major alliances that 
had been so carefully built over the previous decade. Despite offering a radically different 
approach to meeting New Zealand's threats, Hunn's alternative demonstrates the level of 
consensus that existed on the role of China as New Zealand's core long-term threat and 
general level of pessimism on China's future power that existed in 1965. 
 FINANCE 
While the review process was quick to highlight extra needs for the armed forces, the 
Cabinet and the Treasury proved less convinced by the need for urgency. New Zealand's 
military spending was limited not just by the country's small size but also by its particularly 
small industrial base and currency controls. All major acquisitions had to be imported with 
precious foreign exchange that became increasingly difficult to spend as American 
equipment replaced British sourced items. Forward Defence was also a drain on foreign 
currency through the need to house large numbers of personnel and their families overseas. 
Increases in defence spending would not just mean the need to economise on other 
government spending, it would mean the reduction in imports generally.  Greater defence 
imports would have to be offset by reductions in the importation of consumer and capital 
goods. Treasury therefore needed to be convinced that the extra spending was warranted and 
Cabinet needed to be convinced that increasing the defence share of imports would be 
politically acceptable to the public. The reluctance of both to commit to the full 
recommendations of the review would slow the review process into 1966. 
The Defence Council understood the difficulty of financing new and American sourced 
products. It argued that new methods of foreign spending needed to be found rather than 
adjusting military expenditure year to year based on the amount of foreign currency 
available. It suggested that the Export-Import Bank be utilised when procuring American 
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equipment and further investigations on how to cut the cost of forces stationed abroad.262 
Cabinet did exactly what Phipps had warned against at the beginning of the review process 
and deferred several decisions on the defence programme. 
Treasury was sceptical of the need for the size of the project and warned that any increase in 
spending for the armed services would necessitate more borrowing or heavy cuts in 
domestic spending and imports. Treasury was already concerned about a balance of 
payments crisis and increases in foreign spending over the rest of the 1960s. Any increase in 
future spending would have to be placed in the context of economic headwinds such as 
British entry into the European Common Market without special dispensation for New 
Zealand exports.263 Defence had asked for £244.5 million in spending for the period 
1965/70, but Treasury proposed two options cutting this to either £204 or £210 million.264 
The Ministry of Defence reacted strongly to the Treasury analysis claiming it would leave 
the armed forces unbalanced, unable to get forces speedily into action and sustain them 
appropriately, and fail to improve the effectiveness of New Zealand's forces over the next 
two or three years.265 It warned that Cabinet needed to make decisions quickly and not 
simply cut parts of the project as any significant cost cutting would require a complete 
redesign of the programme to maintain the best value for money.266 A rescheduling of 
priorities would assist in overcoming the short term 'special problems' of 1965-1967.267 
Hunn later warned the Cabinet Defence Committee that any reduction from the £244.5m 
would be effectively reducing New Zealand's overall defence capability and that if less 
money was allocated then New Zealand would have to reorganise its forces to more modest 
capabilities which would be hard to explain to allies and the public.268 
 THE TACTICAL LEVEL  
The drafts of the defence review identified China as the primary strategic threat but said 
little about China's forces or how it was expected to fight. Much of this detail went into the 
'The NZ Army Concept of Operations 1966-70’ document which was adopted in early 1966. 
It identified the 'Chinese Communist Army' (now referred to as the People's Liberation 
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Army) as the primary adversary.269 The concept of operations assumed New Zealand forces 
would be involved in low intensity to limited warfare which involved the PLA and People's 
Army of Vietnam (PAVN). It considered, like the strategic-level reports, that deliberate overt 
aggression was unlikely but if it did occur, the communist military aim would be the 
conquest or neutralisation and then peaceful takeover of South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Thailand and possibly Burma. Subversion through guerrilla warfare was expected to be the 
primary means of attack but this could be supplemented with conventional forces causing 
the environment to approach limited war. However, the PLA would be limited by the terrain 
which would be difficult for tracked vehicles and thus necessitate a heavy reliance on 
infantry. Such a scenario was still considered unlikely as insurgency alone would be highly 
effective and could be supplemented with small numbers of conventional forces without 
risking a blatant aggression.270 
The PAVN was considered by New Zealand Army officials to be reliant on the PLA for 
logistic support and any combined operations would be conducted in accordance with PLA 
doctrine. It was considered unlikely that the PAVN would initiate open aggression without 
Chinese participation, but if it did then the North Vietnamese would employ similar tactics 
to what was expected from the PLA.271 The geographic limitations on the use of armour 
were noted alongside the fact that the PLA was adequately equipped with artillery. A portion 
of that artillery had greater ranges than New Zealand's equivalent weapons. Nevertheless, 
the PLA was primarily an infantry force with several technical limitations but an abundance 
of manpower. 
Probably the greatest weaknesses of the CCA are obsolescence of 
equipment, production and procurement problems, tenuous logistic support 
and a weak economic, scientific, and technical base. In tactical operations 
there is an apparent inflexibility of its command organisation at the lower 
levels. However, there is some evidence that this being resolved. Its 
greatest asset lies in its huge resources of manpower and consequent 
freedom from the tactical restraints imposed on Western Armies by the 
need to conserve manpower.272 
The concept of operations shows a reasonable understanding of the irregular and semi-
regular forms of warfare practised by Communist China and North Vietnam. The individual 
Chinese or Vietnamese soldier was described as having several positive attributes and 
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considered a formidable opponent. They were described as tough, hardy, fatalistic, able to 
survive on a meagre diet, dedicated to communism, and having great mobility on foot. The 
communist armies were described generally as having the advantage of familiar geography, 
huge manpower resources, a history of success in battle, and having the initiative in 
choosing the area of operations. These advantages were balanced against the lack of reliable 
logistics, limited air and naval support, and a lack of initiative amongst the rank and file.273 
The authors made reference to and demonstrated a basic knowledge of Mao's writing on 
military matters and theories on guerrilla warfare. An example of this is the authors’ belief 
that enemy intelligence would be thorough due to the close contact between the enemy and 
the civilian population.274 
Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia was also addressed in the concept of operations.275 
The concept of operations identified Indonesia's goals as being the fragmentation of 
Malaysia, the removal of Western influence, and the assertion of itself as the leader of anti-
colonialist 'New Emerging Forces'. The New Zealand Army considered overt aggression by 
Indonesia to be unlikely, but confrontation still posed some risk of escalation.276 This seems 
to show a change in attitude from the intelligence assessments from the previous year which 
were more concerned about the chance of escalation. Yet this new view seems to have been 
based on a low estimate of Indonesian military ability, rather than from a belief that 
Indonesian policy had or would change. 
The Indonesians have failed to achieve two essential prerequisites for an 
insurgency campaign – sufficient support from indigenous people and the 
establishment of secure bases within Sarawak/Sabah. Operations have 
been marked by a lack of coordination, poor planning, faulty intelligence, 
inadequate training and sheer inefficiency. Changes in the command 
structure have not produced the desired improvements, and the Indonesians 
seem not to be learning from their various mistakes.277 
Indonesia was not expected to change its aims even if there were a change of government, 
but its tactics could change if it were presented with a viable alternative to confrontation. 
Until then subversion would continue with occasional shallow cross-border raids with forces 
of company strength and deeper raids of platoon strength. 
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The concept of operations mirrored the strategic level analysis on the expected level of New 
Zealand's participation in South East Asia and the overall level of risk of war. It was a 
reminder that despite the small risk of limited war before 1970, New Zealand was likely to 
see greater involvement in the 'military as well as the political problems of the area'.278 The 
expectation of planners was that New Zealand would come into some form of military 
conflict with China even if that conflict was most likely to be at a low level. There seems to 
have been little expectation of a conflict that involved North Vietnam and not Communist 
China. 
 CONCLUSION  
The defence establishment’s internal debates of 1965 demonstrated the centrality of China 
as the dominant long-term threat to New Zealand’s interests. China’s lack of naval power, 
long range bombers, or ICBMs meant China was still not a significant threat to New 
Zealand’s own shores, but it was believed that the threat would grow over time. For the 
moment China was seen as a threat to South East Asia, a danger that would grow as China 
developed. The confrontation with Indonesia was the more immediate problem. New 
Zealand could not afford the loss of Malaysia but officials felt Indonesia’s hostility would 
eventually dissipate leaving China the most significant threat to New Zealand’s core interest 
of defending the emerging states of South East Asia as they made up the land approach to 
Australia. The view of China coming from the Ministry and the chiefs was one of a state 
attempting to maximise its power; China was thought to be seeking to displace Western 
influence in South East Asia and slowly obtaining the capacity to do so. The only significant 
debate was between Hunn, who thought there was little New Zealand could do to contain 
China’s growing power, and the chiefs, who thought Forward Defence was effective in 
ensuring Anglo-American guarantees for the region. 
The review process was initiated by the creation of the Ministry of Defence but accelerated 
by problems of early 1965. What is striking about the review process of 1965 is the 
confidence of the assessments and the structured approach to strategic problems. Distinct 
categories of potential armed conflict were defined and New Zealand’s defence 
commitments provided a structure for making spending choices for the country’s modest 
spending capacity. SEATO was not an ideal alliance, but it provided the basis of practical 
defence engagement with the United States and war planning in case of a significant 
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emergency. Meanwhile ANZAM and the AMDA provided day-to-day planning and logistics 
for New Zealand. New Zealand was reliant on these arrangements with allies to provide any 
form of military assistance to the region. However, any capability gap in these arrangements 
then provided an opportunity for New Zealand to fill the need. 
The year 1965 was a major pinch point between threat and capability. In January 1965 there 
was serious concern that a rapid escalation in Vietnam or Borneo might require the full 
utilisation of New Zealand’s military resources. This combination of threats from North 
Vietnam and Indonesia highlighted the obsolescence of much of New Zealand’s military 
hardware. The RNZAF was still flying pre-World War II maritime patrol aircraft. Its 
Vampire fighters and Canberra bombers were also becoming antiquated at a time when 
military technology was developing rapidly. The RNZN was also suffering a transition to a 
smaller number of more capable but also more expensive ships. The purchase of the first 
Iroquois helicopters occurred in April 1965 and while operated by the RNZAF, the Army 
would be the main beneficiaries of these aircraft.279 These were expensive upgrades, some 
of which had already been planned by the start of the review, but the review highlighted 
their pressing need. The replacement of capital equipment on this scale would not be seen 
again. Many of the new aircraft – the Iroquois, the Hercules, and the Orions – would 
continue to be used well into the 21st century.  
The power of the Treasury should not be ignored. The opposition from Treasury to greater 
spending was significant. Defence spending was difficult for New Zealand due to the lack of 
domestic manufacturing possibilities and therefore the need for foreign exchange. The shift 
to American produced aircraft exacerbated this problem. The Government had a strong 
incentive to ensure that the defence establishment could not run away with its budget. It 
might be possible to argue that the sense of elevated threat that permeated the Review of 
Defence Policy 1966 was self-serving: an attempt by the Ministry and the chiefs to push the 
Government for new greater spending and greater upgrades. However, even if this were the 
case, this card could only be played once. As will be explored below, the brass found it 
impossible to argue for continued heavy spending once the strategic picture changed. While 
always on the lookout for savings, the Government did accept the strategic picture 
developed by officials in the review process and did provide much of the spending 
demanded by the defence establishment. 
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Despite the decision to commit combat troops to Vietnam, the perceived risk that New 
Zealand would need to place significant forces into a war zone declined during 1965. The 
possibility of limited war came to be thought of by officials as unlikely until at least 1970. 
However, lower intensity warfare was thought to be a serious, ongoing, and worsening 
problem. China was thought to support guerrilla groups across the region in order to 
destabilise Western leaning governments. SEATO and Commonwealth forces were trying to 
both deter China from embarking on a high intensity conflict in the region and also stamp 
out low intensity conflict by local groups directed or inspired by Beijing. SEATO alliance's 
protection of South East Asia was therefore seen less as a steel dome and more as a 
colander. A flood of Chinese forces could be defended against but Chinese power could still 
seep through in the form of low intensity conflict. The war in Vietnam, while not directly 
connected to New Zealand’s core interests in Malaysia and Singapore, was seen by officials 
in 1965 as part of that wider containment of China. 
The final version of the review that was released publicly expunged much of the detail of 
the risks and problems faced by defence officials. However, the identification of China as 
New Zealand’s primary long term source of threat remained. Despite the achievement of the 
review and the upgrades that it helped usher in, the strategic situation would soon change 
significantly and the level of uncertainty would continue to increase. Soon the commitment 
of London and Washington to South East Asia would weaken and so too would Wellington’s 
view of Chinese aspirations and capabilities. The entire basis of containment would break 
down and this would reshape, but not break, the concept of Forward Defence. 
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3 SHIFTING ENDS AND MEANS AND PERPETUAL REVIEW 
 INTRODUCTION 
The Review of Defence Policy 1966 was intended to map out the future of New Zealand’s 
defence policy for five years but Cabinet failed to provide the level of funding required to 
implement it, leading the review process to recommence less than two years after the 1966 
review was released. New Zealand’s allies were also changing their positions. Meanwhile 
the Cultural Revolution would have a significant impact on the New Zealand Government’s 
perceptions of China and its policy of containment, an issue which will be explored in depth 
in the next chapter. This chapter will examine the defence review process of 1968 which 
failed to produce a public statement of defence policy. Nevertheless, the review process 
would see New Zealand through a major transformation of its defence role in Asia and the 
assumptions that underpinned that role. 
The combined influences of British withdrawal, American military difficulty in Vietnam, 
and the Cultural Revolution in China, were precipitating the erosion of both the means and 
ends of New Zealand's China strategy. By 1968 the Vietnam War was, for New Zealand 
officials, no longer part of a policy aimed at the wider containment of China, but had 
become a serious problem in itself. Neither side was likely to achieve victory if the US 
remained committed to the conflict, but in 1968 American and New Zealand public support 
for the war began to slide and American military engagement in South East Asia became 
politically and fiscally unsustainable. The US decision to act in Vietnam independently from 
SEATO had mortally wounded the alliance, which was already suffering from the effective 
withdrawal of Pakistan and France. However, it would take several years before 
Wellington’s faith in SEATO had eroded completely. 
In 1966 the UK confirmed that it would no longer maintain a major or permanent military 
presence east of Aden after 1971. This meant the UK would leave its bases in Malaysia and 
Singapore which were utilised by New Zealand and Australia. This decision left New 
Zealand and Australia with only the shaky support of the US as the only remaining major 
Western power committed to containing China in South East Asia. New Zealand and 
Australia would have to decide whether it was feasible or desirable to continue to forward 
deploy forces to South East Asia. This led to a re-examination of New Zealand’s goals in 
South East Asia and a shift in New Zealand’s commitment to containment began to occur. 
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New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy, came to be justified as a means to support regional 
relationships rather than being focused primarily on containing China. These changes were 
part of a reassessment of New Zealand's position on China which allowed for greater 
engagement with Beijing. 
By the late 1960s, the Vietnam War had become for New Zealand policymakers the 
dominant problem in the region.  The United States’ losses in the Vietnam War and their 
withdrawal from mainland South East Asia would undermine the means of New Zealand's 
Forward Defence strategy. While in 1965 officials still saw the war as an extension of 
Beijing's ambitions, by 1968 they would come to view it as a separate problem. In their 
view, the war was expected to continue into the 1970s, but they saw a lower risk of it 
escalating into a region-wide conflict involving China. By 1968 defence planners were 
looking beyond Vietnam to the kinds of conflicts that New Zealand might take part in after 
Vietnam, and those views were beginning to look quite different from the assumptions that 
had driven the Review of Defence Policy 1966. 
All of these issues would drive the new defence review process which was never completed 
as events in Asia began to outpace the ability of the bureaucracy to complete the review 
process. As a result, New Zealand strategy lost a degree of coherence which was evident in 
the 1966 review. Things just became much more difficult with the declining reliance on the 
UK and the US. The review would begin rehashing the same old argument about Forward 
Defence but end with the whole strategy in tatters. 
3.1.1 Vietnam and SEATO 
While New Zealand had gained little direct support from the Americans through SEATO, 
the alliance was still the organisation through which the US had engaged South East Asia. 
Washington's decision to act outside the alliance in its intervention in Vietnam also 
undermined SEATO's usefulness to New Zealand. The alliance had provided a useful 
framework to design New Zealand force structure. Its complex war plans allowed for New 
Zealand to play a specific role that reflected its resources. This meant New Zealand did not 
have to provide a complete military apparatus but could provide elements for the bigger 
containment machine. The CSR provided an extra, day-to-day, framework which kept New 
Zealand operating at the bases in Malaysia and Singapore. The loss of the British support for 
the CSR and SEATO's marginalisation meant that New Zealand no longer had obvious roles 
to fulfil in its Forward Defence mission. Resources had to be redistributed to fill gaps 
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caused by the British withdrawal and new capabilities had to be justified. The defence 
establishment could no longer use New Zealand's SEATO commitments as a guide for its 
force structure. This combined with the British withdrawal meant decisions had to be made 
about the direction and extent of New Zealand participation in Asian security. 
3.1.2 Restarting the Review Process 
Cabinet's refusal to fund the individual elements of the Review of Defence Policy 1966 
brought about the need for a fresh review of defence spending less than two years after the 
previous review had been completed. This new review would have to accept that spending 
would need to be reduced from what had been expected in the 1966 review. When compared 
to that previous review, there was a distinct change in the arguments made for expanding 
and maintaining military capabilities. The dreaded loss of support for containment policies 
from the US and UK made it difficult for the New Zealand defence establishment to argue 
for increases in funding needed to complete the upgrades that had been planned through the 
decade. Treasury was increasingly hostile to financial requests for defence purposes and 
Cabinet became equally reluctant to allow any increase in the defence share of government 
expenditure or GNP. With the marginalisation of SEATO there were no longer convenient 
structures and missions that New Zealand capabilities could be designed to meet. Previously 
New Zealand had a clear threat in the form of Chinese expansionism, a clear planning 
structure in the form of SEATO, an operational structure through the CSR, a domestic 
political consensus on defence, and an ultimate security guarantee in the form of ANZUS. 
The late 1960s would see the breakdown of all of those elements with the exception of 
ANZUS. The increasing unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the rapidly changing 
international political situation, made Cabinet uneasy about increasing defence spending.  
These political and financial challenges came as the New Zealand military had to adjust to 
the increased demands of the British withdrawal. This need to do more with less sparked a 
debate between External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence as to whether New Zealand 
should continue to maintain forces in Malaysia/Singapore past 1971. External Affairs felt 
that New Zealand's effort should be switched to Vietnam, whereas the Defence Council did 
not want to lose its grip on its foreign bases. The debate would be won by Defence which 
eventually secured a place in South East Asia past 1971. Yet by 1969 the rationales for those 
bases and for the Vietnam War had both worn thin. New Zealand and Australia would 
remain in Malaysia/Singapore without the active support of a major Western power. Yet this 
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presence would no longer attempt to be part of the containment of China. New strategies to 
manage China would have to be found.  
 INTER-REVIEW ASSESSMENTS 
The Cultural Revolution increased uncertainty in the region. Defence and External Affairs 
were informed about what was occurring in China by the New Zealand Commission in 
Hong Kong, but officials remained uncertain as to how to respond and on its impact on 
strategic policy. A year into the revolution, in mid-1967, the Defence Planning Committee 
could not see it having an effect on Chinese strategy in South East Asia. 
The main long term threat continues to stem from Communist China 
whose military capability is steadily increasing. The outcome of the 
“cultural revolution” is not yet clear but it is unlikely to affect China's 
external policy which is to expand communism in South East Asia by 
means of subversion and insurgency and to expel Western influence from 
the region... In our view the strategic situation... gives us little cause for 
optimism that New Zealand's military involvement in South East Asia will 
diminish. Indeed there is every likelihood that increased commitments will 
be expected of us. In these circumstances we see no grounds for changing 
the present focus of New Zealand's defence effort.280 
As far the Committee was concerned, the Cultural Revolution would not change China's 
objectives or its methods in South East Asia and thus the need for containment would 
continue.  
The Review of Defence Policy 1966 was underpinned by officials’ belief that New Zealand’s 
interests in South East Asia were coming under greater threat. However, at the same time, 
they accepted that the threat of global war between the Soviet Union and the United States 
had decreased since the 1961 review.281 As a result, New Zealand’s resources were 
concentrated on Forward Defence, with little emphasis placed on home defence. In 
September 1966 the Chief of Naval Staff, John O'C. Ross, challenged this view by arguing 
that the White Paper had underestimated the possibility of hostile submarine activity in New 
Zealand waters. In his view it was only a change in the political climate, rather than a 
change in technical capability, that would result in Soviet submarines being provided to 
China or Indonesia for hostile actions in the New Zealand area. While the Orions and the 
RNZN frigates would provide an anti-submarine capability for this eventuality, enemy 
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submarine activity would pose a significant mine-laying threat. Ross believed that the navy 
needed modern minesweepers to meet the threat of hostile submarine activity in the event of 
China and/or Indonesia obtaining Soviet submarines. He requested that the White Paper be 
amended to include an investigation of obtaining a modern mine-clearing capability.282 Ross' 
objections were not accepted by the Defence Council but they did record his objection in the 
review of home defence.283  
 SINGAPORE/MALAYSIA VS. VIETNAM 
3.3.1 British Defence Review 1966 
The British Defence White Paper of 1966 would have major implications for the direction of 
New Zealand's defence policy. It recommended that Britain withdraw from its permanent 
major military presences east of Aden after 1971.284 Britain's position as a global power had 
been in decline since the Second World War and New Zealand officials were aware that the 
UK was seeking to reduce its role in Asia.285 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson wrote to 
Holyoake in January 1966 outlining the direction of British policy and discussions with the 
Americans.286 The primary focus of the British review was cost cutting. The UK was facing 
an escalating defence budget and a public with a growing distaste for military entanglements 
far from home. Harold Wilson’s Labour government wanted to re-prioritise conventional 
arms over nuclear forces and align political commitments with military resources. This 
would mean significant retrenchment of overstretched British forces as defence spending 
had reached 7% of UK GNP.287 The Wilson government committed to capping defence 
spending at the 1963/4 figure of £2,000 million. This would mean finding savings of £400 
million by 1969/70. Much of these saving would have to come from reducing Britain’s 
overseas military commitments. Commitments east of Aden were to see the heaviest 
reductions but the UK was still mindful of disrupting the American alliance, its commitment 
to Australia and New Zealand, and its ‘residual colonial territories’ in the area.288  
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During 1966 New Zealand officials were deeply concerned about the effect of British 
withdrawal on New Zealand’s ability to maintain Forward Defence. The loss of the 
Malaysian and Singaporean bases would render SEATO’s Plan 4 (countering a Chinese 
invasion of South East Asia) inoperable for New Zealand. New Zealand supported the 
Australian view that Australian bases would be insufficient to maintain the Plan 4 timetable 
or the wider Commonwealth defence concepts. New Zealand would not be able to deploy 
forces into the area under the proposed timetable, unless heavy peacetime stockpiling was 
undertaken in Thailand or the Philippines. Such stockpiling was seen as economically and 
politically difficult.289 In the wake of the British review it seemed that the loss of the bases 
in Malaysia/Singapore was highly likely and this would mean an end to Forward Defence 
and New Zealand’s commitment to SEATO plans and timetables would have to be 
reconsidered.290 
Over the course of 1966 through to 1968 officials had to assess whether it was feasible for 
New Zealand to continue to place its forces in South East Asia. New Zealand needed to 
decide whether it should continue to deploy peacetime forces to Malaysia and Singapore 
beyond the point they could be supported by British forces. In practical terms it would 
depend on whether Malaysia and Singapore would continue to want to host Western forces 
on their territory and whether Australia wished to continue its presence. A New Zealand 
presence was not considered possible or even desirable without Australia. Yet officials still 
had a strong preference for Forward Defence. New Zealand took a back seat in discussions 
over the possibility of basing UK and Australian forces in northern Australia as an 
alternative to Forward Defence, despite British and Australian requests for New Zealand 
involvement.291 While those discussions took place, an Australasian-only presence in South 
East Asia became more feasible as perceptions of the Chinese threat loosened over the same 
period. As the containment of China became less of a priority for the Forward Defence 
project, the need for British support became less critical. 
The British signalling of their intention to withdraw was one of several factors that were 
undermining the New Zealand 1966 review only months after it was completed. The 
Vietnam War had intensified, Confrontation had ended and China's nuclear capabilities had 
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improved. In light of these developments Thornton recommended the Joint Intelligence 
Committee update their position on the strategic situation as part of an effort to review 
defence needs annually.292 By mid-1967 a fresh review of defence was looking necessary 
but was not possible as Wellington was still waiting for a final decision on the future role of 
British forces in Asia. That was expected in July and Wellington would wait for Australian 
and American reactions before making any decisions.293  
The Chiefs of Staff issued a fresh opinion in September once confirmation arrived that 
Britain would withdraw entirely from its bases in Singapore/Malaysia by the mid-1970s.294 
This report looked at New Zealand's options given the loss of British resources. It noted that 
Britain remained committed to SEATO and the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement but 
the nature, size, and timing, of its commitment would change radically. The report predicted 
that from April 1968 the UK would start failing to meet its previous SEATO commitments 
and British logistic and administrative support for New Zealand's contributions to SEATO 
plans would decline. At some point between 1968 and 1973 New Zealand would no longer 
be able to provide its contributions 'in the cheapest possible way'.295  
The Chiefs of Staff favoured a continued presence in Asia. When giving their reasoning, the 
chiefs continued to assume that the Government would look to continue Forward Defence 
provided that Australia continued its support for the policy. 296 They also assumed 
conscription would not be introduced for overseas service. Threats to Australia were argued 
to be the same as for New Zealand. The location of the effort in Malaysia and Singapore 
was also considered important. In September 1967 the chiefs saw control of the Malaysian 
peninsula as the strategically valuable point between the dangers of China and Indonesia. 
Western forces in Malaysia/Singapore were seen as providing a bulkhead preventing 
Chinese communism from advancing south to Indonesia. However, this is a somewhat 
strained argument as geographical contiguousness was not a prerequisite for the spread of 
communism and the Indonesian military's purge of communists had effectively destroyed 
                                                 
292 Thornton (CoDS) to other Chiefs of Staff, 12 January 1967, MoD 1/1/2 Vol 3, Review of Defence Policy 
293 Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, COS/M(67)24, 23 June 1967, MoD 1/1/2 Vol 3, 
Review of Defence Policy 
294 'New Zealand Military Presence in South East Asia', Annex to COS(67)101, 26 September 1967, MoD 
1/1/2 Vol 3, Review of Defence Policy 
295 'New Zealand Military Presence in South East Asia', Annex to COS(67)101, 26 September 1967, MoD 
1/1/2 Vol 3, Review of Defence Policy 
296 'New Zealand Military Presence in South East Asia', Annex to COS(67)101, 26 September 1967, MoD 
1/1/2 Vol 3, Review of Defence Policy 
  
82 
 
the PKI.297 Regardless, the continued instability of the region still allowed for sudden and 
dramatic changes to the political landscape. 
In general terms a threat to Australian security is not perceptibly different 
from a threat to New Zealand, and Australian strategy is thus for all 
practical purposes indistinguishable from our own. It is of vital importance 
to Australia that Indonesia should be contained if it declines to become a 
friendly trading neighbour. It is of importance to Australia that Indonesia 
should remain in friendly hands and be protected from Communist 
pressures from the North. To this extent at least, the land bridge (Singapore 
and Malaysia) has considerable importance to Australia.298 
Unlike their British counterparts, New Zealand defence officials were still pessimistic about 
Indonesia's susceptibility to communism. The need for American support was made stronger 
by the confirmation of the British withdrawal but this need, in New Zealand eyes, was based 
on the threat from China rather than Indonesia. Keeping the Americans involved in South 
East Asia was now crucial to the objective of containment.  
Australia and New Zealand do not have the resources to counter-balance 
the Chicom threat in South East Asia, and need to have an absolute 
guarantee of support from a major power or powers.299 
The problem was that while the UK had directly supported the Australasian effort in 
Malaysia/Singapore, the Americans were at arm’s length. The US effort in the region was in 
Vietnam and while the US approved of the Commonwealth effort it was not committed to 
providing material support for bases in Malaysia/Singapore. The Chiefs of Staff understood 
that while they saw their interests as being largely in sync with Australia's, the interests of 
the UK and US were different. However, these differences were manageable provided that 
those interests overlapped with those of Australasia. 
The objectives of the United States and the United Kingdom in South East 
Asia are not identical one with the other nor with Australasian objectives, 
but this is not significant so long as Allied strategy encompasses our 
requirements.300 
American commitment to the containment of China was seen by the chiefs as encompassing 
Australasian interests but they also believed Australasian commitments would not make any 
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practical difference to American military objectives. Australasian military commitment 
suited American objectives of demonstrating international support for its policies. In the 
eyes of the New Zealand chiefs, the complete abandonment of the Asian mainland by the 
Commonwealth would not be received well in Washington. They believed the US desired 
the 'southern flank' to be protected 'for the re-assurance of Thailand, but also for the 
deterrence of [Chinese] encroachment into Burma and the “insulation” of Indonesia'.301 A 
military vacuum would be considered undesirable and a withdrawal, even to Vietnam, 
would not be supported by the Americans. This argument has an element of wishful thinking 
as New Zealand officials had expressed repeatedly the difficulty in obtaining American 
interest in Malaysia/Singapore. 
Singapore and Malaysia were thought to consider the US an unsuitable substitute for British 
security and did not expect New Zealand and Australia to withdraw along with the UK. The 
hope in Wellington was that regional associations would develop into collective security 
agreements but it was acknowledged that this would take many years.302 There was hope 
that New Zealand and Australia could form a bridge between South East Asia and the US 
and that an Australasian commitment may encourage sustained British interest in the region. 
Regardless, any structures put in place by Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Australia 
were considered insufficient to contain China without US or British support. 
While convinced New Zealand should attempt to continue its Forward Defence policy past 
the British withdrawal, the chiefs were less convinced of the practicality of New Zealand 
maintaining its own forward deployment. The timetable of British withdrawal looked as 
though the New Zealand military would face significant challenges from 1969 onward. In 
September 1967 the chiefs believed that by April 1969 the loss of British logistical support 
would mean the New Zealand Battalion would no longer be able to deploy on SEATO 
operations according to existing plans as the battalion’s readiness would slide from 11 days 
to four months. By April 1970 the British Fleet Far East would no longer provide stocks for 
the support of RNZN frigates and British command and administrative services for the 
battalion would have gone. By April 1971 the British Fleet Far East might no longer be able 
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to support, service, or repair RNZN vessels.303 Additional administrative elements were 
possible but would increase costs. However, sufficient logistical support to enable 
operations outside Singapore and Malaysia were thought to be beyond New Zealand's 
capability. Increased cooperation with Australia could have allowed for peacetime and low 
intensity counter insurgency operations, but wider operations would require American 
logistical support. Australia had nearly completed an agreement with the US for logistical 
support along the lines of what it received for Vietnam operations and it was expected New 
Zealand could do the same. Increasing New Zealand's interoperability with the US and 
Australia would assist in this effort. Thus New Zealand's continued presence in South East 
Asia was dependent on a number of variables: Australian cooperation; Malaysian and 
Singaporean acceptance of Australasian forces stationed on their territory for operations 
around the region; the agreement of all parties that Australasian guarantees of security were 
provided only via regional security agreements in which the US was a major partner; and 
that the US would provide logistical support to Australasian forces operating in the wider 
region or on major operations around Malaysia or Singapore.304 
If these conditions could not be met then, in the opinion of the chiefs, forces should be 
redeployed to American bases in the region. The most obvious destination would be 
Vietnam but this would create difficulties for meeting calls for collective defence in other 
parts of the region. Thailand was also a possibility but New Zealand's obligations to 
Thailand under SEATO Plan 4 or Plan 8 would be executed with difficulty from Thailand 
itself.305 This did not mean that a complete shift to Vietnam would be either cheaper or 
provide a sustainable increase in New Zealand forces to that conflict. Troops in Vietnam 
were paid substantially more than those in Malaysia and were replaced twice as often.306 
Australia and the US were expected to welcome the prospect of a New Zealand battalion to 
assist the Australian Task Force which was hampered by a lack of infantry. However, this 
would require an annual turnover of 1,400 men which was four times the replacement rate 
of the New Zealand Army in South East Asia at the time. Transferring the remaining 580 
men based at Terendak, Malaysia would not be enough. Those men could have been 
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transferred to form a second supplemented infantry company for Vietnam but on expected 
'wastage rates' (through sickness and battle causalities) this would not be able to be 
sustained for more than two years without changes to recruitment rates or the manpower 
ceiling. However, an SAS element could be provided continuously via New Zealand.307 
Despite the possibility of a transfer to Vietnam the first preference for the chiefs was the 
maintenance of a presence in Malaysia and Singapore. In their view forces should only be 
transferred to Vietnam as the ability to support those elements in Malaysia and Singapore 
was lost. No new forces should be added to Vietnam if it were to imperil the Commonwealth 
Strategic Reserve. However, keeping the force on the peninsular would take significant 
negotiations with allies and thus the recommendation was that all options be left open for as 
long as possible.308 
External Affairs was much more sceptical of the value of keeping forces in Malaysia and 
Singapore after the loss of British support. It saw little benefit to a New Zealand military 
presence on the peninsula and proposed that the infantry there be utilised to create 'a more 
effective force' in Vietnam.309 Air and naval forces could remain in Singapore until services 
to support them were lost. External Affairs did not know what the American or Australian 
attitudes would be, but thought the US was unlikely to give material support to New 
Zealand's continued presence in Malaysia and Singapore at the expense of greater 
involvement in Vietnam. It considered the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve to be an 
outdated concept while Defence still saw merit in it even without substantial British 
involvement. The opinion of Defence on the External Affairs assessment was to try and 
avoid making any moves until it was clear whether new support for New Zealand's presence 
on the peninsular could be found. 
Confirmation of the British withdrawal was also confirmation that the containment strategy 
that underpinned New Zealand’s military role in Asia was unsustainable. Confrontation with 
Indonesia had ended but that did not mean Malaysia and Singapore were secure, nor was 
there any guarantee that Australasian forces would be welcome there in the future. With the 
costs of transferring New Zealand’s forces to Vietnam high, the political desirability of such 
a change low, and little desire for a complete abandonment of Forward Defence, there was a 
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high incentive to keep New Zealand forces in Malaysia and Singapore if possible. The 
question remained whether New Zealand and Australia could realistically deter China 
without significant British support. 
 A FRESH REVIEW 
Final decisions on New Zealand's place in Singapore/Malaysia were not rushed, but the need 
to resolve the issue gained fresh impetus with the announcement that the UK would 
withdraw from Singapore/Malaysia by 1971.310 An interim decision on New Zealand's role 
would not come until November 1968,311 but in the meantime another difficult review of 
defence policy would be required to manage costs and the changing environment. In 
February 1968, Holyoake and the Minister of Defence David Thomson312 both 
acknowledged that, while the principles of the 1966 review remained valid, the British 
withdrawal and the pressure on overseas earnings meant that the objectives of the review 
needed reassessment.313  
While there was a working assumption by officials and the Government that the strategic 
situation had not changed, their description of the problems faced in South East Asia had 
evolved considerably. The Vietnam conflict was now identified by the Ministry of Defence 
as the 'greatest threat to security in East Asia'.314 The future of the conflict remained 
uncertain as (probably in reference to the Tet Offence) 'North Vietnam forces [had] 
recovered the military initiative'.315       
With large Soviet and Communist China support [the North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong] seem determined to press this major test of a war of 
national liberation to a conclusion on the battlefield.316 
This signalled a change in attitude to the war from an extension of or proxy for Chinese 
power in South East Asia to a war of national liberation as Hunn had characterised it over 
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two years earlier. While hostility from China was seen as having increased since the 1966 
review, the risk of war was now a problem subordinate to the situation in Vietnam. 
Since [the 1966 review] Communist China has pursued policies designed 
to eliminate other great power interests and to promote regimes similar, or 
at least acceptable to it, in South East Asia. Such policies seem certain to 
continue. Communist China [is] likely to promote its influence by political 
means, including subversion, and by support for “revolutionary wars”. To 
underwrite these policies, Peking seems intent on developing nuclear as 
well as conventional capabilities. Though unlikely, there will always be the 
possibility that Communist China might become involved in major 
hostilities with the United States and its allies in South East Asia, as a 
result of the escalation of the war in Vietnam and less likely in Laos. New 
Zealand will therefore have a continuing interest in planning to meet the 
greatest possible requirement, New Zealand participation in a war 
involving major hostilities with Communist China. Since it is an unlikely 
contingency this should have a lesser priority than the situation in 
Vietnam. It would nevertheless be necessary to maintain, as a mission of 
the armed forces, ability to contribute in the event of major hostilities 
towards collective defence in South East Asia.317 
This represents an uncoupling of the Vietnam War from the problem of Communist Chinese 
expansion argued in the 1966 review. By 1968 the Vietnam War was seen as a separate 
problem that was unlikely to cause a major conflict between the US and China. This report 
suggests the Ministry of Defence saw Vietnam as both the bigger and more immediate 
problem for New Zealand than the risk of a major conflict with China. 
The other reason for the new review was Cabinet's reluctance to approve funding for the 
individual elements of the 1966 review. Defence would not have the financial resources to 
complete the objectives of the 1966 review. The Army Field Force upgrade programme was 
two years behind schedule and being complicated by rapid obsolescence. Combat aircraft to 
replace the Canberras and additional helicopters had yet to be purchased. Logistic support 
needed to be developed due to the British withdrawal.318 The Defence Council asked the 
Cabinet Defence Committee what changes could be made to New Zealand commitments 
given the financial situation.319 
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3.4.1 Rationalising the Needs and Threats 
To assist the CDC a 12-page report was put together by the Ministry of Defence. In this 
report China was still identified as the major strategic threat, although it was put on the 
same level as indigenous communist movements in South East Asia. 
Instability in South East Asia, carrying risks of strategic deterioration and 
escalation into major hostilities must be of concern to New Zealand, since 
the undermining of states in the area by communist movements or the 
establishment of regimes subservient to a militant Communist China 
would pose a threat to the security and national interests of New Zealand 
and, even more directly, to Australia with which our long term security is 
indissolubly linked.320 
Again it was stated that the objectives of the 1966 review had not changed, but the 
disconnect between China and Vietnam was noted. 
In light of the strategic situation, the most pressing requirement will be the 
provision of combat ready forces for South Vietnam, and similar 
emergencies elsewhere in the area. Discussions are continuing on the 
implications of British withdrawal but there are advantages in attempting 
to maintain a modest military presence in Malaysia/Singapore. In addition 
we have to take account of the risk, even though unlikely, of major 
hostilities between Communist China and the United States and its allies. 
Our principal allies plan against such an eventuality and will expect New 
Zealand to be able to contribute to the defence of South East Asia and of 
its sea and air approaches.'321 
In a change from previous reviews, this update of the 1966 review outlined briefly specific 
missions for the armed forces giving them specific priorities and outlined forces required for 
each mission. The four missions for the armed forces were identified in order of importance 
with the threat of 'major hostilities' notably dropping down on the list of priorities. 
1. Most pressing requirement: the provision of combat forces for 
Vietnam and for similar emergencies. 
2. Second most pressing requirement: the maintenance, depending on 
consultations and satisfactory arrangements with allies, of a small military 
presence in Malaysia/Singapore, at least until the British withdrawal. 
3. Lesser priority: the maintenance of a capability to contribute, in the 
event of major hostilities, towards collective defence of South East Asia 
and of its sea and air approaches. 
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4. Continuing need: the maintenance of a capability to contribute to the 
defence of the New Zealand area should this ever be required.322 
The force designed for Vietnam and other similar emergencies was given the highest priority 
and New Zealand's forces needed to be shaped for this kind of conflict and be able to be 
sustained on operations within 'peace-time' budgets. This force would include an infantry 
battalion with light observation helicopters, an RNZAF force of 9 Iroquois utility 
helicopters and 6 Bristol Freighter medium range transports, and a naval force of 6 patrol 
craft.323  
The force designed for major hostilities would involve a range of operational units which 
could respond to a major conflict in a reasonable amount of time. These hostilities were 
imagined to involve countering Communist Chinese aggression in South East Asia. The 
forces designed for Vietnam and similar operations would provide the initial contribution to 
such a conflict until a larger and wider range of forces could be deployed. The initial 
contribution would involve a combat brigade group with an accompanying logistic support 
group; an RNZAF task force comprising of 10 Skyhawks, 15 Sioux and 26 Iroquois 
helicopters, 7 C-130 transports, and supporting units; 3 frigates with another under refit, 3 
Orions forward deployed for air reconnaissance with 2 kept in New Zealand for training, 3 
minesweepers forward deployed with 1 under refit, a logistics support vessel, and naval 
personnel to arm merchant ships.324 
The defence of the New Zealand area would not require any specific extra units or facilities 
but would require separate planning for New Zealand conditions.325 Final decisions were 
still yet to be made on the military presence in Malaysia and Singapore as it still depended 
on forthcoming decisions by Australia and the UK. Any requirements would not be in 
addition to forces designed for Vietnam-style conflicts or major hostilities.326 The 
development of a new logistical supply chain was on going and would be heavily dependent 
on discussions with the US and Australia.327 Manpower would have to increase to cope with 
these priorities. Increases would occur over five years as new or replacement equipment was 
acquired. 
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Manpower 
Requirements:328 
 Navy Army Air Total 
Counter-
Insurgency 
     
 Deployed 
Overseas 
181 1,299 300 1,780 
 Immediate 
Support in NZ 
105 1,400 105 1,610 
 Total 286 2,699 405 3,390 
Major Hostilities      
 Deployed 
Overseas 
1,196 8,425 1,067 10,688 
 Immediate 
Support in NZ 
791 2,950 302 4,043 
 Total 1,987 11,375 1,369 14,731 
 
In addition to these numbers were a small number for defence aid and ancillary national 
tasks, plus 12,357 other personnel for home defence bringing the total to 30,896. Of these 
16,800 would be regular servicemen, 11,170 would be non-regulars, and 2,926 civilians. 
This would require an increase of 2,151 regular servicemen and 75 non-regulars over five 
years.329  
As indicated in the previous review, major purchases would have to be made, some of which 
had already been ordered. For Vietnam style operations these included major equipment 
upgrades for the regular infantry, seven Sioux and nine Iroquois helicopters, new medium 
range transport aircraft, and six naval patrol boats. For 'major hostilities' upgrades would 
consist of major equipment for the combat brigade group and the logistic support group, 
four C-130 transports (two were already expected to arrive at the end of 1968), 27 
observation and 30 utility helicopters, 18 Skyhawks  (14 had already been ordered at this 
point), 2 anti-submarine warfare helicopters (one already planned for the Canterbury), a 
logistic support ship, a fourth frigate (tenders were already accepted), four minesweepers, 
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two inshore survey craft, a survey vessel, four fishery protection vessels, and 20 jet 
trainers.330 
Under this plan defence spending would increase from $117.25 million for the year 1969/70 
to $138.1 million for the year 1971/72 then decrease again to $127 million for the year 
1973/74.331 Thomson concluded the report by pointing to the increasing costs of maintaining 
the same capabilities with only limited improvements, the difficulty in making savings, and 
the difficulty in making reductions given the strategic environment in South East Asia.332 
The Minister took the paper to Cabinet on 12 February 1968.333 There was a clear division 
between Thomson and his Cabinet colleagues over defence spending as the Minister was 
advocating for increased spending when Cabinet had repeatedly deferred spending already 
on approved defence projects. Holyoake had already released a statement on 8 February 
indicating the need for a fresh review of the 1966 white paper given the circumstances.334 
Thomson, Thornton, and (Hunn’s replacement as Secretary of Defence) William Hutchings 
were all calling for an increase in funding and for budgetary certainty. Any review could 
result in a freeze on acquisitions of capital equipment, including those where funding was 
available through United States Export/Import Bank credit arrangements. Thomson believed 
a new review would be a cost cutting exercise and not a proper interpretation of strategic 
changes. He asked Treasury to reassess its preliminary schedule of requirements for the 
1968/69 financial year, as he hoped no drastic reductions would occur until after the 68/69 
departmental allocations were approved. The concern of the Secretary's office (represented 
by RM Mullins) was that uncertainty would cause problems for New Zealand's discussions 
for collective security in the region. The Defence Council saw any review to be a matter of 
urgency which needed to be completed by the Ministry as quickly as possible. 
3.4.2 JIC(NZ)(68)3 
On 9 February the Defence Council agreed that the Ministry of Defence should begin work 
on an urgent review of defence policy. This would allow the Government to make decisions 
as soon as possible and allow it to be prepared for SEATO and ANZUS meetings that 
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April.335 The JIC quickly produced a new strategic assessment for the years '1968-73 and 
beyond'.336 Like previous JIC assessments, it only tried to look five years into the future. 
While the JIC report gave an outline for the entire Asia-Pacific, it focused separately on the 
fortunes of China and the Vietnam War. While acknowledging the turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution, it doubted that there would be any major change in direction for Chinese policy 
in South East Asia. Much more would depend on the outcome of the Vietnam War which 
was not expected to be realised within the next five years. The Chinese would have their 
policies in South East Asia justified if South Vietnam was to fall, but that would only 
happen if the US did not maintain its support for the country. Yet, at the same time, the JIC 
acknowledged that war fatigue had set in and (in a prediction of the Guam Doctrine of the 
following year) the JIC envisioned the US would fall back to an island periphery strategy 
once the conflict had been resolved. The JIC did not seem to have a clear idea how the 
conflict in Vietnam would conclude but hinted that American political resolve could show 
weakness before Hanoi would be willing to compromise.  
3.4.2.1 Fresh Perspectives on China 
The JIC report provides the clearest picture of an official view of the Cultural Revolution 
and the changes occurring in China placed in a context for New Zealand defence planners. 
The situation within Communist China in recent years has been dominated 
by the Cultural Revolution. The divisive and disruptive forces deliberately 
unleashed have rent the fabric of Chinese society, played havoc with the 
central and especially local party and government machinery, checked 
economic growth, and created turmoil and violence.337 
The report also shows a significant change in the attitude towards China's future prospects. 
Its attitude is far from those expressed in 1965 which saw China as a growing power, and 
the JIC was now even farther from the fatalism that had been expressed by Hunn. The JIC 
saw a China that was unlikely to experience any significant growth and would continue to 
struggle with internal conflict. 
We believe that the Cultural Revolution will be continued or revived in 
some form so long as Mao retains his influence. At his death – or even 
conceivably before then, if he carries his policies to the point where they 
jeopardise the regime's cohesion or security – his ideas will have less 
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chance of prevailing against the compelling reasons for more pragmatic 
policies. A successor regime – which is likely in the next five years, and 
almost certain in the next ten – could well represent an alliance of the 
bureaucratic group and the more flexible army leadership. It might review 
many Maoist policies and, moreover, is likely to require a period in which 
to establish itself. While still communist, it could liberalise economic 
policies, especially in agriculture, and attach less importance to ideology. 
Such policies are likely; on the other hand others, even extremist and 
dogmatic policies, are possible. In any event the regime will continue to 
face significant problems in achieving economic progress in the face of 
population increases.338  
The JIC saw the Cultural Revolution as being driven by Mao but, recognising his advancing 
age, they looked to his successors. The prediction of the rise of 'an alliance of the 
bureaucratic group' and the military which would consolidate itself and then initiate liberal 
reforms, proved accurate but on a longer time scale than was being examined by the JIC.  
External policies were not expected to change considerably with the passing of Mao's 
influence. The Cultural Revolution had led to 'aggressive and disruptive conduct' towards 
China's neighbours but Beijing had still been careful not to risk war. A successor regime – 
even a moderate one – was not seen as likely to change China's approach to South East Asia. 
China would still want the elimination of Western and Soviet influence in the region and 
want to promote regimes acceptable to it. However, the JIC did concede that Beijing could 
change its methods in achieving these goals. 'Pragmatism at home would probably be 
paralleled by more flexible policies abroad'.339 If the Vietcong was successful in uniting 
Vietnam under communism then Beijing could be encouraged to support revolutionary 
movements elsewhere but a setback would lead to a reassessment of their military doctrines. 
3.4.2.2 Vietnam and Limited War with China 
The JIC report was prepared in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive where the Viet Cong and 
NVA had demonstrated their ability to launch attacks on over 100 towns and cities across 
South Vietnam.340 Although the offensive was pushed back and caused significant losses for 
the Viet Cong, it demonstrated a failure of the US to defeat communist forces in Indo-China. 
While the JIC report of March 1968 did not make any direct reference to the offensive, it 
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must have influenced the thinking of the committee. During the offensive the New Zealand 
ambassador to Washington, Frank Corner was informed of the 'shock and air of gloom' 
which fell over the US administration.341 Corner noted that New Zealand should prepare 
itself for further requests for a greater military contribution to the war and heard officials say 
for the first time that the US might cut its losses should South Vietnam fail to hold-up to the 
pressure of the offensive. 
The analysis coming out of Wellington was not as grim, but by this point the JIC did believe 
that the Vietnam War had reached a stalemate without either side being able to defeat the 
other militarily. The success of South Vietnam would depend on the willingness of the US to 
continue the war of attrition, and skill on the part of South Vietnamese to continue 
pacification of the country. Hanoi was showing no sign of accepting a negotiated settlement 
that did not reunite the country under its control. If this were to change, then the North 
Vietnamese would have to be convinced their casualties were losing them the war. The 
South Vietnamese Government was thought to remain precarious during the next five years 
and would require the presence or 'ready availability of military forces'.342 Officials 
concluded that war was likely to continue during the next five years. 
Given the stalemate in Vietnam the JIC was not confident of the stability of US policy in 
South East Asia. Regardless of the outcome of the 1968 US federal elections, American 
policy would have to take into account the 'widespread misgivings and significant 
opposition' to the war in Vietnam.343 The future direction could be dovish or hawkish, but 
US public opinion would not permit a simple withdrawal from Vietnam as it would be 
perceived as a communist victory. US policy for the wider region would come under much 
greater scrutiny in the future. The JIC believed the US would continue its containment 
policy to counter China’s ambitions in Asia, but the JIC's alternative theory was much closer 
to the mark.  
United States strategy could... vary significantly according to the outcome 
of the war in Vietnam and the domestic and political scene. We believe 
that, other things being equal [sic], the United States will be reluctant to 
become involved in any further limited war situations on the Asian 
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mainland except in response to an overt attack upon countries with which 
the United States has treaty obligations. We believe further that it will seek 
to confine its activities to providing military equipment, training facilities 
and other aid designed to assist individual governments to defend 
themselves against insurgency and subversion. The United States will be 
reluctant to maintain forces on the Asian mainland and will prefer to fall 
back to the island bases around the rim of the Pacific Ocean.344 
In a major break from previous JIC reports on this topic, this assessment did not attempt to 
outline the likelihood of limited war with China. This was noted in handwriting on the 
Ministry copy of the report345 and would prove contentious within the Defence Council. The 
risk of global war was still mentioned and considered unlikely. Like the assessment of a few 
months prior, it made a clear distinction between the war in Vietnam and the threat posed by 
Chinese policies, with the war no longer seen as Chinese expansionism. The JIC view of 
Chinese policy was now less about seeking domination and more the removal of Western 
and Soviet influence in South East Asia. China was still seen as a supporter and supplier of 
North Vietnam and the JIC believed the outcome of the conflict would still have serious 
ramifications for Sino-Western relations, but the Vietnam War was no longer seen as a 
conflict that could spill over into a major conflict between Western powers and China. This, 
in part, is a change which sees China behaving more like a major nuclear armed power and 
thus more cautious than previously assumed. South East Asia would continue to be 'unstable 
and exposed to subversion and insurgency'.346 Therefore it seems that the JIC had come to 
the implicit conclusion that the region's instability had reached an equilibrium; or to put it 
another way, its instability no longer threatened major hostilities. The region would continue 
to see violence but the perceived risk of escalation into war between the major powers had 
gone.  
3.4.2.3 Cross-Strait Relations 
The cross-strait dispute was considered stable and it was considered very unlikely that the 
PRC or the ROC would initiate any major conflict in the next five years. Greater democracy 
in Taiwan was considered possible after the death of Chiang Kai Shek but the Guomindang 
was likely to retain control of the island. The US would continue to provide a security 
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guarantee to Taiwan but no major threat was likely to emerge over the next five years. Even 
if such a threat did emerge, New Zealand was unlikely to be drawn into a conflict given the 
terms of New Zealand's security arrangements as they were then construed.347 
3.4.2.4 Chinese Nuclear Capabilities 
The JIC believed China would continue to develop nuclear weapons as they provided a 
deterrent against the United States, a claim of great power status, and increased Beijing’s 
ability to intimidate its neighbours. The JIC believed China had already deployed MRBMs 
with fission warheads and a modest force of thermonuclear armed missiles would have 
come online by 1970. These missiles would have a range which included Japan, the 
Philippines, mainland South East Asia, and northern India. Thermonuclear armed ICBMs 
would slowly become operational during the early 1970s and by 1975 a 'limited number' 
would be deployed.348 China's ability to wage nuclear war against the US would not 
necessarily depend on China achieving nuclear parity,349 but the JIC believed China would 
only use nuclear weapons if it were threatened with invasion. The military gap between 
China and either the US or the USSR was so wide that China would not risk a major conflict 
with either country. Its nuclear forces may threaten smaller neighbours but would only be 
used at great risk of retaliation. China's nuclear weapons development then was assumed by 
the JIC to be closely matched with increases in conventional forces to provide greater 
flexibility in its military strategy.350 
3.4.2.5 SEATO and ASEAN 
There was still a little faith left in SEATO by the JIC. The committee believed that the 
alliance would continue with the same level of activity. It was believed that the US would 
continue to support the alliance while still operating independently in South East Asia. 
However, there was more scepticism of intra-regional cooperation. There were signs of 
cooperation in areas other than defence. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) was the most promising organisation, but was unlikely to evolve into a collective 
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security arrangement. Regardless, no grouping of South East Asian nations would be able to 
'constitute a credible defence against Communist China, although it could strengthen 
resistance to insurgency and political pressure'.351 
For the JIC, the British withdrawal would cause serious tensions between Malaysia and 
Singapore. 'They will be left face to face with each other and with Indonesia. They will need 
to readjust themselves, in their external and internal policies, to their new situation'.352 The 
British withdrawal was already causing a re-examination of Singapore and Malaysia’s 
relations with one another and them and the wider region.353 Meanwhile, Indonesia would 
continue to focus on internal security and economic development. Suharto was thought 
likely to stay in power over the next five years. Suharto was still concerned about China and 
unwilling to endanger his Western support, but it was felt his government would eventually 
come into conflict with Indonesia's neighbours as the number of areas of potential conflict 
was too great.354  
Meanwhile, the JIC believed the Soviet Union had continued to improve its relations with 
South East Asia. It had promoted commercial, diplomatic, and cultural ties to the region. Its 
policies were unobtrusive when compared to the 'truculent' attitude of the Chinese. This 
meant that the Soviet Union had gained influence in the JIC’s view and it believed the 
Soviets would continue to gain influence for the next five years.355 
Despite the importance of the Vietnam War to the future direction of the region, it was still 
China that dominated the important final lines of the JIC’s report. 
While prediction beyond 1973 is uncertain, the main features of the current 
situation will continue: Chinese Communist ambitions; instability in 
South-east Asia; United States policy of containment of Communist China; 
and only limited threats in the South Pacific.356 
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3.4.3 Debate in the Defence Council 
The JIC's assessments did not meet a favourable response when the report was distributed to 
the Defence Council. The council was not prepared for the JIC's shift in the way conflict 
was categorised or for the committee's views on the level of threat. The council still saw 
China as posing a significant threat of limited war. The Chief of Air Staff Cameron Turner 
noted the lack of references to limited war and a lack of detail on China's nuclear 
programme. He thought the tone of the JIC report suggested that the situation was 
improving when he believed that it was much less favourable than the JIC's assessment. 
This triggered a discussion in the council on the definition of limited war. The Chief of 
Defence Staff, Leonard Thornton, defined limited war 'as excluding the use of nuclear 
weapons and participation by the Soviet Union'.357 The Council believed that: 
A statement of the likelihood (during the next five years) of limited war in 
South East Asia with Communist China was needed in the paper to enable 
Council to assess whether Government should be advised that this was a 
contingency against which New Zealand should prepare.358 
The Secretary of External Affairs, George Laking,359 was also concerned that the JIC had 
not detailed the risk of Chinese intervention. Laking felt the Vietnam War continued to 
provide a chance of limited war with China. He thought ‘there was a day-to-day possibility 
of Chinese intervention [in South East Asia]’.360  
RM Mullins, the JIC Chairman, responded to the comments by the chiefs saying that the 
committee had tried to avoid using the term limited war and added that the committee 'had 
been tasked with considering “likely situations”'.361  
'If a specific assessment of the possibility of conventional warfare 
involving Communist China was required [,] it could be provided [,] but 
was unlikely to go beyond the comments contained in the previous 
strategic assessment (JIC(NZ)(67)1)'.362  
Mullins said he did not believe that the possibility of renewed confrontation with Indonesia 
needed further investigation. He also stated that he did not see an early settlement of the 
Vietnam conflict. 
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Thornton said that the Defence Council should avoid influencing the JIC but could still ask 
specific questions of the committee. He noted it was the task of the JIC to outline the 
probabilities and the job of the Council to advise the government on how to prepare for 
those eventualities. The Council asked the JIC to revise and expand the assessment for 
1968-73 to take into account the discussion.363 The subsequent revision provided more detail 
on the likelihood of limited war with China. 
While not seeking to initiate limited war, [China] will underwrite [its] 
objectives by the possession of a limited nuclear deterrent and an improved 
conventional capability. It is possible, though unlikely, that Communist 
China might become involved in major hostilities with the United States 
and its allies in which it deploys substantial forces into South-east Asia, as 
a result of the escalation of the situation in Vietnam and, less likely, Laos. 
In the unlikely event of [a] United States invasion of North Vietnam, 
Communist China would substantially increase its direct involvement in 
the Vietnam conflict and, in the event of operations in the Red River Delta, 
would intervene in strength. We believe, however, that Communist China 
will continue to be cautious about a clash with the United States and seek 
to promote its objectives by support for indigenous communist and anti-
western forces.364 
The members of the Defence Council were still not completely happy with the new revision. 
Mullins explained that the JIC wanted to avoid the term 'limited war' as it could be 
interpreted a number of ways. He agreed with the council that 'major hostilities' could be 
replaced with the words 'overt and direct military engagement'.365 Thornton was also critical 
of the assessment’s view on how long it could be until Confrontation could reoccur. Mullins 
agreed that it was possible beyond 1973. 
3.4.4 External Affairs and Foreign Policy Goals 
The next step would be for the council to have the Secretary of External Affairs outline the 
priorities for New Zealand's defence objectives in terms of New Zealand's foreign policy. 
Thornton believed the Strategic Outlook Paper established the need for the following 
military activities: 
A) Continuing military assistance to Vietnam 
B) Continuing military presence in Malaysia and Singapore 
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C) The provision of 'on call' forces to meet SEATO commitments to 
the level of counter-insurgency – This would mean being able to 
provide assistance to Thailand if requested. 
D) Depending on findings of the Strategic Outlook Paper: the need 
to contribute forces in the event of limited war. 
E) Small scale military aid to the Pacific.366 
The paper developed by External Affairs for the Defence Council outlined New Zealand's 
national defence objectives and the current strategic requirements. The national defence 
objectives had not changed from previous statements and still included vague objectives 
such as 'the preservation of security and national interests'; the maintenance of security and 
stability of allies; material backing for collective defence; willingness to make efforts to 
support the national interests of allies (and thus make a claim for a voice in important 
decisions); and to maintain the commitment of the US and – to the extent possible – the UK 
to the security of areas of 'primary strategic concern to New Zealand'.367 External Affairs 
expressed the view that the size and nature of New Zealand forces should be related to the 
missions of: maintaining the ability to deploy into the Pacific in situations that relate to New 
Zealand's national interest primarily; contributing to vital air and sea communications; 
contributing to the security of friendly countries in the areas of primary strategic importance 
to New Zealand; maintaining standby forces to assist the UN or NZ defence partners; and 
contributing to the general deterrent effect of Western forces.368 With the possible exception 
of Western deterrence, these goals are largely consistent with New Zealand's defence 
objectives today.369 
While these objectives had remained fairly consistent, External Affairs acknowledged that 
the external environment had changed over the previous three years and so too had the effect 
that change would have on New Zealand's defence requirements. The department's opinion 
neatly summed up the relationship between the Vietnam War and the larger objective of 
Chinese containment. 
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Since the Defence Council report 1/65, the United States and its allies have 
introduced substantial combat forces into Vietnam and the war has taken 
on a new dimension. The JIC report notes, and this Department agrees, that 
in several respects the Vietnam war is of critical importance to the future: 
it will have a significant effect on the development of Chinese communist 
policy generally, in the area; it will almost certainly determine the course 
of developments in Cambodia and Laos; it will profoundly affect the 
situation in other South East Asian countries; it will affect the policy of 
major powers outside South East Asia, both friendly and unfriendly; and 
its outcome will profoundly influence the United States policy (whether, 
for instance, the United States maintains forces in mainland South East 
Asia).370 
External Affairs also noted the effect of British withdrawal on logistics, the 'radical' changes 
in Indonesia, setbacks in UN peacekeeping, and the diminished importance of SEATO due 
to independent American actions, and the decline in British, French, and Pakistani 
participation.371 
The conclusions reached by External Affairs had implications for Vietnam, Chinese 
containment, Malaysia/Singapore, the Pacific, and peacekeeping. The need to provide 
combat forces for operations in Vietnam or a similar emergency had become of greater 
importance over the previous three years. A capability for a larger contribution to a 'greater 
emergency' involving a Chinese attack on South East Asia – specifically SEATO Plan 4 – 
was desirable but it was of lesser priority to Vietnam type activities.372 The department was 
much less convinced of the need for a continued New Zealand presence in Malaysia and 
Singapore than the Ministry of Defence and the chiefs. External Affairs thought such a 
presence should only be considered in conjunction with Australia and with the cooperation 
of Malaysia/Singapore. It would also need the understanding, if not the underwriting, of the 
US. The department warned of costs in 'men, money and political and military risk' that 
needed to be balanced against the value of any contribution to South East Asian security,373 
the benefits of which would depend on the terms of any agreement which replaced the 
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AMDA and the level of freedom New Zealand forces would have to operate in the wider 
region.374 
Thornton questioned the relative importance of the goals outlined in the External Affairs 
paper. He wondered whether a Plan 4 scenario was really of lesser importance than the 
Vietnam commitment. The Chief of Defence Staff put it that greater resources would be 
required for Plan 4 operations over the longer term. 
In this respect it could be accepted that New Zealand, in common with its 
major allies, would not wish to “place everything in the shop window”. 
She should have the capacity to make an effective contribution to the 
greatest threat envisaged i.e. the possibility of involvement in an overt and 
direct engagement between the forces of Communist China on the one 
hand and the USA on the other.375  
3.4.5 Missions of Forces 
The most important document produced during the 1968 review process was the 'Missions 
of Forces' report. This outlined the objectives of New Zealand defence policy. It brought 
together the JIC's analysis of the threats, the policy goals identified by External Affairs, and 
created a set of mission statements for the armed forces. In one sense it formed the complete 
strategic outline, as it showed how military means would be brought to achieve political 
ends. As a consequence, this document neatly expressed New Zealand's strategic challenges. 
One example is the tension between the traditional desire for collective security and the 
realities of Cold War security. 
As a small power with world wide interests, New Zealand continues to 
reject “neutralism” or “isolationism” as a practicable basis of national 
policy and has long recognised that its security and protection of national 
interests abroad must be found through collective security arrangements. 
Short of a world wide system for effective peace-keeping, New Zealand 
can serve its own national policies and interests best by active participation 
in regional collective defence arrangements in the areas of primary 
strategic concern[:] South East Asia and South Pacific. At the same time 
New Zealand should continue to support the principles of collective action, 
as lain down in the United Nations Charter, and work to make the world 
organisation a more effective body in the peace-keeping field.376 
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‘Missions of Forces’ based its description of the threat to New Zealand interests in South 
East Asia on the JIC and External Affairs reports, but it still identified China as the most 
serious threat. 
The most serious threat we are likely to face in the foreseeable future is the 
pursuit by Communist China of an expansionist foreign policy in South 
East Asia aimed at displacing Western power and influence in the area. 
The undermining of the states in an area of such importance would pose a 
direct threat to the security and national interests of New Zealand.377 
While the JIC may have begun moving away from seeing China as a threat which could 
bring about a major war, the basic premise of avoiding all threats from China remained in 
New Zealand's strategic DNA. China was still the most serious threat to New Zealand’s 
interests but the likelihood of war had decreased significantly.   
The ‘Missions of Forces’ report noted that, regardless of the direction of New Zealand's 
position in South East Asia, New Zealand security would have to be guaranteed by the 
largest power in the Pacific. The need for protection by the Pacific hegemon had been a 
fundamental position of New Zealand strategy since the 19th century but was confirmed by 
the Pacific War.  
The ANZUS Treaty continues to be basic to New Zealand defence policy. 
By remaining linked, like Australia, with the dominant power in the 
Pacific, we can best protect New Zealand against any repetition of a major 
threat from a great power in Asia.378  
In a change from the JIC report, the 'Mission of Forces' report considered it less likely that 
the US would withdraw from the Asian mainland. However, both reports thought that the 
US would continue to attempt to contain China to some extent. 
The United States policy of containment of Communist China will 
continue and it is in our interests that there be no weakening of this 
resolve. Although United States strategy could vary significantly, 
depending on the outcome in Vietnam, it is unlikely that the United States 
would contemplate a complete military withdrawal from mainland South 
East Asia.379 
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The 'Missions of Forces' report was critical of SEATO and expressed a desire for a grouping 
that was more representative of the countries of the region. Such a grouping was not 
considered likely and insurgency and instability would continue in the region for some time. 
This meant New Zealand was best served by continuing its military and economic aid to 
South East Asia which would be 'vital to the stability of the area whilst the slow process of 
nation building continues and indigenous defence capabilities develop'.380 
Instability in South East Asia, carrying a risk of strategic deterioration or 
of escalation, must be of concern to New Zealand, since the undermining 
of states in the area by communist movements or the establishment of 
regimes subservient to a militant Communist China would pose a threat to 
the security and national interests of New Zealand and, even more directly, 
to Australia with which our long term security is indissolubly linked.381 
While the 'Mission of Forces' report may have used the kind of strong language about China 
that the JIC had avoided using, the link between the Vietnam War and the containment of 
China was again severed explicitly. The defence review process of 1965 had seen the 
aggression of North Vietnam and the Vietcong as being linked inextricably with Chinese 
expansionism. In 1968, the 'Mission of Forces' report denied the certainty of the earlier 
perspective: 'The extent of North Vietnam's military involvement in the South, and the 
support of Communist China and the Soviet Union is no longer in doubt'.382 What had not 
changed was the sense that New Zealand's security interests were for the wider region rather 
than having any direct connection to Vietnam, but nevertheless New Zealand would have to 
remain committed to that conflict: 'New Zealand's strategic interest in the security of South 
East Asia and in a United States commitment to regional defence would suggest that the 
most pressing mission of our armed forces in the next few years will be the provision of 
combat ready forces in South Vietnam'.383 
As part of the compromise between the JIC and the Defence Council, the term 'limited war 
was replaced with 'major hostilities', although the intended meaning appears to be the same. 
The analysis is also striking for its lack of reference to SEATO: 
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Though unlikely, we have to take account of the risk that Communist 
China may engage in major hostilities with the United States and its allies 
in South East Asia. Our principal allies plan against such an eventuality 
and will expect New Zealand to be able to contribute to the defence of 
South East Asia and its sea and air approaches. New Zealand will therefore 
have a continuing interest in maintaining a capability to meet an 
emergency of this kind. This will require suitable follow-on forces to 
supplement forces which may be held forward. Since their deployment is 
relatively unlikely, they will, however, have lesser priority than the 
provision of ready forces for Vietnam and similar emergencies.384 
This represents a major weakening of the language when compared to the 1965 review and 
even the documents of 1968 that feed into this report. There is no longer an assumption that 
New Zealand's part in SEATO planning would provide a guideline for New Zealand's force 
structure. China was still a threat but it had been side-lined almost to the level of the threat 
of global war, which had been all but ignored since the Cuban Missile Crisis. New Zealand 
would still have to prepare for 'major hostilities' but Vietnam and similar emergencies were 
the greater priority. 
Concern over the British withdrawal continued. While the ‘Missions of Forces’ report still 
expressed confidence in the US remaining tied to the region through Vietnam, the British 
withdrawal was still seen as having the potential to kill the Forward Defence strategy. With 
no decision yet made on the future of New Zealand's place in Malaysia/Singapore, the 
'Missions of Force' statement is unsurprisingly pessimistic. The lack of certainty put the 
authors in the position of having to describe a strategic vision when one of the linchpins of 
the existing structure was under threat. 
The British withdrawal will in particular cut direct across the arrangements 
on which New Zealand, and, in a less dependent sense, Australia, have 
maintained forces forward – acclimatised, equipped and trained to respond 
to emergencies ranging from the initial response to the requirements of 
SEATO plans, up to and including major hostilities involving Communist 
China. By dramatically reducing the logistic support available to us, 
British withdrawal will seriously affect, if not eventually call into question, 
our forward defence strategy.385 
The problem of the difficult balancing of Malaysia/Singapore and Vietnam was a continuing 
headache for planners. The Vietnam War was more important for New Zealand's long-term 
interests in maintaining a friendly great power in the region and containing China. However, 
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Malaysia and Singapore were looking to New Zealand and Australia to fill the void left by 
British withdrawal. Staying in Malaysia/Singapore without British support added to the risk 
that New Zealand could be drawn into a local conflict between the two countries or between 
either Malaysia or Singapore and Indonesia. Yet at the same time New Zealand and 
Australia would be unable to provide a force capable of providing military guarantees, 
especially without the US or UK 'underwriting' the project.  
Despite these problems there were advantages in retaining a permanent presence in 
Malaysia/Singapore. A presence would assist in local stability while still allowing the 
freedom to employ forces to other parts of the region. Indonesia was willing to accept New 
Zealand and Australian forces at the, then, current levels and the presence helped maintain 
good relations with Malaysia and Singapore.386 These arguments seem quite removed from 
the earlier arguments that pointed to the potential for communist insurgency. The role of 
China in New Zealand's deployment to Malaysia/Singapore was slipping away. 
Nevertheless, while the continued presence in Malaysia/Singapore was yet to be proved 
politically or economically sustainable, it remained New Zealand's second priority after 
Vietnam, with a force able to contribute to 'major hostilities' being the third priority.387 
During 1968 the individual services would develop their own plans based on the 'Mission of 
Forces' and their own needs. This would largely amount to a set of shopping lists that set out 
the upgrade needs for each service. The effect of the statement of mission would have 
differing consequences for the three services. For instance, the RNZAF largely had to 
continue its programme of upgrades that had been in development for some time. The 
programme included the purchase of the Skyhawks and C-130s that had already been 
planned. The purchases would necessitate the increase of the manpower ceiling from 5,025 
to 5,300 through to the early 1970s.388 The need for detailed spending plans meant progress 
was slow. It would be October 1968 by the time the debate over financing the new review 
would occur.  
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3.4.6 Finding the Money 
By October the new defence review was in a state to be examined by Cabinet and Treasury. 
Given that the review had been prompted by the reluctance of Cabinet to fully fund the 
previous review, it is unsurprising that Treasury was critical of the proposed spending and 
manpower increases. Getting the review funded was a serious battle for Thomson and the 
military. The conflict would improve Treasury's understanding of defence planning but the 
much desired defence upgrades would struggle to get past an increasingly sceptical Cabinet 
and growing public opposition to the Vietnam War. The language used by the military 
establishment to describe the military situation in South East Asia would not change but the 
response of Treasury and Cabinet would become even more hostile to the ambitions of the 
military.  
Uncertainty still hampered decisions on funding. Australia's post-withdrawal plans were still 
unclear and the manpower implications of the review were yet to be finalised. Given these 
uncertainties, the quantum of the defence budget over the next five years was still yet to be 
determined. Abandoning the bases in Malaysia/Singapore would not mean a saving in 
manpower. In a Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, Thomson stated that if maintaining 
the Forward Defence bases in South East Asia was not approved then the alternative would 
be cooperating with Australia in a continental defence strategy and this would involve 
greater commitments for New Zealand.389 
At the same the military chiefs were becoming more and more downbeat about and hostile 
to the financial constraints placed on them. Thornton told the Cabinet Defence Committee 
that the strategic situation was 'getting worse with no prospect of improvement'.390 Increases 
in defence funding were necessary in order to maintain New Zealand's capabilities. He told 
the Cabinet committee that they had a choice between accepting an inadequate level of 
national security and increasing defence expenditure. He outlined the various effects of the 
three levels of expenditure provided by Treasury would have on defence capabilities. If the 
figure of $460 million for five years was adopted, then there would have to be substantial 
cuts in equipment on order. The medium figure of $500 million would mean no further 
orders and the top figure of $540 million would mean no further growth in capabilities. 
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Even with the largest option the services would need to cancel increases in manpower and 
equipment upgrades. However, Treasury official, R.J. Leathwick, doubted New Zealand 
could afford defence to take up as much of GNP as even the smallest figure represented. He 
recommended that Cabinet defer any decision until the costs of restructuring in other parts 
of the economy had been established.391 The Defence Council was forced to outline in some 
detail the effects of each option392 and build closer links with Treasury in order to overcome 
their scepticism.393 
3.4.7 Losing Strategic Perspectives 
The conflicts over financing and the uncertainty of the direction of allies led External 
Affairs and Treasury to oppose the Government making any new statements on defence 
policy. External Affairs felt that there were a number of 'inhibiting factors' that should 
prevent the Defence Council from presenting a view to government for consideration before 
May 1969.394 However it was the financial challenges that were causing concern for military 
leaders. There were always significant lead times for new equipment before it became 
operationally effective. Any long gap in purchasing would not be able to be caught up even 
if the military need became pressing, which the chiefs (with their pessimistic attitude toward 
China and Asia) considered to be possible. The defence establishment needed interim 
decisions to be made even if the new defence review was not to be released for some time. It 
was the opinion of the Ministry of Defence that the Defence Council needed to quickly 
resolve any disputes between the various departments so that they could provide clear 
advice to the Government at least on administration and planning and thus work towards 
longer term policy.395 
These immediate needs were pressuring the Ministry of Defence to put the cart before the 
horse. As the Ministry could not get a firm direction or budget numbers from the 
Government, the Ministry looked to obtain confirmation for what it saw as its immediate 
needs rather than a programme built on a government-approved strategic policy. This 
problem was at the heart of the objections by External Affairs. The department saw the 
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Forward Defence concept as being in fundamental danger in the post-Vietnam War 
environment due to Australian indecision and 'the absence of positive indications of future 
United States policy in South East Asia'.396 These factors were fundamental to the concept 
of Forward Defence as it was stated in the draft 1968 review. If Forward Defence could not 
be maintained, then the review process would have to begin again and new statements of 
defence objectives and policy would have to be developed. 
The Ministry of Defence was critical of External Affairs' perspective as it believed that even 
if major changes in New Zealand's strategy had to occur, its interests in the region would 
not. New Zealand would still want to contribute to collective defence in South East Asia 
even if forces could no longer be forward deployed. Even if New Zealand had to withdraw 
its forces from South East Asia within five years, the necessary force structure would remain 
largely unchanged as forces would still need the ability to deploy rapidly to South East Asia 
in a crisis. The developments in capability that defence had hoped for were not dependent 
on whether New Zealand forces remained stationed on the Asian mainland.397 These 
differing positions reflected the interests of their respective institutions. External Affairs was 
focused on maintaining the relationships with the allies, whereas Defence was concerned 
with sustaining their capabilities in a time of financial restraint. 
By the end of November officials finally had some level of certainty as to the foreign bases 
but still not for the budget. Australian Prime Minister John Gorton announced publicly that 
Australian forces would remain in Malaysia/Singapore until 1971. This allowed Holyoake to 
announce that New Zealand forces would remain in Malaysia and Singapore at 'about the 
[then] present level until the end of 1971'.398 Thomson used this as an argument for the need 
to avoid a reduction in New Zealand's capabilities and fully fund the defence programme.399 
Thomson wrote to Robert Muldoon (now the Minister of Finance) outlining the need to keep 
defence budgeting at the figure of $650 million for the next five years. Thomson criticised 
Cabinet's procrastination with defence spending noting the number of broken defence 
programmes which led to uncoordinated procurement, deferred combat readiness, and 
retention of obsolete equipment. For this the Minister of Defence blamed a 'discrepancy 
between Vote provisions and the readiness of Government to give actual approvals for 
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expenditure'.400 While Thomson thought that New Zealand's armed forces had met the tests 
of the 1950s and 1960s, he noted that the future was not likely to be easier.401 
In March 1969 the leader of the opposition, Norman Kirk, acknowledged that 'fundamental 
changes' were about to take place in Asia and argued that the Government's defence policy 
did not take these into account. However, Kirk still approved of the decision for New 
Zealand forces to remain in Malaysia and Singapore. Forward Defence, in Kirk's view, was 
primarily to keep Britain and the US interested in defending the region. He noted that 
SEATO was weak and ineffective and that New Zealand was doing nothing to shore up the 
alliance. He pointed to Indonesia and Japan with which New Zealand needed closer 
relations but were outside of SEATO. Kirk argued for a greater emphasis on economic aid to 
South East Asia rather than defence assistance. These points were made without reference to 
Vietnam and only a passing reference to China. He noted that the Government had changed 
its views on China and had started to favour recognition of Beijing.402 
 CONCLUSION: DISAPPEARING CHINA 
The financial debate would continue well into 1969 with Cabinet continuing to defer 
making a concrete decision on the five-year programme. Instead Cabinet again balked at the 
cost. The review process continued at a crawl and would not be completed until 1972. In the 
meantime, Cabinet only funded major purchases that it was already contractually obliged to 
make, such as the Skyhawks and the fourth frigate.403 Through 1969 the financial debate 
would become all-encompassing as the strategic questions in relation to China had largely 
been answered in 1968. China's role as the top level threat was over and so were the alliance 
structures and commitments that held China's containment together. New Zealand's 
involvement in Vietnam was initially in pursuit of containing China, but by 1968 no one was 
making that argument. The Vietnam conflict was now a serious problem and the defence 
establishment feared the US would become disinterested in the region once the war was 
over. The 1968 review would ultimately fail to materialise into a public document because 
the strategic picture continued to evolve faster than the ability of the Government and 
bureaucracy to plan for the future.  
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The decline of SEATO's relevance meant it was less clear what capabilities New Zealand 
should provide for South East Asian security. SEATO's significance to New Zealand seemed 
to shrink over the course of 1968 with later documents making fewer references to it. 
SEATO's marginalisation brought institutional rivalries to the fore as the shape and extent of 
a post-Vietnam and post-containment defence policy was fought out between External 
Affairs, Defence, and Treasury. Once it became clear that it was possible to keep bases in 
Malaysia/Singapore and once greater involvement in Vietnam became even less desirable, 
then those debates became more about financing rather than strategic direction. Yet, the 
rationale of these decisions was not fully appreciated at the time. A continued presence in 
Malaysia/Singapore was only credible if the primary purpose of those bases changed from 
containing China to responding to smaller emergencies around the immediate region. 
3.5.1 The Disappearance of China 
Attitudes to China and the details of New Zealand strategy changed over the course of 1968. 
How and when views changed in different parts of the defence policy making apparatus is 
clouded by the fact different parts were writing at different times. By focusing on the next 
five years and intelligence (rather than policy), Mullins and the JIC provided the least self-
interested assessment. While the overall level of instability in the region had not fallen, the 
likelihood that China would involve itself in a major conflict in the region had reduced. The 
JIC initially completely eliminated any prediction of limited war with China and only made 
mention of it at the insistence of the incredulous Defence Council. Yet it appears that the 
Defence Council came to accept the lower risk of Chinese intervention by placing it as the 
third most important defence priority.  
Not only was the perceived threat of China dissipating, the structures for containment were 
also being lost. The UK was going and US commitment to the region was sapping as the 
Vietnam conflict dragged on. In early 1968 it was feared New Zealand could not maintain a 
military place in Asia without the UK but as the year went on it became easier to remain. 
The support of Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia was crucial to remaining in 
Malaysia/Singapore but, as the previous review suggested, a presence in Asia would have 
been pointless if it was not at least underwritten by a major power. With the decline in 
Chinese threat, the arguments in favour of retaining forces in Malaysia/Singapore became 
more compelling, especially when contrasted against greater involvement in Vietnam. 
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3.5.2 Institutional Rivalries  
Undertaking a new review of defence policy would always be difficult, perhaps even 
unwise, when there was so much uncertainty as to the direction New Zealand defence could 
be taken. As a small player in the network of Western powers, New Zealand was limited by 
the options of its partners. This was managed much more easily when the containment of 
China was the paramount concern and SEATO provided the framework for containment in 
South East Asia. By 1968 containment was being swamped by Vietnam and the weariness of 
Britain and the United States to South East Asian entanglements. Without the convenient 
structures that containment had brought New Zealand, planners had to find their own way to 
a much greater extent than they had in the past. This problem intensified institutional 
rivalries as External Affairs, Defence, and Treasury all pushed a strategic direction based on 
their own interests rather than fulfilling their place in a fairly well established framework. 
The points of difference came not only from the level of financial need but also the direction 
of military effort. 
The priority of the Ministry of Defence and the chiefs was to maintain their operational 
capability. British withdrawal was a major challenge, but so was a lack of investment in new 
equipment. The upgrades prepared for during the course of the 1960s were at risk and most 
of these would simply keep the armed forces at a similar level of capability. On top of this, 
new logistic support and administration would have to be developed in order to cope with 
the British withdrawal. The chiefs were acutely aware of how long it took to plan for, 
obtain, and deploy new major purchases. A quickly changing political or strategic 
environment might cause the loss of defence funding which could have disastrous 
consequences if the climate changed suddenly for the worse. Yet, at the same time, it was 
much harder to make a case for new capability development when the threat of a major 
conflict was decreasing. The bases at Singapore and Malaysia were an asset that, if lost, 
would be impossible to replace. A switch to greater involvement in Vietnam was looking 
increasingly like an unsustainable proposition. Given the threats to their funding and foreign 
bases, the chiefs were not inclined to see the strategic situations as improving even if the JIC 
told them the threat of a high intensity conflict with China was decreasing. 
For External Affairs the priority was maintaining the alliance system that had been carefully 
managed since the formation of ANZUS and ANZAM. Relations between Malaysia and 
Singapore had been difficult and continuing New Zealand's military presence could place it 
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in a difficult position if those relations became even more fraught. A greater investment in 
Vietnam could shore up American commitment to the region after the conflict ended. While 
External Affairs seem to have given up trying to convince the US to keep bases on the South 
East Asian mainland it still wanted to maintain the protection from a distance that had been 
seen previously as inadequate. However, as the review progressed through the turbulent year 
of 1968, it would be hard to imagine that External Affairs' argument for greater involvement 
in Vietnam gained any popularity amongst Cabinet or the other parts of the civil service.  
Treasury was deeply concerned with containing the costs of defence as a portion of 
government expenditure and GNP. What is notably different from the experience of the 
1966 review is the attempt of Treasury and Defence to work together to build a better 
understanding in Treasury of defence needs. While Treasury's reluctance to allow the 
expansion of defence spending tells us little of the exchequer's views on strategy, it does 
show the Treasury's inflexible views on the importance of defence relative to other functions 
of government. 
3.5.3 Finding Our Own Way 
The year 1968 would not only be transformative in terms of creating a defence policy that 
was not dominated by the containment of China but also transformative in terms of the 
rationale for the Forward Defence strategy. The loss of great power support and the 
diminished need for containment (at least in the way that New Zealand had promoted it) 
meant that Forward Defence required a new raison d'être. Instability in South East Asia was 
now seen as a regional problem primarily rather than one directed from Beijing. In that 
context New Zealand and Australia could make a useful contribution without the direction 
or immediate support of a major power. However, this does not mean that New Zealand no 
longer saw China as hostile; it simply thought a limited war with China was no longer a 
significant possibility and that the Western political will to contain it in South East Asia had 
gone. A new more diplomatic path would be needed to avoid the spread of Chinese 
influence in South East Asia. This diplomatic effort would be more flexible and able to 
adjust once China came out of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and looked to engage 
with the West. 
 
  
  
114 
 
  
  
115 
 
4 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
 INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand's view of China would undergo a major change with the upheaval caused by 
the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution.404 The revolution would help break down the idea 
that China was a credible military threat to South East Asia and put in motion a shift 
towards the view that diplomatic engagement was not only possible, but the best way of 
securing New Zealand's interests in Asia. The nature and objectives of Mao's last revolution 
were debated by Western and Soviet-bloc sinologists as both camps struggled to explain the 
explosion of radical political activity and disorder in the PRC during the decade-long 
conflict. The Western observers followed by New Zealand officials were split between those 
that saw the revolution as a purge of those opposing Mao's vision of perpetual revolution 
and those who saw it as a struggle for power between those who might succeed Mao after 
his death. Mao's aims were generally thought to be the revitalisation of the Chinese 
communist revolution and to avoid China becoming a bureaucratised police state like the 
Soviet Union. As Richard H. Donald of the US State Department wrote in a paper which he 
shared with the New Zealand Embassy in mid-1967: 
[A] clearer picture… has emerged of the ultimate objectives in Mao's mind 
when he instituted the Cultural Revolution – the establishment of an 
Utopian [sic] communism based on the broadest democracy held together 
more by the commonly shared and implicitly accepted code of ideology 
and ethics known as Maoism than by rigid control and organisational 
forms.405 
While the revolution would last a decade, its most radical period would be in the first two 
years, 1966 to 1968, when Mao utilised China's youth to form the 'Red Guards'. These were 
groups of young political activists driven by ideological fervour and their glorification of 
Mao. They denounced traditional sources of authority, attacked China's cultural heritage, 
and rooted out bourgeois elements, 'capitalist roaders', and Soviet 'revisionists'. Slogans such 
as 'bombard the headquarters' and to 'rebel is justified' were used to encourage a radical 
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breakdown of communist and traditional social structures and sources of power.406 'The 
masses', encouraged by Mao and his closest supporters, clashed violently with local 
governments which were dissolved across the country in favour of 'revolutionary 
committees'. Leaders of the Party and PLA alike were removed from their positions and 
subjected to public denouncements. Foreign diplomats, including those from Britain and the 
Soviet Union were attacked, and relations with almost all of China's neighbours became 
tense. In June 1967 Red Guards broke into the British Embassy and assaulted three British 
officials.407 In 1968 the Cultural Revolution moved out of its most turbulent phase with Mao 
reining in the Red Guards. The PLA began taking a stronger role in political life and 
maintenance of order which was largely achieved by the start of 1969. 
The nature of these events in China were extremely unclear. New Zealand's own sources of 
information were limited but External Affairs had good access to the outside observers of 
larger powers. The New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong was a major conduit and 
analyser of such information. Wellington's officials around the world needed to pick apart 
the occasionally conflicting opinions of its diplomatic and intelligence partners. The 
discussions between New Zealand officials and their counterparts in friendly nations 
provided the basis of New Zealand's information stream on events in China. Those incoming 
assessments of events in China would often be in conflict with one another. However, it is 
the reports by New Zealand officials of their discussions with friendly nations which 
provide a specifically New Zealand perspective on events in China. The media was also a 
major source of information. This was not restricted to Western media as Japanese and, to a 
lesser extent, Soviet-bloc reports were also considered useful.  
This chapter utilises the reports made by New Zealand diplomatic missions on their 
discussions on the Cultural Revolution with officials from their host countries. These reports 
include foreign assessments and relevant press clippings. They were shared with Wellington 
and distributed to New Zealand's other missions around the world. While it is not clear the 
extent to which External Affairs shared these reports directly with the defence chiefs, their 
strong links through the Defence Council and the JIC meant it is unlikely that the chiefs 
were unaware of the information on China flowing from the diplomatic service.  
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In the first year of the revolution the reports collected by External Affairs expressed a strong 
feeling that chaos and irrationally had overcome China and analysts initially struggled to 
make sense of the revolution. Two main schools of thought emerged, one seeing it as a 
purge of Mao's enemies, the other focused on the struggle to succeed him. New Zealand's 
diplomatic circles avoided falling too heavily into either camp, but regardless of the 
approach taken it was necessary to try and understand what factions existed in the Chinese 
government and which ones were in control. Broadly, the battle was viewed by New 
Zealand officials as being between those committed to Mao's vision of perpetual revolution 
and those keen on political stabilisation and economic reforms. However, the huge number 
of Chinese officials at all levels who were being denounced, dismissed, or rehabilitated at 
any one time made it exceptionally difficult to understand where power lay at any given 
moment. The place of Premier Zhou Enlai was considered to be hugely important to New 
Zealand observers as his competence and practicality were admired by many around the 
world. The role of the PLA was also of keen interest as it was the military that was correctly 
assumed by New Zealand officials as the source of order when Red Guard violence got out 
of hand. The Chinese military would also come to have a significant role in the creation of 
revolutionary committees which would displace the CCP-based organisation of local 
government across China.  
The ability and desire of the Chinese leadership to control or place limits on the disorder 
would have huge implications for China's foreign policy. It would affect the likelihood of an 
intervention in Vietnam or some other foreign adventure like an attack on Hong Kong. If the 
Chinese leadership was unwilling or unable to control the revolution, then a serious 
miscalculation was much more likely. If the revolutionaries were being kept from 
threatening China's external security, then it was much more likely that China would stay 
inward looking and not threaten its neighbours. New Zealand's diplomats and their 
counterparts overseas were split on this question. The Americans changed their opinion 
regularly and Frank Corner appears to have considered the situation in China (at least at one 
point) to be uncontrolled chaos.408 However, the New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong 
argued strongly that the Chinese leadership could, would, and were keeping the revolution 
under its control and would avoid taking the People's Republic into a dangerous clash with 
its neighbours. 
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The end of 1968 would see the completion of the transfer of power in China to a triple-
alliance of the party, the military, and revolutionary groups, even if in reality much of the 
power was in the hands of the PLA and what remained of the party apparatus.409 This would 
dampen much of the disorder even if it did not improve China's foreign relations. 
Skirmishes along the Soviet border occurred over much of 1969, highlighting the risk posed 
by the USSR and refocusing the need for change in foreign policy amongst China's leaders. 
These changes would allow for better relations with the West, even if Chinese ambitions 
remained largely unchanged.  
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS' SOURCES FOR EVENTS IN CHINA 
A major source of information for New Zealand diplomats on events in China were their 
discussions with their British, American, Canadian, Indian, French, and Australian 
colleagues. These discussions make up the best available evidence of New Zealand's 
assessments on China during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Open source and secret 
intelligence reports – especially those of the Joint Intelligence Committees of the UK, 
Australia and Canada – were provided to Wellington, but (as with the New Zealand JIC 
reports) only a few are currently available publicly. The minutes and most reports of the 
New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee for this period (other than those referred to in 
other chapters) remain classified or have been lost.410 The files of the New Zealand Mission 
to the United Nations provide the most complete record of these discussions, supplemented 
by the reports of the New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong which provide the clearest 
New Zealand official perspective on events in the People's Republic.  
Information from larger friends and allies was not taken uncritically. Reports by New 
Zealand's foreign missions often interwove their own views with those of their foreign 
counterparts, fudging the distinction when they agreed with their host’s analysis and only 
making direct comments when they disagreed explicitly with what they were being told.411 
External Affairs made some effort to establish the biases and blind spots of their friends. The 
Cultural Revolution did not affect External Affairs' preferences for information sources on 
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China. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, American views on China had generally received 
less criticism from New Zealand officials than other sources. The British had been viewed 
by Wellington as underestimating the threat from Beijing and overestimating its ability to be 
accommodated. The Canadians and the Australians were also, like New Zealand, more 
cautious although lacking the occasionally fanatical anti-communism that could come out of 
Washington and that had marked analysis of the early Cold War. 
There is no indication from the files available that External Affairs was utilising information 
from New Zealand communists visiting China let alone sharing that information with their 
foreign colleagues. 
4.2.1 Hong Kong Commission 
The New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong (referred to hereafter as 'the commission') 
stands out as the most independent New Zealand source and analyser of information on 
China during the late 1960s. With no official New Zealand representation in either Beijing 
or Taipei, the Hong Kong commission was the only New Zealand diplomatic post in wider 
China. It utilised wide contacts and sources in the colonial administration, Chinese language 
media inside and outside the PRC, business people trading in the PRC, and most importantly 
the British Embassy in Beijing. The commission's direct link to the British Embassy gave it 
a link to events in Beijing that were unmatched by other New Zealand posts, despite the 
hardships placed on British diplomats during the Cultural Revolution. 
The commission produced the largest volume of reports on China during the late 1960s of 
any New Zealand overseas post. The commission was especially active during the Hong 
Kong riots of 1967 and the violence in Guangdong the following year. Over the course of 
1967 and 1968 it built a view that highlighted the limits placed on the revolution by the 
central leadership. The commission's view looked past the chaos of the revolution and saw 
the rational forces at play and the desire on the part of Zhou Enlai and even the hard line 
Maoists to ensure that the revolution did not endanger China's foreign interests and external 
security, especially in Hong Kong. 
While Hong Kong provided a crucial source of information on China for New Zealand 
policy makers, the colony's security was not in the forefront of the minds of New Zealand's 
defence planners. It did not receive any significant attention during the 1966 or the 
(unfinished) 1968 defence reviews, nor was there any obvious expectation that New Zealand 
would be involved in any immediate defence of the colony in a crisis. Wellington had made 
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some preparations for the defence of Hong Kong in the period immediately before the 
creation of the PRC. In August 1949 New Zealand agreed to provide Dakota cargo planes to 
assist in Hong Kong’s defence.412 By November that year that situation had calmed. New 
Zealand's chiefs were sent British intelligence reports which were confident that China's 
new communist leaders had no plans to take the colony by force. In the late 1960s it seems 
that New Zealand had left the defence of Hong Kong up to the British. This is possibly 
because the territory would have been very difficult to defend. In 1956 the British JIC (Far 
East) recommended using nuclear weapons immediately after a hypothetical Chinese 
invasion began.413 As with its view prior to the Second World War, New Zealand's focus was 
on South East Asia with Singapore providing the linchpin of the British defence of New 
Zealand interests rather than Hong Kong, but Hong Kong was a major post for trade with 
mainland China and thus the important point of contact for information about the mainland. 
4.2.2 The Media and Big Character Posters 
The international media was an important source for New Zealand officials. The official 
Chinese press was collected and analysed by the commission in Hong Kong. Other New 
Zealand missions collected their host country's reporting from China and distributed them to 
other New Zealand posts around the world. In the first year of the revolution New Zealand 
officials took advantage of Japanese press reports as these provided 'the bulk of the reports' 
on events in Beijing.414 Japanese reporters could blend in more successfully and usually had 
better Chinese written language skills than their Western counterparts. Their ability to read 
dàzìbào (big-character posters) was especially useful. Reports from Soviet-bloc journalists 
were also utilised but were often treated as fanciful by the commission.415 Yugoslav 
reporting was treated more seriously.416 The Far Eastern Economic Review and The 
Economist were regular sources of reporting and the work of Roderick MacFarquhar was 
particularly popular at the New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong. 
                                                 
412 MinExternal to NZ High Commissioner Canberra, 17 August 1949, JSO 32/16/2, 165/2/1 1, ABFK W5767 
19754 Box 125, Hong Kong – Defence, 1948-56 
413 'Military Threat to Hong Kong up to 1960', 3 August 1956, Annex to JIC(FE)(56)50 Final, 165/2/1 1, 
ABFK W5767 19754 Box 125, Hong Kong – Defence, 1948-56 
414 NZ Commissioner in Hong Kong to SecEx, 12 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China 
– General, ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
415 NZ Commissioner in Hong Kong to SecEx, 12 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China 
– General, ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
416  B. Bogunovic, ‘The Storm in July’, Politika, c. late 1966; NZ Commissioner in Hong Kong to SecEx, 12 
January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
  
121 
 
During the revolution big-character posters and billboards became a major system of 
communication between numerous revolutionary groups. Dàzìbào were a major source of 
information on who was currently facing criticism and which groups were in control of an 
area at a given time. The commission saw big-character posters as a form of 'free press' 
where the Red Guards could make statements and attack enemies.417 Dàzìbào in Beijing 
were treated by the commissioner as being reasonably authoritative on events in the capital, 
but less so if the posters depicted events in the provinces. For example, dàzìbào reports of 
40 dead and 500 injured in violence in Nanjing were thought to be exaggerations by 
observers in Hong Kong. However, stories of violence in Shanghai were regarded in Hong 
Kong as accurate.418 Meanwhile, the New Zealand High Commission in Ottawa did not put 
much faith in the posters, but accepted they were the best source of information at times.419 
During the course of the first two years of the revolution it became increasingly difficult for 
foreign journalists to operate in China. Increasing restrictions were placed on foreign 
journalists and they were eventually barred from reporting on the posters or on anything not 
covered in the official Chinese media. The Cultural Revolution sparked, in the words of the 
commission, a 'spy mania' which saw the detainment of several Western individuals, both 
communists and journalists alike. New Zealand officials were aware of the British Reuters 
correspondent Anthony Grey's detention in July 1967.420 Grey was released in October 
1969.421 Another British journalist, Norman Barrymaine, was detained for over 18 months422 
but a month into his confinement New Zealand officials knew only that he had 
disappeared.423 The commission's concern had been sparked by press reports in New 
Zealand that even Rewi Alley was under suspicion.424 Only cursory attention seemed to 
have been paid to private New Zealand citizens in China, but the New Zealand Commission 
in Hong Kong was active in checking with the British if any New Zealanders had been 
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detained in the PRC.425 In February 1968, L.W. Tattersfield, a New Zealand businessman 
trading with China, told the commission that as he left the country customs officials had cut 
out images of posters from photographs he had taken.426 By April that year the commission 
understood Mongolian diplomats were the only foreigners able to read the posters with any 
immunity.427 
4.2.3 New Zealanders in China 
There is no evidence that New Zealand diplomats utilised the PRC's New Zealand 
supporters in their discussions of the Cultural Revolution and Chinese policy. In fact, the 
contempt of the commission for New Zealand communists is evident when it described the 
visit of the General-Secretary of the Communist Party of New Zealand, V.G. Wilcox.428 
Wilcox had already been to China several times and in March 1967 he received another 
warm welcome by the Chinese leadership. Zhou and Kang Shen greeted him at the airport 
where several hundred listened to Wilcox speak. Later Wilcox met with Mao, Zhou, and 
Kang. The commission noted the lavish treatment of Wilcox and took it as a sign of China's 
increasing international isolation and the lack of foreign supporters of real influence. 
The CPNZ and its leaders have in recent years been accorded special 
treatment by Peking. When Wilcox last visited China (in March 1966) he 
was met at Peking Airport by Secretary-General [Deng Xiaoping], and was 
given a banquet by Chairman [Liu Shaoqi] ... Comrade Wilcox probably 
could not have foreseen that these faces would be missing in March 1967, 
or that this time he would be met on arrival by no-one less than [Zhou 
Enlai] and awarded the supreme accolade of a meeting with Chairman 
Mao. Peking surely is scraping the bottom of the barrel.429 
 PURGE AND STRUGGLE 
External Affairs' understanding of the Cultural Revolution focused initially on establishing 
the facts on the ground followed by attempts at making sense of the political reasoning for 
the revolution and the future direction of Chinese policy. Mao's desire to uproot the political 
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system he had created and sow mass discontent made little sense to Western observers who 
saw it as irrational and having a detrimental effect on the economy. Outside observers, even 
those in the diplomatic community, had little information on which to base their 
assessments. External Affairs' confidence in understanding events in China was low despite 
the cooperation of their American and Commonwealth counterparts who were also 
struggling to understand the situation. The New Zealand High Commission in Ottawa 
(quoting from a confidential Canadian report) recognised that little could be established 
firmly: 
This interpretation is clearly speculative, as must be any attempt to impose 
a pattern on domestic events in China, especially since early 1966. The 
bald fact is that to a great extent we do not know what has happened in 
China and that where we are able to clearly identify events, we must fall 
back on speculation, sometimes very tenuous, in placing interpretations on 
them.430 
By early 1967 two schools of thought emerged in the academic and journalistic communities 
that External Affairs followed. One group was known as the 'purge' school. This school 
favoured the notion that Mao was attempting to remove those who did not follow his vision 
of perpetual revolution and distaste for 'Soviet revisionism'. This school placed Mao at the 
centre of events and saw him as supremely powerful. Mao was using new political 
organisations – such as the Red Guards – to criticise and humiliate those that favoured 
reforms. Yet the ability of other perspectives to survive the political and physical attacks 
shows that some form of dissent was still possible, albeit from a weak position due to Mao's 
cult of personality.  
The competing perspective was the 'struggle for power'. That school saw the revolution as 
being a competition between the Chinese leadership to succeed Mao. This school saw Mao 
as a weaker figure: a man in failing health overrun by the conflicts around him. The political 
factions that emerged during the revolution were of interest to both camps. The competing 
factions were central to the 'struggle' school but those who saw a 'purge' also noted the 
importance of factions in the leadership as they tried to measure the amount of opposition to 
Mao. Members of the diplomatic community (which New Zealand officials were part of) 
tried to avoid aligning themselves with either camp, yet these competing views often framed 
discussions on China.  
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The NZHC in London considered the division between the purge and struggle schools to be 
largely an American debate.431 British experts and Foreign Office officials were thought 
more to focus on policy over personality factors. The high commission noted the opinions of 
a number of British commentators. The Economist, The Times, and Roderick MacFarquhar 
writing in The New Statesman and the Sunday Telegraph all referred to Mao's desire for 
continual revolution and abhorrence of Soviet revisionism.432 The NZHC in London shared 
an article by Richard Harris in The Times which dismissed the struggle for power argument. 
Harris noted that Mao's opponents were not solely concerned with supplanting him as most 
had been committed to Mao for decades. Harris considered any struggle for power to be a 
secondary concern. Contrasting those views, the NZHC London noted that, in The 
Guardian, Victor Zorza supported the 'struggle' perspective arguing that there was a struggle 
between the Left and Right factions, with Lin Biao trying to destroy the Right faction in the 
party to ensure his place in the succession. However, it was the views of MacFarquhar and 
Harris that the NZHC London considered to reflect the general opinion of British experts 
and 'to a large extent' the UK Foreign Office.433 
At the turn of 1967 the US State Department was very concerned about the situation in 
China and described the picture to the New Zealand officials as 'one of a breakdown of 
authority and near anarchy'.434 The main contact for China policy in the US State 
Department for New Zealand’s Washington Embassy staff was the Deputy Director of the 
Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Richard H. Donald. Donald did not subscribe fully to 
either the struggle or the purge camp,435 and tended to focus more on the chaotic nature of 
the revolution. Donald and his colleagues could not understand why Mao and Lin Biao were 
willing to harm their personal prestige when the revolution was potentially so damaging to 
the economy and Chinese state. The Americans told the New Zealanders that the 
revolution's political attacks were aimed at undercutting the power of the CCP apparatus, 
but the Americans thought attacks on the political structures that underpinned industry and 
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agriculture were designed to hit Mao's opponents in the regions rather than a deliberate 
attempt to spread the revolution to those sectors of the economy. 
The Cultural Revolution decision [sic] to extend these [revolutionary] 
activities to industry and the countryside is a measure of desperation 
undertaken in order to undercut areas of organisational strength controlled 
by the party apparatus. The guidelines to industry and agriculture are a call 
for anarchy and are totally irresponsible... The consequences of extending 
the cultural revolution to the countryside may be critical.436 
Canadian assessments obtained by New Zealand were closer to American opinions than 
British ones. The Canadian perspective was based on the assumption that the Mao-Lin 
faction was in control of the Government and that the PLA had a considerable amount of 
loyalty to them. In the view of the NZHC Ottawa the Canadian perspective was somewhat 
clouded by the internal debate going on in Canada over the question of official recognition, 
whereas the Americans believed that Mao had not yet been able to enforce his will on the 
CCP and his control of the country had diminished.437 
While the possibility was discussed, the breakdown of order caused by the revolution was 
never seriously thought likely to descend into civil war by New Zealand officials or their 
friends overseas. The Americans were the most concerned about further disorder, whereas 
the French Foreign Ministry was the least convinced by the idea of a civil war. In February 
1967 the French were already telling the New Zealand Embassy in Paris that it looked to 
them as though order was being restored in China.438 The French Foreign Ministry believed 
that Mao's enemies had been defeated and that the Government was looking to normalise the 
situation in China. The disorder in Inner Mongolia and Tibet were considered special cases 
by the French due to the ethnic differences of those provinces. Indian officials were 
similarly relaxed about the Cultural Revolution in their discussions with the New Zealand 
High Commission in Delhi. The Indians thought that the disorder was not having a massive 
effect on China.439 They thought the damage to the economy was limited, there had not been 
any widespread fighting and there was not any major discontent in the army. Civil war or 
the collapse of the state was unlikely in the Indian view. 
                                                 
436 NZ Embassy Washington to SecEx, 10 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – 
General, ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
437 NZHC Ottawa to SecEx, 24 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, ABHS 
W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
438 NZ Embassy Paris to SecEx, 17 February 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, 
ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
439 NZHC Delhi to SecEx, 19 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, ABHS 
W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
  
126 
 
The New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong also questioned whether China was in a state 
of civil war and whether the breakdown of central authority was being surrendered to the 
provinces. While not answering these questions directly, it did see the situation as extremely 
complex with multiple groups in violent conflict with one another. 
We have commented previously that, despite Lin [Biao]'s recent 
description of the current situation in China as a “civil war without guns”, 
what seems to be happening is not civil war but violent clashes, not 
between two clearly defined sides, but among two, three or even more 
groups – contending factions all claiming to be Mao supporters, supporters 
of party cadres endeavouring to preserve the status quo, peasants and 
workers taking up arms to protect themselves from Red Guard disruption, 
and the PLA itself split.440 
Even if outright civil war wasn't thought likely by New Zealand's diplomatic circles, it was 
still not clear the extent to which the chaos was being controlled – rather than simply 
initiated and incited – by Mao and his supporters. Disorder was generally seen as being in 
Mao's interest (especially by the purge school) but it was also destabilising to the economy 
and China's foreign interests. Mao was perceived broadly as favouring revolutionary furore 
as an end in-and-of itself as well as seeing it as a method of removing enemies. Yet at the 
same time analysts in New Zealand and abroad wondered at what point and in what places 
Mao would try to limit the disorder. One official report in External Affairs' files described 
the Maoist leadership as being unwilling rather than unable to limit the disorder except for 
brief periods for economic necessity, but also using such periods as a method of control: 
The next such period may be the hiatus called for by the autumn harvest 
and grain collection. The next such pause over the last two years, however, 
has been only an introduction to a renewed swing to the “left” and toward 
new disorders immediately thereafter during which eager or enthusiastic 
welcomers of the “pause” period have been swept away by the flood of 
Jacobin enthusiasm.441 
On 5 April 1967 a number of Commonwealth diplomats (including those from the New 
Zealand High Commission), representatives of the Foreign Office, and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat met at Marlborough House to discuss the developments in China that year.442 
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The summary of the discussion detailed criticism of the idea that the revolution was a 
struggle for power and the attendees generally considered it to be more about the future 
ideological direction of the People's Republic. 
There does not appear to have been a struggle for power in the sense of 
attempts being made to overthrow Mao or predetermine the line of 
succession. Rather it has been Mao seeking to determine the ideology that 
will survive after him and to remove those who might undermine it. This 
action has no doubt produced a reaction, especially since all must be 
assuming that Mao is unlikely to last much longer and will therefore be 
concerned to get themselves well positioned for the new era after Mao... 
But the struggle at present would nonetheless be better characterised as a 
struggle of ideologies – a clash between Mao's “revolution” and Liu Shao-
Chi's “revisionism” ... [Mao's] endeavours have now become more 
strongly and urgently manifest because of his worry that Soviet type 
Communism was taking root in China and also that the bureaucracy of the 
Party was becoming divorced from the mass. It could indeed be argued 
that he is currently trying not to purify the Party but to get round the back 
of it.443 
The revolution was also accompanied by a rapid escalation in Mao's cult of personality. This 
did not escape the attention of the Americans. They saw Mao as being recognised as a 
'prophet' of Marxism on the same level as Lenin and Marx himself, rather than Mao simply 
being seen as an interpreter of Marxist-Leninist thought.444 The New Zealand Commission 
in Hong Kong also noted Mao's personality cult but were still puzzled by the complete lack 
of public attacks on Mao when so many other powerful Chinese leaders were being 
condemned. The commission noted that the personality cult was being utilised to attack 
Mao's enemies and the splintering revolutionary organisations judged each other on their 
adherence to Maoist dogma: 'The immense prestige and charisma of the Chairman remains 
one of his greatest weapons'.445 
In June, Donald wrote a paper which was shared with New Zealand officials. In it he 
outlined Mao's goals for the Cultural Revolution which he saw as a state of perpetual 
revolution and a society held together by ideology rather than bureaucratic 
authoritarianism.446 While Donald had concerns about the security of Hong Kong, he was 
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relatively sanguine on the overall direction of the Cultural Revolution. It was becoming the 
view of American officials that the revolution was to some extent under the control of the 
Chinese leadership. 
...the PLA remains a coherent force, responsive to Peking's orders. 
Although it has not in fact restored order, except in isolated cases such as 
that of Wuhan, it probably still has the ability to do so, if and when the 
leadership can make up its mind to issue unequivocal instructions. It can 
hardly be said therefore that the situation is completely out of control. In 
this respect, Donald said, the pendulum of opinion [in Washington] has 
lately been swinging back, and more emphasis is now being placed on the 
fact the Chinese leadership itself is responsible for the present state of 
affairs. Whether it is that Mao cannot make up his mind, or that there is a 
tug-of-war between two or more groups below him, the fact is that the 
regime does not seem capable of deciding on a course of action and 
sticking to it. If it could, and did, the PLA could probably ensure that its 
wishes were carried out; but in fact the Army seems not to know what is 
required of it and for this reason its efforts are largely ineffectual.447 
New Zealand ambassador to the US Frank Corner was somewhat amused by Donald's 
assessment as Corner believed little had changed in China over the previous few months of 
1967, while the attitudes of Western countries had shifted. To Corner the US assessment of a 
totally or somewhat controlled revolution was moving against the tide of opinion. Corner's 
tone suggests that he did not agree with the American view of controlled 'chaos' but does not 
state it explicitly. As he saw it 'others' were coming to:  
recognize that China is in chaos, and even... contemplate the possibility of 
[it] breaking up [whereas] the Americans are off on another tack, stressing 
the possibility of the situation being brought under control, if and when the 
leadership can pull itself together.448 
By 1968 confidence grew among New Zealand's diplomatic circle as to the nature of the 
revolution but this does not mean there was any greater consensus. The commission was 
increasingly of the view that the Chinese Government was still a coherent entity and that it 
could place limits on the revolution when it wanted or needed to do so. In its view the 
revolution did not mean China would act without any predictability or rationality. Donald 
did not agree with the commission's view that the leaders of the Cultural Revolution could 
be separated from the Chinese government. Donald saw the two as interwoven and neither 
as acting with any consistency. In Donald's view, the sources and motivations of power in 
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Beijing were unknowable and unpredictable. He noted the August 1967 attack on police in 
London by Chinese diplomats. Donald saw this as a staged event under orders but could not 
say by whom.449  
4.3.1 Finding the Factions 
While the nature of the revolution was an overarching concern for New Zealand diplomats 
and their Western counterparts, the day-to-day focus of officials was establishing which 
political grouping was in control at any one time and what the implications would be for 
policy, especially foreign policy. Initially the two groups of importance were Mao's faction 
headed by the Chairman himself and Lin Biao, and reformers headed by Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng Xiaoping. Deng and Liu were the recipients of the heaviest criticism during the 
revolution with Mao and Lin singling them out as 'revisionists'. As the revolution continued, 
with Deng and Liu being marginalised (the latter being secretly imprisoned), assessing 
which factions were leading the Government became more difficult. A third group, led by 
Zhou, appeared to emerge. This group was thought by New Zealand officials to be a voice 
of moderation.  
To complicate matters, positions in the PRC government or in the CCP did not necessarily 
reflect the level of influence a person held. The term Paramount Leader would later emerge 
in the Deng Xiaopeng era to cope with the fact Deng (and Mao before him) had not held 
many of the major government offices, but during the Cultural Revolution the distribution of 
power was very murky. During the revolution it was not clear who was in control of the 
various organs of state and how well those institutions could function. Top members of the 
Government and the party were frequently attacked in posters, in the press, or during mass 
demonstrations; only Mao was above criticism. The fall of an office holder did not 
necessarily mean a significant change in leadership or policy, but continuity was also a weak 
indicator of stability. This was not fully understood early in the revolution but became 
apparent to New Zealand officials as the revolution went on. Officials were also trying to 
understand the relationship between individuals in the government leadership and a 
multitude of regional power brokers, the ever splintering revolutionary organisations, and 
weakened party apparatus. This was a considerable challenge given scarcity of information. 
Determinations on major shifts were often made on the scantiest evidence. 
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In the view emanating from the High Commission in Ottawa, as the revolution got going 
resistance coalesced around Liu Shaoqui and Deng Xiaoping. The fact they remained in 
their posts as of January 1967, despite the criticism they received, suggested to the NZHC 
Ottawa that there was serious resistance to Mao and Lin's efforts. The New Zealanders in 
Ottawa were beginning to see a 'palace guard' forming around Mao headed by Chen Boda 
and Jiang Qing. These two, combined with Lin Biao and the PLA formed the basis of Mao's 
power and isolation from the party which they were attacking.450 
The New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong closely followed the attacks on Liu Shaoqi 
and his wife Wang Guangmei. For example, in January 1967 the commission reported on 
Red Guard posters in Beijing showing Liu and Wang on an official trip to Indonesia in 1963. 
Wang was shown lighting a cigarette for Sukarano and Liu dancing with an Indonesian girl. 
The caption described Wang as 'intolerable' and Liu as 'crazed with wine and women' and 
'an ugly fellow of Khrushchev type'.451 The commission noted that rallies followed, with the 
Red Guards claiming that more than 100,000 people attended in Beijing on 8 January where 
Liu and Deng Xiaoping were denounced. The following day a Red Guard newspaper quoted 
Zhou saying that the criticisms were warranted but Mao did not want young revolutionaries 
to go to excess.452 Zhou also told Red Guards that criticisms of others including foreign 
minister Chen Yi and former vice-premier Tan Zhenlin should cease as they were 
undergoing 'self-criticism'.453 Despite the denouncements and rallies Beijing was reported 
by the commissioner as peaceful. 
The commission also noted, starting in January 1967, the rise of former actress and Mao's 
wife Jiang Qing. Jiang would become a major player in the Cultural Revolution and become 
one of the Gang of Four, whose arrest in 1976 would mark the end of the revolution. The 
commission’s interest in Jiang was sparked by an article in The New Statesman by Roderick 
MacFarquhar.454 The commission supported MacFarquhar's suggestion that Jiang was 
positioning herself as the unchallenged interpreter of Mao's thoughts in his later life. This 
was thought to be either by Mao using her as a mouthpiece or her own attempt at power. The 
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commission regarded Jiang as one of the most extreme leaders, but noted that she had lent 
support to Zhou when he warned revolutionaries against excessive criticism.455 Nevertheless 
there was a reluctance on the part of the commissioner to take Jiang seriously: 
As a former actress she may find the Tienanmen [sic] rostrum a more 
satisfying stage than the Shanghai theatre. The sounder observers, who 
normally have regard for Macfarquhar's [sic] views, are sceptical of the 
implication that [Jiang Qing] is seriously in contention as an heir apparent. 
They are more interested in contemplating the nimble footwork of [Zhou] 
En-lai.456 
The Indians were slightly less prejudiced. They noted the growing importance of women in 
the Cultural Revolution and pointed out Jiang Qing was the most prominent of many female 
activists and Red Guard members. However, Jiang Qing was also said by the Indians to have 
a 'personal and rather vindictive vendetta against Mrs Liu'.457 Gendered thinking did not 
stop the Indians from considering Jiang a power broker. They shared the view coming from 
the Soviets that Kang Sheng was 'an up and coming man' due to his close relationship with 
Jiang Qing.458  The lack of public criticism of Kang suggested to the Russians that he had 
become allied to Mao and Lin. 
Lin Biao was not seen publicly for several months after 26 November 1966 which led some 
to wonder whether he had suffered a fall from grace. Meanwhile Jiang was seen to rise 
spectacularly.459 In early 1967 the NZHC in Ottawa was unsure of Zhou's position, but it 
followed the American and Canadian perspective that saw three groupings Mao/Lin/Jiang, 
Deng/Lui, with Zhou in the middle. Zhou had been a mediator between the two extremes 
and had occasionally appeared to support either side. At that moment Zhou appeared to be in 
a position of strength to Canadian watchers.460 The commission was initially less convinced 
of a three way split. It circulated a Yugoslav article461 which argued that Deng Xiaoping was 
not fully aligned with Liu Shaoqi and that it was Deng which represented the third force in 
                                                 
455 NZ Commission Hong Kong to SecEx, 19 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – 
General, ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
456 NZ Commissioner in Hong Kong to SecEx, 12 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China 
– General, ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
457 NZHC Delhi to SecEx, 19 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, ABHS 
W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ  
458 NZHC Delhi to SecEx, 19 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, ABHS 
W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ  
459 NZHC Ottawa to SexEx, 24 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, ABHS 
W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
460 NZHC Ottawa to SexEx, 24 January 1967, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 5, Political Affairs – China – General, ABHS 
W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
461 B. Bogunovic, 'The Storm in July', Politika, no date.  
  
132 
 
Chinese politics bringing the 'Mao and anti-Mao factions' together in 'order to prevent the 
destruction of the party apparatus'.462 While not in complete agreement with the view from 
Ottawa, Indian officials told the New Zealand High Commission in Delhi that they saw a 
strong distinction between the harsh criticism of Liu Shaoqui and the milder treatment of 
Deng Xiaoping.463 The NZHC Delhi also noted that Mao did not have the intention or  
'sufficient strength' to eliminate Liu Shaoqui and Deng Xiaoping by Stalinist measures.  
The fact Deng and Liu continued to hold positions seemed at first to signify strength on their 
part, but as time went on New Zealand officials and their China watching contacts, began to 
wonder if Liu and Deng represented real opposition. There was an acknowledgement that 
the revolution represented an attempt at a new form of politics. The NZHC Delhi noted that 
public criticism of government officials was referred to by the Chinese as 'extensive 
democracy'. A member of the Indian mission in Beijing had been told several times by 
Chinese friends that they saw the current campaign as a 'pure democracy'. However, the 
Indian and NZHC Delhi opinion was that Mao was in control of the mass organisations that 
were denouncing his enemies.464 The British felt the real opposition to Mao was not easy to 
estimate but 'the picture of a nationwide opposition, presided over by Liu and Teng [Deng], 
is almost certainly a deliberate creation for propaganda purposes'.465 
In the view of the commission in Hong Kong, power was vested in a small number of 
people with Mao, Lin, Jiang, Chen Boda, and Kang Shen. Zhou was not seen by the 
commission as being in the core group but was invaluable in maintaining the economy and 
limiting excesses. Below them was a large number of changing faces as new people forced 
themselves to the top only to be found to be lacking revolutionary fervour. The commission 
said, according to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, as of February 1967, eighty percent of the 
Central Committee had been criticised and were now mostly members in name only.466 
The commission noted that revolutionaries had highlighted and exaggerated 'counter-attacks' 
from 'bourgeois reactionaries' which were attempting to gain support through offering 
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increased wages and welfare benefits.467 Liu and Deng were seen by the commission as 
being associated with this opposition and having significant support among party officials 
across the country. However, the commission was uncertain of how coordinated the 
opposition to Mao's policies were. Unbeknown to the outside world, Liu Shaoqi was placed 
under house arrest in 1967 and later subjected to torture and severe maltreatment. Despite 
his incarceration he kept his title as President of the PRC until 31 October 1968. He would 
die a year later from causes mostly related to his captivity. His arrest was not made public 
and he continued to be the subject of heavy criticism.468 
At various points it seemed the revolution was slowing or coming to an end. The northern 
spring brought the need for the planting of crops which meant a return to the countryside of 
many who had taken part in revolutionary activity over the winter. Research obtained by the 
State Department indicated that the only two months when labour was not absolutely 
required for farm production was from mid-November to mid-January, the months when the 
revolution seemed to reach a peak.469 During the spring planting season of 1967 the British 
Embassy in Beijing had told the commission that they had detected signs of moderation. 
Schools begun to resume classes, efforts were made to prevent disruption to spring 
ploughing, revolutionary exchanges ceased, protests at foreign embassies dwindled, and the 
army took up responsibility for security in Beijing. The Chinese press was placing a greater 
emphasis on the role of the PLA in educating the revolutionary masses, ensuring a proper 
proportion of party officials remained in their posts, and correcting the indiscipline of the 
revolutionary groups.470 To the commission these were signs of consolidation rather than an 
end to the revolution: 
Rather than a complete reversal of Mao's line of unleashing the masses, it 
is more likely a case of taking one step back in order to take two steps 
forward.471 
Signs of a return to normality were short-lived. By April the Americans and the Commission 
in Hong Kong both noted an increase in denouncements of Deng and Liu.472 The New 
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Zealand Embassy in Washington noted an article by Stanley Karnow in the Washington Post 
stating that Mao was rekindling the revolution and that this was damaging the position of 
Zhou. Donald agreed with the article and said it matched the information the State 
Department was receiving. Zhou, it seemed to the Americans, was being attacked by the left 
and the right and 'had blotted his copybook with Mao and that while the old man is prepared 
to make use of him temporarily he is also looking for an opportunity to get rid of his 
unsympathetic Premier'.473  
American experts in the State Department (although not Donald) thought Mao had 
reluctantly agreed to slacken the pace of the revolution in order to facilitate spring planting, 
but as of April was willing to relaunch the struggle, but power was increasingly in the hands 
of the PLA and the civilian bureaucracy.474 Meanwhile the British Embassy in Beijing told 
the Commission that the attacks on Liu were being used as a way of reinvigorating the 
revolutionary movement and uniting the splintered cadres, while also allowing others to 
'purchase forgiveness in return for denouncing Liu'.475 The Canadians also saw the up-swing 
in the revolution as an attempt to shift Zhou, who they considered to then hold the most 
right wing position in the Chinese leadership. Like the Americans, the Canadians felt the 
need to ensure food security had ceased to be at crisis levels and so Mao no longer needed 
Zhou's restraint.476 Daniel Molgat at the Canadian Department of External Affairs admitted 
this view left questions. They could not explain why the attacks on Liu were so intense 
when Deng was a more obvious scape-goat. Nor could they explain why Liu could not be 
dismissed from his position as President by a session of the National People's Congress. Yet 
the Canadians doubted that Mao would be able to revive the revolution as it was bogged 
down in the provinces. They assumed Zhou was in some way aligned to Liu due to his 
pragmatic positions, but admitted denouncements of Zhou were still not permissible in April 
1967, and thus his position was still solid at that point in time. 
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Zhou was near universally popular with outside observers. He was seen as competent, 
reliable, and moderate by the diplomatic circles in which New Zealand discussed China. 
New Zealand officials had been impressed by Zhou when they saw him up close at the 
Geneva Conference of 1954477 and criticism of Zhou is hard to find in any of the discussions 
New Zealand officials had about China during the Cultural Revolution. Some others, such as 
the French, expressed open admiration for Zhou. They thought any realistic successor to 
Mao would require total adherence to Maoist principles, but hoped that Zhou's pragmatism 
would make him the next supreme leader.478 Zhou would continue on as Premier, never 
seeming to fall out of favour, but never being associated with the revolutionary circle around 
Mao. Zhou’s position would be strengthened after Lin’s death in 1971.479 Much later, Henry 
Kissinger noted Zhou's ability to stay both practical and indispensable to Mao almost right 
up until their deaths in 1976.480  
The New Zealand commission was always the most confident of Zhou's influence and the 
ability of the Government to act in moderation when needed or desired. This view stemmed 
from Beijing's handling of its relations with Hong Kong especially during the communist 
supported riots that hit the colony in 1967.481 The commission noted that foreign trade 
continued despite the xenophobic rhetoric of the revolution and Beijing's poor relations with 
the outside world. The attempts at maintaining trade with the USSR was considered by the 
commission to be strong evidence of the influence of moderate forces in the Chinese 
leadership or at least the ability of the radicals to act moderately in some areas.482 The 
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commission gave Zhou a large amount of credit for keeping the country on track during 
Mao's revolution. 
If anyone deserves the title of China's Man of the Year, it must be Premier 
[Zhou] who has exerted a decisive influence on the course of events. He 
early aligned himself with the Maoists and paid appropriate tribute to Mao 
and Lin [Biao], but he supported prominent party officials under attack 
until it became impossible not to bend with the wind. Foreign Minister 
Chen Yi for one probably still holds his position only because of [Zhou's] 
influence. It is [Zhou] En-lai who has been the supreme negotiator, the 
chief spokesman of the Party Centre in its endeavours to unite warring Red 
Guard factions throughout the country. It was he who was primarily 
responsible for calming the major trouble spots of Wuhan and Canton. 
While major figures on both right and left have fallen, [Zhou] has 
remained a dominant figure.483 
Yet the characterisation of Zhou as a moderate was not universally agreed. Alexander, the 
chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), told the NZHC Singapore 
that he did not agree with the characterisation of the competing groups as being moderates 
and extremists. He saw it more as pragmatists and ideologues. In Alexander's view, the 
'moderates' such as Zhou could be very extreme at times, even if he was more pragmatic 
than the ideologues.484 
The debates over the direction of the revolution and the makeup and power of the leadership 
tell us of the difficulty of establishing basic facts of Chinese politics. At the same time, it 
shows how the New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong and later the rest of the 
Department of External Affairs became confident of the control Mao had over the 
revolution. Yet, the commission was still dismissive about the results of the revolution after 
its first year-and-a-half. The People's Republic had not collapsed or fallen into civil war but 
neither had China entered into Mao’s desired perpetual state of revolution.  
Despite the upheaval experienced throughout 1967, China at the beginning 
of 1968 is still a functioning entity, and the writ of Peking still extends to 
the country's borders. But Chairman Mao's ideal of a China in a state of 
perceptual revolution has not been realized. The “little red generals” have 
been forced to return to the classroom, and rebellion will only be justified 
if its spearhead is pointed at China's Khrushchev. Those such as the May 
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16 Group, who pointed the spearhead in other directions – such as against 
[Zhou] En-lai – have lost power.485  
While the extent of the disorder was debated by Western observers, the perceived fluidity of 
power amongst China’s leadership added to the general sense of flux occurring in both 
China and the wider region. New Zealand officials were generally confident that there were 
limits being placed on the chaos by Mao, Zhou and others, but the direction of the 
revolution would depend on how the Chinese military decided to act. 
4.3.2 Role of the PLA 
The role of the PLA was seen by many in New Zealand's diplomatic circles as crucial to 
China's ability to sustain the revolution without the state collapsing. New Zealand officials 
kept watch on any signs that the PLA would intervene in the revolution either in support of 
Mao or against him in a coup. Perhaps ironically, given fears of Chinese military 
expansionism, the PLA was perceived by New Zealand officials as the entity that could 
stabilise the revolution in China. Yet the state of Chinese civil-military relations was even 
less clear than how power and influence flowed inside the civilian leadership. The level of 
influence of any faction on the army was unclear, certainly in the first two years of the 
revolution, as was whether the PLA would act with unity or was as fractured as the body 
politic seemed to be. Given the attitude amongst External Affairs that the Cultural 
Revolution was a largely irrational exercise, or at least against the long-term interests of the 
Chinese state, it was generally assumed that the PLA would eventually tire of the chaos and 
restore order by force. It was left open as to whether this would be on the initiative of the 
military itself or following some faction of the political leadership interested in stemming 
the revolution.  
Generally, the PLA was seen a faction in itself and acting in a unified if not always coherent 
fashion; it appeared as if the military took some time to decide how to handle the revolution. 
The relationship between the Red Guards and the PLA was not clear initially, but it soon 
appeared the guards were a nuisance to the military. Eventually the PLA would begin to 
support the province-by-province transition of power from the party to revolutionary 
committees. This confirmed the impression that the PLA was willing to support the 
                                                 
485 NZ Commission in Hong Kong, 9 January 1968, NYP 3/16/1 Vol 6, Political Affairs – China – General, 
ABHS W4628 6958 Box 46, ANZ 
  
138 
 
revolution, although more to support a stable transition of power rather than radical action in 
support for or against Mao and his supporters. 
At first, the American view shared with New Zealand was that the 'Red Guard' was a single 
paramilitary force with a 'reserve function' to the PLA.486 The Americans had heard reports 
that the Red Guards had been provided with training from PLA bases. While unsure if this 
was true, the Americans saw such training as a dangerous step toward anarchy and a sign of 
low confidence in the PLA. Around the same time Jiang announced that the PLA would take 
over maintenance of public security from the police.487 This followed Red Guard criticism 
of the commander of the Ministry of Public Security Xie Fuzhi. From the Indian Embassy in 
Beijing, the commission in Hong Kong understood that the Public Security Force had been 
dominated by supporters of Liu Shaoqi. However, Xie was a major supporter of the Cultural 
Revolution and would remain in his position as Minister for Public Security and would be 
elected chairman of the Beijing revolutionary committee when it was set up later in 1967. 
The New Zealand High Commission in Canada saw the PLA as having an important 
function in supporting attacks by Red Guards aimed at the party: 
The Red Guards... may have been created in co-operation between Lin 
[Biao] and Mao [Zedong] in the face of resistance in the Central 
Committee as a means of destroying resistance in the Party and of purging 
it without having to rely on the Army itself to do so. Certainly, after an 
initial stage in which they attacked individual citizens for 'bourgeois' 
tendencies, the Red Guard seem to have become primarily a weapon 
controlled lightly but fairly surely by the Army, which was directed at 
Party organs and officials at the level of the provincial and regional 
bureaux; as the movement developed, their attacks spread to individuals in 
the central organs in Peking where they remain concentrated at the present 
time.488 
The use of the PLA to support revolutionaries in the creation of revolutionary committees to 
replace existing party-controlled local governments was considered by the commission to be 
a turning point in the revolution.489 The commission noted the Liberation Army Daily had on 
25 January 1967 proclaimed that the army could no longer remain neutral. The same day the 
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Central Military Commission ordered all army units to support the revolutionaries where 
necessary. Mao was said to support the measure and prior to the announcement the PLA had 
already suppressed 300 'counter-revolutionaries' in Harbin. For the first time PLA units had 
appeared on the streets carrying arms. Counter to previous statements from the commission, 
it now suggested that the Mao-Lin group might be in the minority and Mao was understating 
rather than overstating the level of opposition. As the commission put it: 
The fact that Mao has had to fall back on the support of the PLA may be 
regarded as a reflection of the inherent weakness and disorganisation of the 
revolutionary rebel red guard forces which he has endeavoured to forge as 
the instrument of his revolutionary vision of China's future. Mao may 
realize that the forces he has released are going to be very difficult to 
control, as indiscipline and excesses among the revolutionary rebel groups 
have been reported from many places.490 
Associated with the wider question as to the extent to which Mao was in control of the 
revolution, was to what extent Mao would use the PLA to suppress the revolution if chaos 
and disorder went beyond what was in his interests. NZHC Ottawa thought Mao might be 
no more able to control the military than the complex web of competing revolutionary 
organisations.491 The view being shared by the Far Eastern Division of Canadian External 
Affairs was that Mao would not use the PLA to put down the revolution as this would be an 
admission of ideological failure and the army could be difficult to send back to their 
barracks once stability had been restored. NZHC Ottawa warned, along the lines of an 
article in the The Economist of 10 December 1966, that rivalries between the political and 
military establishments could be a further cause of destabilisation.492  
The amount of support for the revolution in the PLA was never clear. The commission 
pointed to possible revolutionary activity in the PLA with the creation of a cultural 
revolution group in its command structure and Chinese military press warnings of 
reactionaries in the PLA leadership, which usually preceded denouncements493 Signs of the 
military's involvement in public life or in the maintenance of order were considered 
significant by several observers but not always for the same reasons. Increases in the 
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military activity in the civilian sphere was cautiously seen by the Embassy in Washington 
and by some in the State Department as the military undermining Mao and supporting the 
party. 
…some other China experts in the State Department have pointed out to 
us... that, despite the renewal of the campaign against Liu and [Deng] and 
other indications of revived activity among the extremists, the actual 
running of the country seems still to be in the hands of the Army and its 
collaboraters [sic] within the civilian bureaucracy. The feeling of these 
experts seems to be that, whatever, the superficial appearances may be, the 
reality is that power lies in the hands of the Army and is being exercised 
not to advance the Cultural Revolution but to maintain order and to keep 
the economy running more or less smoothly.494 
This was part of a wider general assumption by the Americans and others that the military 
would try and maintain order regardless of whether it supported the wider aims of the 
revolution.495 Yet the commission saw the encroachment of the PLA into civilian affairs as a 
sign that the PLA was supporting the revolution rather than undermining it and that the PLA 
was fighting the party rather than propping it up: 
The PLA is now deeply involved in the campaign; the Peoples Daily has in 
fact inferred that its support for the revolutionary rebels is the difference 
between victory and defeat. At first reluctant to commit the army in their 
support, Mao appears to have been finally forced to take this step, 
presumably because of the strength of the opposition. In announcing the 
army's full support for the proletarian revolutionaries, the Liberation Army 
Daily quoted Mao's dictum that political power grows out of the barrel of a 
gun. Another dictum of Mao's, that the party must always control the gun, 
not the gun the party, seems to have been conveniently forgotten.496 
These positions were reflective of the commission's overall difference of opinion to the 
State Department. The revolution, in the commission's eyes, was under more control by the 
senior leadership than believed by the Americans. The State Department was more inclined 
to see events as chaotic and unpredictable; they thought Mao was riding out a storm into 
which he had intentionally sailed. Both saw greater involvement by the PLA as confirmation 
of their overall attitudes. To the commission the use of the PLA was an example of the 
leadership exercising their control over the situation, but to some in the State Department it 
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was more evidence of opposition to Mao's excesses. While the commission agreed Mao 
seemed to be 'riding the wave, and probably enjoying himself too', the commission could 
see signs of moderation in the Mao-Lin group.497 
Another perceived source of tension in the PLA was a split between those who favoured 
traditional military professionalism and those more influenced by Mao's teaching on 
revolutionary warfare. Mao's approach placed greater emphasis on the mass army and on 
guerrilla warfare while minimising the role of expensive capital equipment, technological 
development, and the professional military leadership. For the British the split had 
ramifications for foreign policy as they thought the professionals in the PLA wanted better 
relations with the USSR in order to gain access to modern weapons but this was opposed by 
the Maoists with their 'emphasis on terrain, morale, mobility and guerrilla tactics'.498 The 
Americans also noted this source of tension to New Zealand officials.499  
As the revolution continued the PLA's involvement in internal security and civil 
administration grew and became more obvious to outside observers. With greater 
involvement in the running of the country the PLA brought itself into conflict with 
revolutionary organisations even while it facilitated the transfer of power from the party to 
revolutionary committees. The commission noted this tension and the attempts by the 
leadership to reconcile the PLA with the revolutionary masses.500 The role of the PLA in the 
revolution and its goals were perhaps even less clear to Western observers than the 
relationship between the factions in the Government, but it did have more influence on 
China's foreign policy. A military preoccupied with maintaining internal order was less 
likely to take part in foreign adventures. This helps explain China’s decline as a military 
threat in the minds of New Zealand planners from 1968.  
By 1968 the revolution was eighteen months old. The increase in the PLA’s role was a sign 
of likely greater future stability in China and greater preoccupation of the Chinese military. 
The realisation among New Zealand defence officials that China posed less of a threat came 
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just as the PLA worked to restore order and transfer power to revolutionary organisations. 
The PLA’s facilitation of the transfer of power to revolutionary organisations would be an 
aspect of the revolution in which New Zealand observers, especially the Commission in 
Hong Kong, took great interest. 
4.3.3 New Organisational Structures and the Economy 
The revolution saw local Communist Party governance replaced by new revolutionary 
committees. This transfer of power would begin in early 1967 and take until late in 1968 to 
replace all the previous regional bodies. Initially the call was for revolutionary organisations 
to seize power but soon revolutionary committees were organised through a 'triple alliance' 
of revolutionaries, the PLA, and pro-revolutionary or rehabilitated former leaders from the 
party. The failed attempt to create a 'people's commune' in Shanghai, based on the Paris 
Commune of 1871, showed the difficulty in using revolutionary zeal alone to create new 
institutions. The commune's failure showed that revolutionary renewal of China's 
governance would require cooperation between the party, the military, and the revolutionary 
organisations.  
The transfer of power would be easier in some places than others. Some provinces would 
experience a considerable amount of violence. New Zealand observers and their foreign 
colleagues were concerned that the transfer of power would cause an immense amount of 
strain on the Chinese state or cause severe damage to the economy. New Zealand officials 
and their foreign colleagues had little solid information on which to base their assessments 
of the Chinese economy. Their predictions for the Chinese economy were largely based on 
the assumption that the disorder of the Cultural Revolution would affect production. This 
was either through direct disruption of production or transportation, or through indirect 
effects such as through the need of workers to take part in revolutionary meetings and 
demonstrations.  
The NZHC Ottawa noted the regionalism the revolution was creating. The high commission 
considered the effect of the revolution on China's structure to be unpredictable and thought 
extreme outcomes were possible. If a future government of national unity emerged, then it 
might have to be even more 'coercive and illiberal' in order to reaffirm Beijing's power. 
Alternatively, a decentralised state with a weak governing party but strong military was also 
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foreseen as potentially more coercive and illiberal than the then current situation.501 By 
comparison the NZHC London thought a civil war would be possible if the military became 
pressured by the decentralisation and split along regional lines.502 Following the failure in 
Shanghai, the Americans noted to New Zealand officials signs of Zhou's moderating 
influence on the transfers of power. The masses were still being encouraged to seize power, 
but they were told to choose their targets. As an example of the new directive, the new 
revolutionary organisation in Heilongjiang was staffed by mainly those from the old party 
structure with only a few being made scapegoats.503 
The commission saw attempts at co-opting the PLA and sympathetic party elements into the 
new revolutionary committees as a way of consolidating and coordinating the revolution 
rather than halting it.504 The commission pointed to reports in the Chinese press of the 
takeover of local party committees by revolutionaries in the provinces of Shanxi, Guizhou, 
Heilongjiang, Fujian, and the cities of Shanghai and Qingdao. The Chinese press had been 
full of 'adulatory articles' on the action of revolutionaries in these areas and claims of 
accompanying increases in production. Local broadcasts had also claimed revolutionary 
takeovers in Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangxi, and Shaanxi provinces but they had not been 
confirmed by officials in Beijing. The commission noted to Wellington an editorial from the 
People's Daily on 10 February 1967 which listed four factors that made the struggle in 
Heilongjiang a good example for proletarian revolutionaries. The revolutionaries had united 
with Mao's supporters amongst the leaders of the provincial party committee and with the 
PLA; they had seized media outlets to improve propaganda efforts prior to taking control of 
the provincial party committee; 'left forces' had united with 'middle forces' to attack 'most 
stubborn reactionary forces'; and had used Mao's thought to keep the struggle on the right 
path.505 The article said it was the combination of proletarian revolutionaries, PLA units, and 
pro-Mao supporters within the Party that was important in seizing power away from those 
who would take the 'capitalist road'. The People's Daily emphasised that existing party 
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leaders could and should remain in positions of responsibility if they stood with Mao, and 
those who had committed mistakes could be rehabilitated through re-education. 
The commission noted that the seizure of power by revolutionaries was at different stages 
across the country and achieved much more easily in some areas than others: 'It is taking a 
long time... for a single spark struck in Shanghai to start the prairie fire'.506 In some areas the 
rebel committees had been set up and media outlets taken over, but the provincial and 
municipal party committees were still in command. Conflict and protest continued in some 
places where revolutionaries had taken complete control. The emphasis on unity in the 
Chinese press was taken by the commission as being a sign of the great difficulty in uniting 
the various revolutionary organisations to run the new provincial administrations. The 
commission had heard reports that Red Guard units in Beijing were refusing to work with 
other units to create a new revolutionary administration for the capital city. The disruption to 
the normal chain of command was also thought by the commission to have created 
confusion and hindered the consolidation of revolutionary forces.507 
Outside observers worried the expansion of revolutionary activity to heavy industry and 
agriculture would place a significant strain on the state and the economy. The NZHC 
London thought that if Mao's campaigns were to be pressed in all sectors at once then the 
economy and the civil administration could grind to a halt, but this was not likely.508 The 
Commission in Hong Kong noted from January 1967 that the revolution was spreading to 
factories and the countryside. Like other commentators, the NZHC in Ottawa did not put 
any faith in the economic outcomes of Mao's revolution. Spreading the revolution to farms 
and agriculture was seen as particularity dangerous by the Canadians in their reports to the 
NZHC which were repeated to Wellington. 
The economy of China has probably already suffered seriously from the 
activities of the Red Guard, from the gaps... in the ranks of able but 
ideologically 'undependable' specialists and technicians... and from the 
disorder which has apparently already been created in the production, 
distribution and communication sectors. If the recent decision to spread the 
Cultural Revolution to factories and farms is actively carried out, the 
paralysing effects on the economy would be much more widespread and 
pronounced; there are reports that this has begun. If the Mao-Lin group 
wins, their views are likely to be unconducive to the realistic, rational or 
effective development of the economic sector. If the group resisting them 
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wins, we might expect more realistic and rational economic policies and 
practices. However, we do not know to what extent differences over 
economic policy lie at the root of the present struggle. In the absence of 
such knowledge it is difficult to predict what kind of policy shifts might 
result.509 
A few months later the Canadians noted that the Chinese were able to fulfil all their export 
contracts and that exports to Hong Kong increased during major unrest in January 1967. Yet, 
they also noted reports of famine in Guizhou and disruptions to rail and port traffic. They 
concluded there was not any evidence that damage to Chinese industry caused by the 
revolution had reached 'critical proportions'.510 NZHC London noted Zhou's calls to protect 
overseas trade by allowing goods to flow through ports and the free passage of mail and 
telegrams. Zhou had also urged the rebel organisations to resist taking over more 
organisations and to keep supervising the ones which they already controlled.511 The 
commission wrote of Zhou's successful attempts to get rival revolutionary organisations in 
Canton to agree not to disrupt the Canton Spring Trade Fair which was a major export 
business opportunity for the PRC.512 Generally, it appears that New Zealand's circle of 
observers did not find evidence of the economic disaster they predicted during the first 
months of the revolution, but this did not mean they saw any economic benefit to China 
from the revolution, simply that it had not done any major immediate damage.  
The interest in China’s economy could be seen as an attempt to gauge the extent of the 
revolution, with the assumption that revolution would be damaging to economic output. It 
was also an attempt to determine the stability of the Chinese state and its ability to fund the 
military. Economic predictions were not part of the defence assessments of 1965, but there 
was an assumption that China’s power would grow into the late 1960s and 1970s.513 Trade 
with China during the Cultural Revolution was not yet on a such a scale that it was a major 
consideration of officials. That would start to change from 1970, but there was more of a 
focus on South East Asia than China.514 Even if the revolution did not damage the economy 
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to the extent that had been predicted initially, such assumptions helped break down the idea 
that China was a growing power. Certainly, External Affairs attempted to gain a 
comprehensive look at the situation in China and with so few reliable sources of 
information, any news was potentially meaningful.  
Reports on China from diplomatic posts other than the Commission in Hong Kong slowed 
over the second half of 1967 and into 1968, but the commission continued to report on 
Chinese politics and the economy as well as the Hong Kong riots of 1967 which dominated 
events in the colony. Reports on mainland events from the commission were dominated by 
the transfer of power to the revolutionary committees. By June the commission was 
reporting that three-way alliances had been established in four provinces, and the cities of 
Beijing and Shanghai. Ten provinces were under military control, five had set up provisional 
organs of power, and the remainder were out of touch with the capital.515 While the 
commission continued to be confident of the ability of Beijing to place limits on the 
revolution, the Indian view had darkened by August 1967 and they were now envisioning 
the possibility of a return to the China of the 1920s where de facto control was in the hands 
of the provinces with limited de jure control in Beijing.516 Yet by the following year, and 
despite considerable violence reported by the commission, revolutionary committees had 
been established in twenty-four of the twenty-nine provinces. Only Yunnan, Tibet, Guangxi, 
Fujian, and Xinjiang remained and delegations from these provinces were in Beijing 
attempting to settle their differences.517 
 CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
China's foreign relations became particularly difficult in the first years of the revolution. 
Relations with much of the outside world became frozen if not openly hostile. Communist 
China's xenophobia became extreme as the Red Guards and officials alike viscerally 
denounced the bourgeois West and the revisionist Soviet bloc. As Henry Kissinger later put 
it: 
China's diplomatic posture came unhinged. The world was treated to the 
nearly incomprehensible sight of a China raging with indiscriminate fury 
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against the Soviet bloc, the Western powers, and its own history and 
culture.518 
The British Embassy in Beijing was sacked by Red Guards; its staff were harassed and 
denied exit visas for months. The Soviet embassy was subjected to noisy round-the-clock 
demonstrations to prevent its staff working or sleeping. Chinese diplomats across the world 
were recalled home for re-education and/or denouncement. Only Albania and a smattering 
of African nations maintained functional – let alone friendly – relations with Beijing during 
the late 1960s.  
Observations of China during the early revolution were focused on domestic affairs due to 
the complex, tumultuous, and unprecedented nature of the revolution. Observations of 
foreign policy were pushed to the background for some time, but as the revolution went on 
diplomatic discussions of Chinese foreign policy by New Zealand's officials became more 
common and better informed. The question of Chinese support for North Vietnam and the 
likelihood of Beijing's intervention into the war was a major interest for New Zealand 
officials, as it had been for defence planners since 1965, but so was coming to grips with the 
major external pressures on China and how it was likely to react to them. While New 
Zealand’s debates about China in the defence and diplomatic fields ran in separate streams, 
they both looked to understand the likelihood of China entering a major conflict. A major 
change in Chinese foreign policy had major implications for New Zealand’s threat 
perceptions. As China’s foreign policy shifted in 1968, so too did New Zealand’s perception 
of threat.519 
The extent of Beijing and Moscow's mutual hostility became more and more evident during 
this period as the idea that Beijing could seek rapprochement with the west to counter the 
Soviet threat crept slowly into New Zealand's diplomatic circles and built credence. Defence 
officials adjusted their views slightly later as Sino-Soviet relations continued to 
deteriorate.520 However, some sense of stability in China was necessary before 
rapprochement was possible. Western countries needed to be assured that Beijing was 
capable of making stable and predictable foreign policy before there was a serious 
possibility of engagement with Beijing. Nevertheless, a China thrown into chaos was not a 
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stable partner for diplomatic relations, but neither was it likely to be able to dominate South 
East Asia in the way New Zealand defence officials had once feared.  
4.4.1 External Pressures and Vietnam 
Much time was spent by New Zealand's diplomatic circles determining which external 
pressures were having an impact on Chinese politics and foreign policy. The Americans 
were much more convinced than the British that American action in Vietnam had been the 
external force responsible for the Cultural Revolution. The British meanwhile saw China's 
foreign policy failures elsewhere as boosting Mao's critics, causing him to initiate the 
revolution. In early 1967, the New Zealand Embassy in Washington summed up the 
differences: 
There is one other point... with which experts here would agree but the 
Foreign Office may not, and this relates to the broad policy question... the 
Charge says “It seems probable that the setbacks in foreign policy suffered 
by China in 1965, e.g. the collapse of the Algiers conference and the 
debacle in Indonesia, will have stimulated Mao's critics.” American 
observers would probably point out, however, that the strongest external 
stimulus has been that provided by the United States stand in Vietnam. By 
sending large numbers of troops to South Vietnam from July 1965 on, the 
Administration has, it is argued, revived the Chinese fear of an American 
invasion, and in so doing it has brought to a head differences over 
strategy... Analysts here also feel that the threat of invasion precipitated 
Mao's decision to launch the Cultural Revolution, for they point out that 
one of the justifications continually being advanced by the regime is the 
necessity to prepare for an American attack. These experts therefore 
maintain that, insofar as the present disarray in Peking is due to external 
factors, it is not the minor relaxations in Western policy towards China 
which have been responsible, but on the contrary the hard line which the 
United States has taken on the crucial issue of Vietnam. That there is a role 
for the carrot as well as the stick in getting the Chinese to adopt a more 
reasonable attitude, few here would deny; but there are not, as far as we are 
aware, very many in the United States Government who would agree that 
the West should rely primarily on relaxing its isolation and encirclement of 
China, and should do so before Peking is ready to adopt a more moderate 
line.521 (Original emphasis)   
In other words, American experts thought American power in South East Asia had caused 
the revolution but a relaxation of that power was unlikely to generate a more cooperative 
response by Beijing. While this might have overstated American influence in the Cultural 
Revolution, such a view was compatible with New Zealand fears during 1965 of Chinese 
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intervention in Vietnam which has been discussed above.522 Then the most serious concern 
was that the American escalation in Vietnam would trigger a Chinese intervention.523 By 
early 1967 confidence began to grow in the US and, to a lesser extent, in New Zealand that 
China would not intervene in Vietnam and the question had become what could be done to 
improve relations between China and the US.524 
The Canadians also put some weight to the idea that events in Vietnam had helped spur the 
Cultural Revolution. They noted evidence of air raid drills, efforts to disperse the 
populations of large Chinese cities and other civil defence precautions which suggested the 
Chinese leadership was taking the threat from the US seriously.525 By contrast the British 
thought the revolution had little to do with China's 'external preoccupations'.526 They saw no 
immediate threat to Hong Kong or Vietnam. They considered the trouble in Macau to be 
caused by local issues.527 There had been troop movements in the west and north of the 
country but the British did not consider them to be a prelude to a clash with the USSR or 
with India.528 
The Canadians were split as to whether the Cultural Revolution could be preparing the 
Chinese people for war and whether the leadership envisioned any 'external ventures'.529 The 
three possibilities for Chinese action given by the Canadians to the NZHC Ottawa were an 
attack on Macau, an attack on India, or an attack on Vietnam. Only an attack on Macau was 
thought to be remotely realistic and then only as the result of Red Guard excesses rather 
than as a planned offensive. Ottawa dismissed the idea of an invasion of Hong Kong: 
“events in the past months have shown the Chinese to be mad and irrational, but not that 
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mad” (original emphasis).530 While perhaps more hawkish in their discussions with New 
Zealand officials than some, the Canadians still considered the external stimulus on China 
was ideological rather than military and that the ideological stimulus had come from the 
USSR rather than American activity in South Vietnam.  
The NZHC in Ottawa was not willing to make clear predictions itself on the future of 
Chinese foreign policy. It noted the hardening of Chinese foreign policy combined with a 
growing indifference on the part of China’s leaders to the country’s growing international 
isolation. The willingness on the part of those pushing the revolution was seen as a sign that 
the Chinese leadership did not believe 'the USA will force war on them'.531 Nor did the 
NZHC see any sign China was contemplating a military confrontation with the US over 
Vietnam. However, the NZHC warned (in the most qualified terms) that the irrationality 
seen in Chinese domestic policy could spill-over into an ill-considered military action.  
Nevertheless, much that is quite irrational in practical terms has already 
been done by those who appear to be in the ascendancy in Peking, with 
serious domestic consequences; there is no reason to expect greater 
rationality in their assessment of the international consequences of their 
acts, and we cannot exclude the possibility, for example, that an act of 
desperation in protecting their threatened ascendancy may lead them to 
launch an external adventure of some sort, not inconceivably in the form of 
military confrontation with the USA.532 
Ottawa was also concerned that Hong Kong might be a flash point for such an overreaction. 
Molgat [at the Canadian Department of External Affairs] concluded by 
reiterating a remark that he had made to us previously and of which the 
Hong Kong disturbances are a graphic illustration – the present danger in 
Chinese foreign policy is not so much the likelihood of foreign adventures 
undertaken on official instruction as much as the possibility of an irrational 
response to alleged “provocation”. It should not be lightly assumed that 
China's reaction to any event which the Chinese people might consider to 
be of significance will necessarily be guided by her own best interests.533 
Regardless of how much weight observers placed on the idea of a foreign adventure by 
Beijing, it was generally agreed that the Cultural Revolution was largely inward looking. 
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The US and UK both told New Zealand officials that if Mao and his successors were 
successful in imposing their will, then foreign policy would remain inflexible.534 China 
would not send large numbers of forces into Vietnam unless the security of China was 
threatened. However, the British – unlike the Americans – did not acknowledge the threat 
posed by Chinese subversion and Beijing's support for national liberation movements. Such 
an omission was viewed by Washington and the NZ Embassy there as being unbalanced,535 
but soon after, the Secretary of External Affairs wrote to the NZHC in Delhi saying he 
thought Chinese foreign policy had been characterised by inactivity in both its diplomatic 
and subversive efforts.536 This shows that New Zealand views on the risk posed by Beijing-
backed revolutionaries was beginning to change.537  
In contacting Delhi, Laking was seeking the Indian view on 'Chinese territorial ambitions in 
its south-western border area'.538 The Indians did not share the secretary's view that Chinese 
foreign policy was inactive, but they did agree it had slowed down with fewer foreign 
communists visiting China. The Indians believed that Chinese foreign policy was continuing 
much as it had before the Cultural Revolution despite the return to China of many Chinese 
diplomats. The Indians noted that the Chinese had been active in Tanzania, Pakistan and 
Cambodia. Propaganda campaigns continued in Thailand and India. In the Indian view, 
China was looking to confirm its great power status and that it was the leader in promoting 
world revolution.  
New Zealand officials asked if the Indians thought China was aggressive or simply looking 
to gain influence. In reply the Indians noted that China had showed restraint in Vietnam but 
its search for great power status would mean it would not like to be seen to be pushed 
around by either the Soviet Union or the United States.539 The Indians thought that it would 
suit China to establish a series of communist client states in South East Asia and there was 
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no reason to abandon this programme. However, the Indians thought Chinese foreign policy 
was xenophobic and subconsciously driven by old ideas about the superiority of the Han 
people, the concept of the Middle Kingdom, and the inferiority of barbarians living on its 
periphery. Indian officials thought these attitudes were ideologically reinforced by the 
success of the Chinese Communists in defeating the Chinese Nationalists. These officials 
felt this should not be exaggerated and they were much more relaxed about the Cultural 
Revolution than their Western counterparts. They considered Western reports of the 
upheaval in China to be highly exaggerated. Despite the mass meetings, parades, and signs 
of mass hysteria, Indian officials considered the revolution to be well under the control of 
the Government, especially Zhou. In their view Zhou was keeping the revolution from 
affecting the administration in any significant way. 
As Delhi suggested, there were signs that China would demonstrate its unwillingness to be 
bullied by the Soviets and the Americans. The New Zealand Embassy in Washington noted 
that for the first time the Chinese were warning both Washington and Moscow against 
taking advantage of the Cultural Revolution and that the Americans considered the Soviets a 
major military preoccupation for the Chinese. New Zealand officials were coming to realise 
that China saw the Soviets as a greater threat than the West.540 
The threat [to China] may, moreover, be seen as coming more from the 
Russians than from the Americans. The former Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Kosaka, told the State Department after his visit to China in September 
that the factory managers and others he spoke to felt a much stronger and 
more personal antipathy to the Soviet Union than to the United States, and 
Donald [the Deputy Director of the US State Department Office of Asian 
Communist Affairs] thought that this is probably true of most of the 
managerial class in China, including its military members. It is unlikely 
that even Mao would take the irrational step of actually launching a foreign 
adventure, whether in Vietnam or against the Soviet Union, but it is by no 
means inconceivable that Peking leadership may deliberately play up the 
Soviet bogey to strengthen its position at home, and in fact it seems to 
have been doing so in the last couple of weeks.541 
Unlike Mao and the other revolutionary leaders, Zhou’s rationality was never questioned. 
Throughout the turbulent years of 1966-1968, Zhou was consistently viewed by almost 
every observer in New Zealand’s diplomatic circles as actively moderating the revolution 
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and its effects on Chinese foreign policy. However, the figures seen by outside observers to 
be opposing the revolution were not necessarily considered to be more inclined towards 
détente than the revolutionaries. In March 1967 the NZHC London noted that The 
Economist, unnamed American scholars, and the Far Eastern Department of the UK Foreign 
Office, were of the opinion that the 'revisionist' group of Liu and Deng favoured a tougher 
policy towards the Vietnam War.542 This posed the awkward possibility that those opposed 
to the revolution wanted to challenge the Americans in Vietnam even more than those 
advancing the revolution and that stability in Chinese politics might not bring better 
relations with the West.  
Expectations of Chinese intervention in Vietnam were dampened by strains in Hanoi's 
relationship with Beijing. The Americans were seeing signs of Hanoi's independence from 
Beijing. The State Department told New Zealand officials of its confidence that Beijing 
would not intervene in Vietnam unless at Hanoi's request, a request the Americans were now 
confident Hanoi would not make. It seemed to the State Department that Hanoi was afraid 
of China but the North Vietnamese were concerned about a political rather than military 
intervention in Vietnam.543 Hanoi's publication of letters between President Lyndon Johnson 
and Ho Chi Minh on the conditions for peace talks was seen by the State Department as a 
means of limiting Beijing's influence, but it also delayed making such talks possible. Yet, a 
diminishing of Beijing's influence on Hanoi was seen as positive from a US perspective,544 
with the Americans hoping for a Sino-Vietnamese split to match the Sino-Soviet split. This 
contrasts strongly with earlier New Zealand defence assumptions that implicitly assumed 
Hanoi and Beijing were more monolithic.545  
Zhou confirmed in April 1967 that China would intervene in Vietnam if Hanoi asked for it, 
or if China's own security was threatened. Chen Boda added a third trigger: an attempt by 
the United States and the Soviet Union to impose a settlement of the conflict which 
“betrayed” the interests of North Vietnam. An American landing in North Vietnam or the 
overthrow of the North Vietnamese regime was considered by the US to be unacceptable to 
the Chinese. However, while looking at these statements, Donald at the US State 
Department wondered privately to his New Zealand counterparts whether the American 
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bombing of North Vietnam could lead to Chinese intervention in an air war which could 
then escalate further. However, he thought the Chinese were still taking a cautious approach 
and focused on their internal problems; there was still no sign of a resurgence in Chinese 
interest in foreign policy.546 
Slight changes were noticed the following month when the commission noted an upswing in 
Chinese press statements on foreign policy issues. These showed the dangerous paranoia 
that China was experiencing in its relations with much of the outside world, especially the 
Soviet Union.547 
Throughout the period of the cultural revolution, the Chinese have of 
course frequently made bitter and vehement attacks on the Soviet Union, 
and the stated purpose of the cultural revolution after all [sic] is to prevent 
China from following the revisionist road. Recently the Chinese press has 
come out with a rash of editorial statements and articles on foreign affairs 
and in particular on events in Indonesia, the Congo, Aden, and India. The 
underlying theme of these statements has been the allege collusion of the 
U.S. imperialists, Soviet revisionists and local reactionaries in the global 
“holy alliance” against China.548 
The Americans could see that they had similar interests to the Soviets in South East Asia, 
especially in regards to limiting Chinese influence in the region.549 However, this was 
tempered with a feeling that greater Soviet influence in the region would also be against 
American interests.  
The greater involvement of the PLA in public life in the first half of 1967 did not improve 
American confidence in assessing Chinese willingness to intervene in the Vietnam conflict. 
The State Department was unsure as to the effect of an effective military takeover in China 
on Beijing's Vietnam policy.550 The PLA could be pleased to see the US bogged down in 
Vietnam and willing to continue supporting North Vietnam as it had done, but it might also 
be less ideologically focused than the political class and thus more inclined towards 
intervention. However, the overriding presumption was that the policy of non-intervention 
would be maintained and the risk of escalation would decline. 
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The New Zealand officials in Washington felt that the level of irrationality in Chinese 
foreign policy stopped well short of causing an intervention in the Vietnam War.551 Yet they 
also noted that Mao was being circumspect in regards to Vietnam whereas the 'alleged 
pragmatists' such as Liu and Luo Ruiqing (a PLA general under heavy criticism) were 
thought by the New Zealand Embassy to favour intervention in Vietnam and rapprochement 
with the Soviets.552 The New Zealanders thought Mao's reluctance to intervene in Vietnam 
could be both ideological and practical. 
Mao's ideology made him opposed to this [intervention in Vietnam]: it is, 
after all, a basic article of his creed that a war of national liberation must 
be fought by the people of the country concerned. But this ideological 
position may well have been reinforced by a recognition of the dangers 
which a direct confrontation with the United States would involve – 
dangers beside which those in the cases of Hong Kong and Burma pale 
into insignificance.553 
Despite the signs of restraint in Hong Kong, the Americans were increasingly seeing 
Chinese foreign policy as irrational and unpredictable. In a change from their arguments of 
seven months prior,554 the Americans now saw foreign policy as a direct result of the 
internal pressures China was facing and not of any specific external pressure. The bellicosity 
of Chinese diplomatic rhetoric was seen by the Americans not so much as a tool to distract a 
domestic audience from internal problems, but as an earnest expression of the xenophobia 
and ideology produced by the revolution. This made the Americans very concerned about 
the possibility of a Chinese military adventure as China foreign policy now appeared to be 
based on ideological fervour rather than a sober accounting of China's long term interests.555  
The difficulty in following the rapid pace of events in China and the swings of opinion 
amongst allies was not a solid basis to make foreign policy. Laking sought to find the limits 
of any extremism and the source of the unpredictability of Chinese foreign policy by 
looking at Beijing’s policies towards Hong Kong, Nepal, Burma, and overseas ethnic 
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Chinese communities.556 He noted the takeover of the Chinese Foreign Ministry by the 
revolutionaries and the delicate balance between the Zhou's moderate and experienced 
influence and that of the radicals who had limited knowledge of foreign affairs. Laking 
assumed that the radicals were looking for a showdown with the British over Hong Kong 
and that Beijing's 'backtracking' when the riots risked involving China directly was caused 
by the moderates winning the argument over Hong Kong. However, in Laking's mind, 
Burma, Nepal, and Mongolia were further away from Chinese interests than Hong Kong and 
Vietnam and so the extremists could be allowed greater influence in those areas without 
harming China's core concerns.  
It would, we feel, be going very far to infer from the incidents in China's 
neighbour[ing] countries that the Chinese, even under the stimulus of 
revolutionary zeal, would be prepared to move on to action in Vietnam. 
[Zhou] En-lai and the moderate element, more experienced in foreign 
affairs, doubtless realise that in Vietnam, wider issues, including the risk of 
nuclear war, are involved. They would consequently be more ready to 
wield all their influence to prevent any rash action instigated by the zealots 
which might spark off a major war.557 
Laking felt that since Vietnam was not connected directly to the disputes over the Cultural 
Revolution, Zhou had more room to manoeuvre on this issue with his more extreme 
colleagues. Zhou could set a course of action on Vietnam that took into account these 
political and military realities without inspiring the wrath of the revolutionaries.558 Laking 
concluded that without an imminent military threat to China or an existential threat to North 
Vietnam, the Chinese leadership would not embark on a clash with the United States.  
While it was still possible China could overreact to an incident, Laking thought that China 
would continue its 'oscillation between irrationality and restraint' in its foreign relations and 
in its domestic policy. In Laking’s view the revolution had not affected national projects 
such as its nuclear weapons development. The outcome of the revolution was still unclear to 
Laking but the conditions that made the Chinese leadership wish to avoid confrontation with 
the US were still in place. Laking was less certain on how easy it might be for revolutionary 
zeal to upset those conditions which made conflict undesirable and move China a 'gigantic 
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step' from irritations with small neighbours to a major war. Laking acknowledged that the 
range of possibilities for the future of China were broad and a careful watch was necessary. 
We fully agree with the State Department's comment that it is necessary, 
now more than ever, to keep a careful watch on Chinese actions and upon 
the movement of China's military forces. No one can be sure that 
[Donald's] assessment of Chinese motivations and objectives is accurate. It 
would be sensible, even though one might continue to believe that China 
will be careful not to provoke an international crisis which would place its 
own survival at stake, to continue hoping for the best while unobtrusively 
preparing for the worst.559 
The Canadians were in agreement with Laking’s perspective, although they were sceptical 
that the Chinese nuclear programme was advancing during the revolution.560 Like the 
Canadians, Australian officials were largely in agreement with Laking's analysis of Chinese 
foreign policy. However, they were less convinced about China's restraint in Hong Kong. 
Canberra considered the lack of Chinese guerrilla action in Hong Kong was due to a lack of 
'revolutionary development' in the colony compared to South Vietnam and, for that moment, 
Beijing was focusing on material and propaganda support for Hong Kong communists and 
biding their time rather than limiting their goals. 
4.4.2 The Softening of Chinese Foreign Policy 
From late 1967 signs of Beijing’s softening attitude to the outside world began to appear to 
New Zealand officials and their foreign colleagues. This would start with a general 
stabilisation of Chinese foreign policy and increased activity with the few friends Beijing 
had maintained during the revolution. This quickly led Western officials to speculate about 
the possibility of the rapprochement that would follow in the early 1970s. There was clearly 
a pent-up demand for better relations with China amongst New Zealand’s closest partners.  
This is not surprising given the military difficulties they were having in South East Asia. As 
time went on wishful thinking for better relations seemed to become more common than 
pessimism that a military confrontation could occur. In August 1967 the chairman of the 
British JIC (FE) believed that the goals of Chinese foreign policy had not changed because 
of the revolution, but moderation might give way in the longer term. 
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China was in a militant, expansionist and aggressive mood. China would 
not attack anyone directly but it would not hesitate to stir up trouble and 
support subversion wherever possible. Its aims were first presumably to 
spread the Communist gospel, second to restore its traditional sphere of 
influence in South-east Asia and third to secure compliant governments in 
the states on its borders.  
The first of these aims might lose its fervour as the revisionists gained 
control; and they might do this more quickly than expected, partly because 
today's revolutionaries become tomorrow's revisionists, but also because it 
would be in the way of things for today's revisionists to regain the edge in 
the current struggle. In ten years or so China might be much more ready to 
adopt a policy of peaceful coexistence. The second and third of China's 
aims were virtually inevitable in the long run, however much China was at 
present cutting herself off from the mainstream of international relations.561   
This view harkened back to New Zealand’s fears of Chinese expansionism in 1965,562 but 
unlike that view, this prediction assumed that an outward looking China would be interested 
in peaceful coexistence. Such a peaceful co-existence would have big defence planning 
implications as it would represent a major decline in the risk of war. 
New Zealand officials in Canberra noted that China's isolation was only tempered by the 
maintenance of relations with several emerging African nations. One area of Chinese foreign 
policy unaffected by the revolution was Chinese foreign aid, especially to friendly African 
nations such as Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Tanzania, and Somalia. The NZHC Canberra 
saw these relationships as the start of a wider softening of Chinese foreign policy and a 
greater interest in the outside world. 
As China progressively withdraws into a position of hysterical hostility 
towards nearly all governments not slavishly conforming to the Maoist 
standard, the exceptions become the more prominent. It would seem that 
powerful influences in Peking are able to protect the relationship with 
certain African countries. In this connection it may be of particular interest 
to Australia that those African regimes with whom not merely a status quo, 
but a forward-moving, relationship is indicated from the evidence available 
here, command the western seaboard of the Indian Ocean and the entrance 
to the Red Sea.563 
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By December 1967 it looked as though moderate forces were back in control of the Foreign 
Ministry. Chen Yi was thought by the Canadians to be back in control of the Foreign 
Ministry having been rehabilitated and reappearing in public having lost a considerable 
amount of weight. Revolutionary groups were told by the Central Committee that foreign 
diplomats were not to be interfered with and they were to be kept safe.564 However, this was 
not a sign that Maoist principles had been abandoned. This tension was noted by the 
Canadians.  
There is, and has always been, a schizophrenic aspect to China's foreign 
policy. The urge for a revolutionary foreign policy carried out in defiance 
of conventional diplomatic methods has always been present. So has the 
yearning for an international respectability and recognition to give some 
substance to the oft-repeated claim “We have friends all over the world”.565 
Such a tension was seen even in individuals with Zhou, the moderate, calling for revolution 
in Africa and the extremist Jiang Qing criticising the Red Guards for harming China's 
international reputation by attacking embassies. Nevertheless, there was a feeling, especially 
amongst the Canadians, that this tension could be navigated by Western countries. The 
Canadian Trade Commissioner saw the possibility of improving relations. 
It is also possible that China will come to show more interest in developing 
her relations with countries like Japan, Italy and Canada, in order to 
expand her visible circle of friends. Chinese, even at a rather low level, 
seem to be aware that the cultural revolution has given them a bad press in 
the rest of the world, and even the enthusiasts amongst the Chinese 
leadership may see some value in providing the Chinese people with some 
reassurance in the form of visibly improved relations with some other 
nations.566 
By March 1968 change in Chinese foreign policy was more evident.567 Chen Yi was 
apparently considering an overseas trip. The New Zealand Embassy in Washington thought 
few countries would have welcomed a Chinese Foreign Minister in 1968 but they did not 
believe that any trip would have been possible six months earlier. Nevertheless, challenges 
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still remained, including the fact British diplomatic staff were still forbidden from leaving 
China.568  
As revolutionary pressures faded, longer term challenges were brought back to the fore. 
Donald told the New Zealanders that the Americans had resumed talks with the Chinese in 
Warsaw. These talks were no more productive than they had been before the revolution but 
now the Americans felt the Chinese delegation had abandoned their revolutionary 
extremism and the historic roadblock of the status of Taiwan had returned as the core 
blockage in improving relations between the US and China. The New Zealanders noted that 
'some' had taken this as sign of a Chinese desire for rapprochement but Donald thought it 
was simply the end of the revolutionary extremism and a return to the impasses of the past. 
Even during the Johnson Administration, the New Zealanders noted a desire on the part of 
the Americans to improve relations with China and establish a much more distant form of 
containment. Donald’s colleague at the State Department, William Bundy, made public 
statements which, to the New Zealanders in Washington, were a signal by the US to 
moderates in Beijing that good relations with the US were possible and that the US was not 
'obdurately hostile to Communist China'.569 The US needed better relations with China if it 
were to disengage from military entanglements in Asia and this was understood by the New 
Zealanders in Washington. 
Donald evidently does not envisage the continuation of the containment 
policy in quite the same form as it has taken in the past... [Donald said 
recent comments by senior White House officials were to] paint a picture 
of an Asia less ridden by tension than it has been in recent years – an Asia 
in which the United States was still involved, but involved less, because 
the countries of the area were themselves more viable. The aim was, in 
effect, to show the Chinese that there is nothing ineluctable about the 
conflict between the United States and Communist China: that if they are 
prepared to live in peace so are the Americans... The case for making such 
gestures is based on the assumption that sooner or later Peking will be 
forced to come to terms with realities and adopt a more pragmatic 
approach.570 
Donald is making it clear that American policy – even before Richard Nixon’s election – 
was heading towards a less engaged form of containment and a more relaxed attitude 
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towards China. Donald’s point that the states of South East Asia were more viable was not 
shared by New Zealand officials. Nevertheless, the Americans and New Zealanders were 
facing the same political reality that a significant military effort in South East Asia was not 
sustainable domestically or militarily. 
Donald felt that in order to feed their increasing population the Chinese 
will have to concentrate their efforts on internal economic development 
and give up, for the time being, their desire to become a great nuclear 
power. We questioned whether they would do this: Is not the desire for 
power central to the Chinese outlook? Is the idea of the Middle Kingdom 
not fundamental? Donald did not disagree, but he thought that through 
Marxism the Chinese have absorbed enough of Western values to see these 
goals in humanitarian terms... Whatever their ancestors may have done the 
present-day leaders are not, he thought, prepared to see people starve by 
the million so that they may have power. And there is thus a reasonable 
chance that if the olive branch is held out to them they will sooner or later 
take it.571 
This view was not universal in the United States. The embassy in Washington thought 
comments by Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested a more sombre attitude on the 
possibility of rapprochement with China and the embassy thought this attitude was shared 
by many Americans. However, Donald's optimism was also thought to be widespread. 
By mid-1968 the commission noted that Chinese foreign policy seemed to be returning to 
normal. The northern summer was the traditional time for foreign delegations to travel to 
Beijing and by June 1968 the season had already seen visits by ministers from Mali, Guinea, 
and Nepal with the President of Tanzania due to arrive in the capital in a fortnight. It was 
rumoured that Zhou would visit Cambodia that year. The previous two years of the Cultural 
Revolution had only seen one foreign visit by a senior Chinese leader.572 The rebuilding of 
Chinese foreign policy was now undeniable and would continue as China looked to build 
better relations with the outside world to counter the Soviet threat.  
 CONCLUSION 
The early period of the Cultural Revolution coincided with the breakdown of the 
containment strategy which had provided the framework for New Zealand's defence policy 
since the early 1950s. By the end of 1968 that framework still existed but its irrelevance was 
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evident due to the lack of support from the US and UK. The loss of great power support for 
the containment of China in South East Asia removed New Zealand and Australia's means of 
containing China. However, the Cultural Revolution undermined the assumptions about 
China which underpinned the containment strategy. China was no longer a growing power. 
The ability of the CCP to unify the country and expand its economic and political power had 
been tested and it had failed. China had degenerated into a semi-controlled chaos which had 
increased Mao's personal prestige but had severely damaged the Chinese state and its 
reputation abroad. The idea that China had a political and economic system which the 
people of South East Asia might like to emulate was losing its credibility. The failure of the 
communist riots in Hong Kong showed the limits of Beijing's ideological influence on 
offshore Chinese. Meanwhile Beijing’s refusal to provide material support to Hong Kong 
communists demonstrated the ability of the Chinese leadership to prevent the revolution's 
hostility to the West escalating dangerously. 
With no diplomatic representation on the Chinese mainland, External Affairs' understanding 
of the Cultural Revolution was based largely on information from friendly nations and the 
international media. New Zealand's diplomatic discussion circle for the revolution was not 
large but External Affairs was well placed to keep a close eye on events in China albeit via 
intermediaries. Washington, London, and Ottawa were the capitals that provided the bulk of 
the information on China to New Zealand diplomats, both written and through face-to-face 
meetings. Paris and Delhi provided additional sources and perspectives that were often quite 
different from those of the Anglosphere. It also is evident that New Zealand did not take the 
word of its Anglo partners blindly and tried to look to as many sources as possible. The 
relative lack of input from other missions such as Canberra, Tokyo, Singapore, and Kuala 
Lumpur is surprising but is not necessarily meaningful as this may be a reflection of 
document management by External Affairs or haphazard declassification of files rather than 
an absence of diplomatic activity.  
What is unsurprising is the New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong's predominance on 
Chinese issues in External Affairs. Unlike the other missions the commission dealt with 
Chinese issues on a daily basis and was more confident in its analysis of events on the 
mainland. The commission's view was of a revolution that was violent and chaotic but 
ultimately corralled by a leadership that was capable of moderation and practicality when 
necessary. This view was heavily influenced by information coming from Beijing but also 
by violence in Hong Kong and Guangdong. The commission's access to the British Embassy 
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in Beijing and the mainland press gave New Zealand as good an insight into events in China 
as it could have without a diplomatic presence in Beijing. 
The revolution did not make China seem friendlier to New Zealand in the eyes of officials. 
By the end of 1968 China had not softened its ideological attacks on the West or the Soviet-
bloc but it was no longer perceived to be the growing threat to New Zealand's interests in 
South East Asia it had been. Beijing's retreat from isolationism was only just beginning in 
1968 and time still had to pass before diplomatic recognition of Communist China would be 
realistic or politically acceptable to the New Zealand public. However, it was the revolution 
that seemed to be containing China within its borders more than SEATO ever could have. As 
China's foreign policy stabilised and it sought better relations with the West, a new way of 
handling China would emerge, one where diplomatic engagement was not only possible but 
necessary to meet New Zealand's interests. That path was not obvious at the start of 1969 
but with the failure of containment there was little else for New Zealand to do than find a 
modus vivendi for it and China. 
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5 FROM CONTAINMENT TO RECOGNITION 
 
We are in no hurry to take our seat in the United Nations, just as we are in 
no hurry to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. We adopt 
this policy to deprive the United States of as much political capital as 
possible and put it in the wrong and in an isolated position . . . The longer 
you stall, the more you will be in the wrong and the more isolated you will 
become in your own country and before world opinion. - Mao Zedong, 18 
January 1957573 
 INTRODUCTION 
The years 1969 to 1972 marked a major shift in China policy culminating in the 
normalisation of New Zealand's relations with China. By 1969 Wellington viewed 
containment as a military strategy which, if not dead, was living on borrowed time. The 
British withdrawal and the American quagmire in Vietnam had made the breakdown of 
direct containment evident by the middle of 1968. Nixon's election promise of 'peace with 
honour'574 and the Guam Doctrine of July 1969 further confirmed that Washington was 
unprepared to enter another military adventure on the Asian mainland. China was still 
emerging out of the most disruptive phase of the Cultural Revolution and beginning to 
improve its relations with the world.  
In 1969 Nixon's visit to China was still some way off, but with relations between Moscow 
and Beijing descending to the point of dangerous border skirmishes,575 it became clear to 
some in New Zealand – like Secretary of External Affairs George Laking – that a Sino-
American rapprochement was likely.576 For New Zealand such a rapprochement was 
becoming the ideal outcome as the Government was looking to cut defence costs. With 
containment (as it was envisioned in the mid-1960s) no longer possible, new ways of 
dealing with China needed to be found. China was still thought hostile, but by the start of 
the 1970s Beijing was beginning to look willing to adopt a more conventional foreign policy 
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in which Western countries like New Zealand could have some kind of productive direct 
diplomatic relationship.  
This is not to say that New Zealand implemented an organised strategy which took it from 
containment to diplomatic recognition; the period in between was largely one of trepidation 
and caution, if perhaps not incoherence of policy. The situation was fluid and China's 
relationship with the outside world, especially with the West, was changing rapidly. New 
Zealand was not a leader in this change, nor was it a complete follower waiting on orders 
from Washington, London, or Canberra. Wellington tried to keep its options open, trying not 
to box itself into a corner when the establishment of relations with China and Beijing's 
admission to the UN were perceived as inevitable. New Zealand needed to make the best of 
the situation and come to terms with China in the most advantageous manner and with the 
least risk of embarrassment.  
As China emerged from the depths of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, two policy decisions 
for New Zealand were brought to the fore: whether to vote for the PRC's admission to the 
United Nations and whether to accord the communist state diplomatic recognition and create 
official ties. While linked, these issues were handled somewhat separately. Both questions 
were made complicated by the visceral mutual loathing between the two states claiming to 
represent the Chinese people, the PRC and the Republic of China. One's existence was an 
affront to the other and neither would allow any form of mutual recognition. This forced 
other nations to break diplomatic ties with one of these entities if it chose to establish 
relations with the other. This made the possibility of both Chinese states being represented 
in the UN extremely difficult.  
The lack of willingness to compromise meant that the PRC would not enter the UN or gain 
widespread recognition until it had sufficient influence to force governments to abandon 
their relations with Taiwan. This tipping point came in 1971 as Beijing's new enthusiasm for 
foreign relations began to bear fruit and the White House announced that President Nixon 
would visit China. This relaxed fears among other countries that there would be American 
reprisals for supporting Beijing's bid to join the UN and tipped the vote for the PRC's entry 
at the expense of the ROC. American disapproval was far less of a concern for New Zealand 
the possibility of the ROC’s expulsion from the UN. Regardless, Wellington knew the tide 
would eventually turn in Beijing's favour. 
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In the UN New Zealand could work with its allies and help lobby to keep the ROC inside 
the UN, but ultimately it would have to accept the vote of the General Assembly on the issue 
of Chinese representation. However, direct diplomatic relations were made by governments 
individually. Since 1949 successive New Zealand governments had refused to recognise the 
PRC for a number of reasons that weren't necessarily related to strategic threat: lack of 
direct economic interests in China, opposition to communism, loyalty to the ROC, little 
practical advantage in diplomatic relations, American and Australian non-recognition, and 
the domestic unpopularity of the PRC.577 Recognition did not equate to support for a state or 
government, but it did allow for greater communication. The UK and a small number of 
other (mostly Scandinavian) European countries recognised the PRC in the early 1950s, but 
between 1955 and 1970 the only Western country to recognise the Beijing Government was 
France in January 1964. However, once the PRC entered the UN the trickle of recognition 
became a flood with a large number of Western and non-aligned countries recognising the 
PRC. While the legal details and case law relating to diplomatic recognition is complex,578 
this chapter will detail how recognition was dealt with in New Zealand, which considered 
the issue to be primarily a political decision. 
This political decision would not be made during the Second National Government. 
Ultimately recognition would come with the election of a Labour government. Holyoake 
became deeply interested in China policy towards the end of his premiership. He was aware 
of the changes occurring in China's foreign policies and the direction of global opinion. 
However, like previous prime ministers, he was reluctant to give up recognition of the 
Republic of China. Holyoake's attempts at recognising both Beijing and Taipei would be 
thwarted by the unwillingness of the PRC or ROC to accept such a proposal. He 
acknowledged that a 'two China' policy was not going to be acceptable on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait but thought it was the best compromise possible. Yet it would take a change of 
government in New Zealand before official relations between Wellington and Beijing could 
be established. 
The failure of containment meant China policy moved from an area dominated by defence 
concerns to diplomatic ones. This amounted to a power shift from the defence establishment 
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to the foreign policy establishment on New Zealand’s China policy. The defence 
establishment became the losers from these events. The declines in SEATO's relevance, the 
perceived threat from China, the Government's financial position, and public support for 
defence due to the Vietnam War all influenced the Government in making considerable cuts 
in defence spending. The large upgrades of the 1960s were not to be repeated in the 1970s, 
even if New Zealand was to continue to station some forces in South East Asia. These cuts 
put considerable strain on civil-military relations; the chiefs opposed them in the strongest 
terms possible short of rebellion.579  
The armed forces were facing not only a loss of funding, but also a loss of direction. 
Without a central threat or a major permanent international coalition to be part of, New 
Zealand's defence lost its road map. The continued forward deployment of New Zealand 
forces to Singapore had its advantages, but it was no longer under the pretext of containing 
China. The introduction of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in 1971 was not designed 
to contain China in the way that SEATO or ANZAM had been. With the election of the Kirk 
Government new defence goals had to be implemented which required the military to find a 
new role for itself in a new environment where the Cold War seemed much further away 
from New Zealand's shores and security assessments. 
This chapter is divided into three sections to highlight the parallel but interconnected 
problems faced by New Zealand’s diplomatic and military establishments during this period. 
The first section follows how the increase in Chinese diplomatic activity and Nixon’s 
election influenced New Zealand’s thinking in both defence and diplomatic areas. The next 
section follows how the defence establishment dealt with the loss of China as a threat, 
British and American withdrawal, and significant budget pressures. The final section looks 
at how Beijing’s UN admission, Wellington’s recognition of the PRC, and defence and 
foreign policy issues developed under Norman Kirk’s leadership. 
 NEW ZEALAND AND THE NEW CHINESE DIPLOMACY TO 1970 
5.2.1 China and the UN  
Despite the Republic of China’s defeat on the mainland in the Chinese Civil War, it 
continued to represent China at the United Nations. The PRC’s replacement of the ROC at 
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the United Nations in October 1971 was the watershed moment for China’s growing 
influence in the world. The effort to keep the PRC from being admitted to the UN was led 
by Western nations which were able to dominate the General Assembly in the early years of 
the institution. As an ally of the 'big three' during the Second World War the ROC was an 
original member of the United Nations and also given a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.580 The creation of the PRC in 1949 did not immediately lead to a change in the UN 
as the ROC still existed and Communist China had little support in the international body 
from outside the Soviet bloc. However, votes in the General Assembly slowly turned in 
Beijing's favour as decolonisation expanded the number of sovereign nations. Newly 
independent third-world nations tended to join the Non-Aligned Movement and had little 
reason to oppose the PRC's admission. As Chinese foreign policy emerged from the Cultural 
Revolution it was able to harness the support of these new states as well as improving 
relations with Europe to win a vote to expel the ROC in favour of the PRC. 
New Zealand was a committed member of the coalition to keep the ROC in the UN and the 
PRC out. However, there was a feeling of inevitability amongst New Zealand officials that 
Beijing would sooner or later gain the votes to enter the international body; little Taiwan 
could not claim to represent the most populous country in the world forever. Initially the 
Soviet Union led moves to bring Communist China into the UN at the expense of Taiwan. 
From 1951 to 1960 the US-led opposition used a procedural motion – known as the 
‘moratorium proposal’ – to postpone any discussion of the Soviet proposal for Beijing's 
admission until the following year. The Labour Government of Walter Nash was more 
reluctant to oppose the PRC's admission and abstained from the moratorium proposal 
between 1958 and 1960, but with the return of Holyoake to government New Zealand 
resumed voting against Beijing’s entry.581 
By 1960 support for China's admission had grown and the moratorium proposal won by 41 
for, 34 against, and 22 abstaining.582 This caused the Americans to look for a new method 
for blocking China's entry. From 1961 the US championed making the issue of Chinese 
representation an 'Important Question' (IQ) under Article 18 (ii) of the UN Charter. This 
meant that voting on the issue of representation would be subject to a two-thirds majority. At 
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the time, opponents of PRC admission were still in the majority, but the IQ tactic allowed 
countries to support the American block of the PRC without explicitly voting against the 
Soviet proposal.583 The US continued to use the IQ tactic for another decade, but support for 
Beijing continued to build. After the Sino-Soviet split Albania became Beijing's biggest 
supporter in the United Nations and from 1963 it took over Beijing's cause in the UN. Both 
Beijing and Taipei actively courted the new African states in the UN and after the heat of the 
Cultural Revolution began to dissipate they became more vigorous in their lobbying. 
Washington had opposed Beijing's admission to the UN ever since the creation of the PRC. 
Dwight Eisenhower had resolutely opposed China's UN membership and thought, should it 
occur, that the US Congress would demand the US withdraw from the international body.584 
John F. Kennedy was reluctant to change US China policy as polling showed the US was 
still strongly opposed to Communist China joining the UN, but there was some support for 
change amongst members of his administration. Kennedy's UN Ambassador Adlai 
Stevenson585 and Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles586 had both written articles in 
1960 advocating a ‘two Chinas’ solution in the UN. In January 1961, fearing the moratorium 
vote would be lost, Kennedy told the British Ambassador in Washington Harold Caccia that 
the US could accept Beijing's admission if Taiwan was provided for: effectively a two 
Chinas solution. This brought the White House swift condemnation from Congress, Taipei, 
and even Beijing.587 Communist China's polemical response angered Kennedy into 
refraining from any further attempt at softening US China policy.588 The Johnson 
Administration would again look at a 'two China' solution in 1966 but by this point the 
Cultural Revolution had begun and the Americans continued with the IQ manoeuvre.589 
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5.2.2 Holyoake’s China Diplomacy 
Holyoake became deeply interested in China policy during the last years of his 
premiership.590 The prime minister became more active in China policy as the possibility of 
diplomatic engagement with Beijing grew. He lobbied the public and his caucus for a 'Two 
China' solution to the problem of recognising the PRC.591 Holyoake was not prepared to 
admit the PRC to the United Nations or provide it with diplomatic recognition at the 
expense of the ROC. Like Peter Fraser who in 1949 would not turn his back on an ally from 
the Second World War, Holyoake would not abandon what he saw as a friendly small state 
being pressured by a larger one.592 Two decades after the creation of the PRC the 
international situation had changed and Holyoake was much more enthusiastic about 
recognition of Beijing than Fraser had been, but the status of Taiwan remained a stumbling 
block. 
Holyoake had long been willing to accept the PRC joining the UN provided the ROC was 
not expelled. In 1962 he told the ROC that New Zealand did not 'rule out the possibility of a 
two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan solution'.593 That is to say Holyoake was open to 
the idea of accepting both states as rulers of ‘China’ or accepting the basic reality that China 
was divided with the ROC controlling Taiwan and a few other offshore islands. As with 
Kennedy’s proposal, neither of these options were acceptable to Beijing or Taipei who 
considered China indivisible and themselves to be the only legitimate government of China. 
In 1966 Frank Corner, then leader of the NZ delegation to the UN, said: 
The New Zealand Government is not prepared to support the seating of 
Communist China in the United Nations on a basis that would 
acknowledge the right claimed by Communist China to attempt to seize 
Taiwan by force. It would nonetheless be prepared to give serious 
consideration to any proposal aimed at seating Communist China in the 
United Nations provided this was not to be brought about at the expense of 
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the Republic of China or in a manner that would jeopardise the right of the 
people of Taiwan to a voice as to their future.594 
Statements to this effect were made by Holyoake in the introductions of the 1967 and 1968 
annual reports of the Department of External Affairs.595 Despite the dramatic changes in 
New Zealand’s assessment of China between 1965 and 1968, its official positions on 
recognition of the PRC and its admission to the UN did not change much in the 1960s. 
Nevertheless, the changes in New Zealand’s view of China allowed for changes in policy 
once the most chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution was over and Mao moved to 
improve relations with the outside world, but Holyoake’s commitment to the ROC would 
remain problematic.   
5.2.3 Assessing and Managing the Change in Chinese Foreign Policy 
Keeping on top of the changes in Chinese foreign policy would be vital given the rapid pace 
of change. Holyoake and his officials were looking for signs of Beijing opening to the 
outside world. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs596 believed it was the 
moderates led by Zhou that were leading the change toward better foreign relations and not 
the supporters of the Cultural Revolution. It felt that the moderates would become more 
powerful as time went on. The 9th Party Congress in April 1969 was taken by officials as a 
signal that China would be returning to more stable policies. In a telegram to the Tokyo 
Embassy, the Ministry outlined its view that the 9th Party Congress: 
…represents the ending of the worst period of confusion brought about by 
the Cultural Revolution and that a new period of reconstruction is about to 
be embarked upon. We would expect, eventually, that this will lead to 
more pragmatic and flexible policies in the external field. We note that 
while radical elements have retained a key position in the communist 
hierarchy they are balanced, to some degree, by [Zhou] En Lai (and the 
professional administration he represents) and the military (whom we 
would tend to regard as more conservative). We would expect the views of 
these less extreme groups to grow in influence as Mao's control over China 
slackens… obviously Communist China's objectives have not RPT not 
changed, but we may, over the next few years, need to show greater 
imagination and skill ourselves in dealing with more determined and 
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effective endeavours by Communist China to extend its influence 
throughout Asia.597  
The response from the Japanese Government was less optimistic. The Japanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs told the New Zealand embassy in Tokyo that it considered the PRC to have 
become a virtual military dictatorship with the leadership still favouring extremism and only 
lightly moderated by the conservative bureaucracy.598 A public statement of Holyoake's 
opinion came in May with a report of the Department of External Affairs tabled in the 
House of Representatives. The report used extremely guarded language to note that China, 
while still hostile, was making tentative changes to its relationship with the United States, 
but not with the Soviet Union.599 The Prime Minister was well aware of movement in 
China's position and shifts in the attitude of other states to Beijing. The need for a change in 
China policy by the wider region was noted by Holyoake at the SEATO Council meeting in 
June. He found similar attitudes amongst the other SEATO members. Officials from Foreign 
Affairs noted the importance of shifting attitudes to China. 
Mr Holyoake opened this topic by saying that now that Communist China 
appeared to be over the worst of its internal difficulties there might be new 
developments in Chinese external policies. The Prime Minister made the 
point that while Chinese objectives were scarcely likely to change the 
methods of pursuing them might and that the allies had to be ready to deal 
with them. This led the Thai Foreign Minister to develop the theme he has 
put forward over recent months of the need for Asian leaders to try to get a 
dialogue going with the Communist Chinese leaders.600 
Holyoake and his SEATO peers were looking at the problem of Chinese power differently. 
While SEATO’s leaders were not about to lose their distrust of Beijing and its influence, 
they had begun to see China's politics as evolving and bringing it more in line with standard 
diplomatic practice. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs these were not throwaway 
comments. The ministry saw these comments as reflection of a wider change in ideas driven 
by American fatigue in South East Asia as much as change in Beijing. 
The exchanges were interesting not so much for what was actually said as 
for the indication that was given of a new approach to Asian politics. The 
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prolonged discussion over the future of American policies in the area has 
obviously had its impact. There appears to be a growing feeling that if the 
Americans are not going to be as deeply involved in the Asian mainland as 
they have been up to now it makes sense for Asian countries to try to get a 
better relationship with Communist China. This by no means implies 
recognising the Peking Government and establishing diplomatic relations 
with that regime. It does mean, however, that there is likely to be a 
growing disposition on the part of Asians to talk a little less harshly about 
the Chinese – and it makes sense, if you are not quite so certain about the 
extent you can rely upon the Americans, to avoid as far as possible 
antagonising the major Asian communist power. In terms of immediate 
practical politics this does not mean too much, but in the long term it could 
be a tendency of considerable importance.601 
With the kind of containment practised in the 1960s now improbable due to declining 
American support, the other SEATO states were looking to slowly shift to a less hostile 
approach to Beijing. There was not going to be a sudden love affair with the People's 
Republic but public antagonism of China was no longer considered wise by those who had 
tried to contain it. In fact, in 1969 the ministry was underestimating the speed at which 
attitudes towards Beijing would change in Wellington and other capitals over the next few 
years.  
Beijing’s return to normal diplomatic practice did not take long to start producing benefits. 
The tide in the United Nations began to turn in China’s favour in 1969 and Holyoake urged 
it to find a solution to the China question. On 19 September of that year he told the UN 
General Assembly that: 
The United Nations is increasingly faced with the need to come to terms 
with a situation where a quarter of the world's population remains 
unrepresented in it. The effectiveness of our organisation is impaired by a 
gap of this magnitude.602 
Simultaneous to China’s re-emergence on the world stage was a serious decline in its 
relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1969 Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated 
so badly that it looked to be the problem dominating Chinese foreign policy. This dangerous 
decline in relations between the two communist powers, and China’s newfound diplomacy 
provided an opportunity for the new Nixon administration to reshape its relationship with 
China, but it would still take some time before it was clear how this could happen. 
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5.2.4 The Nixon Administration Emerges 
In many ways Holyoake’s policies were more flexible than Washington’s which had to 
move much further in its China policies to establish relations, even though Washington had 
signalled its desire for change early in the Nixon Administration. Well before his election 
(and during the turbulent phase of the Cultural Revolution) Nixon wrote of the need to 
change the dynamic of the Cold War and bring China into the community of nations even if 
it were to remain hostile to its neighbours. 
Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever 
outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates 
and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a 
billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.603 
However, when Nixon was elected New Zealand officials were still unclear how much 
change in Sino-American relations was possible as it was not known how far either the US 
or China were willing move towards rapprochement. In 1969 US Secretary of State William 
P. Rogers signalled that the US was prepared to renew the Warsaw Talks (the only 
significant bilateral forum for the PRC and the US between 1955 and 1970604) and at the 
same time the US relaxed some travel and trade restrictions with Communist China.605 
Rogers told Holyoake at an ANZUS council meeting in August 1969 that he found the 
question of China's future role fascinating and that he'd detected hints that Beijing was 
interested in coming to an accommodation with the US but was unsure how it could be 
accomplished.606 The New Zealand Embassy in Washington had already noticed press 
reports of consultation by the US National Security Council with other government agencies 
on how to improve relations with Beijing.607 
The introduction of the Nixon (or Guam) doctrine raised significant concerns for America's 
Asian allies. New Zealand assessments in the 1960s argued that the removal of American 
forces from the South East Asian mainland would leave little to deter China, even if US 
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forces remained in offshore bases in the Western Pacific. However, by the late 1960s New 
Zealand officials accepted that such a withdrawal was inevitable.608 With the confirmation 
that Washington expected its Asian allies to take greater responsibility for their own defence, 
New Zealand wanted to know exactly where the new limits would be. Officials wanted to 
ask their American counterparts at the 1970 ANZUS Council meeting if Washington was 
willing to accept South East Asia coming under the influence of China or the Soviet Union 
and if the US would provide air support to South East Asia to help prevent this outcome 
even if ground troops were no longer likely.609 Laking wanted to avoid any discussion of the 
Sino-Soviet split in the official communiqué of the meeting and wanted all three 
governments to express their belief in the importance of China and the need for dialogue 
and better relations with the PRC.610 The final communiqué was reasonably blunt in its 
language, calling for greater engagement with China while also expressing concern about 
China’s continued support for revolutionary warfare.611 
In 1969 Washington began to make stronger statements on the Sino-Soviet Split. With Sino-
Soviet relations deteriorating badly, Nixon was in an increasingly better position to take 
advantage of the situation. The US had moved a long way from President Kennedy's 1963 
statement that 'a dispute over how best to bury the free world is no grounds for Western 
rejoicing'.612 In September 1969 Under-Secretary of State Elliot Richardson said in a speech 
that while the ideological differences between the biggest communist powers was no 
business of the United States, a major military conflict between China and the Soviet Union 
would have an impact on America's vital interests.613 The split was no longer seen by 
Washington as a philosophical dispute, it was now a serious threat to international peace and 
security. More privately – and unknown to New Zealand’s policymakers – during the 
previous month Nixon had made the determination to his National Security Council that the 
Soviet Union was the more dangerous adversary and American interests would be harmed if 
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China was to be crushed by the Soviets.614 By taking the seriousness of the split more 
seriously the US was putting itself into a position where it was easier to make a change 
towards engagement with Beijing. 
While the extent of Nixon’s ambitions for Sino-American relations were not completely 
clear to New Zealand officials, the Americans continued to share their views on China with 
them. A US State Department report from early 1970, given to the New Zealand 
Commission in Hong Kong, took the view that the revolution continued to dissipate due to 
the order provided by the PLA and that China’s fears of an American attack had been largely 
displaced by the growing Soviet threat. The report noted that these elements were present a 
year previously but the events of 1969 had changed their importance. 
Viewing China as 1969 ends compared to a year ago is something like 
playing with a kaleidoscope: the pieces are the same but rearranged, the 
focus has shifted.615 
At the turn of the 1970s it was slowly becoming clear to many New Zealand officials that 
China was heading for some kind of rapprochement with not only the West but also the non-
communist nations of South East Asia. The extent and the ramifications of this change were 
not yet clear. Political conditions in China may have calmed since the heady days of 1966 
and 1967 but Maoist China was still wholly alien to the West and significant challenges to 
better relations remained. With containment looking less and less practical, the growing 
public opposition to the Vietnam War, changes in China’s foreign policy, and economic 
challenges for the New Zealand government, it became clear that defence policy would need 
to change. 
 DEFENCE POLICY RESPONDS TO CHANGE: 1970-1972 
New Zealand’s defence establishment faced several significant challenges from 1969. These 
challenges stemmed from the decline in the perception of threat from China, the impending 
withdrawal of British and American forces from the mainland, the related breakdown of 
alliance structures for the region, and a tightening of New Zealand’s fiscal situation.  While 
SEATO’s leaders recognised they needed to change their approach to China, defence 
officials thought the relevance of the organisation had declined even further. In March 1969 
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the Defence Planning Committee decided that British withdrawal had ‘invalidated’ New 
Zealand’s SEATO operational concepts. This meant new concepts would need to be 
established with Australia if New Zealand was to deploy forces according to SEATO 
plans.616 However, by the end of 1969 faith in SEATO had dropped to the point where the 
Defence Planning Committee recommended that the readiness of New Zealand's forces in 
South East Asia be based on the 'assessed probability of hostilities rather than to the 
requirements of any particular SEATO contingency plan'.617 Previously readiness had been 
tied to SEATO Plan 4 but given the financial constraints and the 'improbability of major 
hostilities' this requirement seemed unrealistic.618 
5.3.1 Quanta and Commitments for the 1970s 
Political and economic forces continued to move faster than the ability of the Ministry of 
Defence to produce a defence review. The preparation for the 1970 Defence Review (which 
would not be completed until 1972) was set against major financial pressure from the 
Holyoake Government. These pressures had existed during the earlier reviews, but by the 
end of the 1960s the Government was prepared to make significant cuts to military 
capabilities rather than just delay upgrades. New Zealand was not going to withdraw from 
its military commitments to Asia, but the frameworks for New Zealand's commitment were 
also experiencing significant change.  
In January 1970 Laking wrote that while New Zealand could not withdraw from any of its 
broader security commitments (such as SEATO, ANZUS, ANZAM, and Commonwealth 
agreements) without significant harm to the willingness of the US to defend the region, it 
could reduce the amount of effort provided to those commitments. Laking realised these 
agreements could change over time, perhaps with greater involvement of the Asian states, 
but New Zealand could not unilaterally exit from its commitments without damaging its 
interests.619 However, Laking also considered the necessary level of military commitment to 
be undefined: 
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Acceptance of these obligations does not lead automatically to the 
acceptance of a specific programme for the size and shape of our forces. It 
is not, for instance, realistic to consider whether under our Manila Treaty 
obligations we are obliged to have a capability to contribute a division, or a 
brigade group or a battalion group. Our obligations are, of necessity, 
expressed in general terms and need to be weighed in the light of the actual 
situation, including the actions of our allies, and of our real capabilities. 
What does follow inescapably from the obligations we have accepted is the 
need to be able to make a reasonable contribution in the areas of primary 
strategic interest, South-east Asia and the South Pacific. Judgement will be 
required as to what constitutes a reasonable contribution.620 (original 
emphasis) 
This was a very different argument to those made during the mid-1960s when SEATO 
declarations were treated as a framework for determining necessary capabilities. South East 
Asia and the South Pacific were still the areas of primary strategic interest but the attitude 
towards them had changed. With the threat from China no longer dominating New Zealand 
thinking, Laking could argue the minimum force New Zealand needed to maintain in Asia 
was not prescribed by its formal defence agreements but by the attitude of its allies. Without 
a significant threat from China or a significant containment force on the Asian mainland, 
New Zealand had the flexibility to reduce its commitments in Asia up to the point where the 
US and others considered New Zealand to no longer be an active participant in the region's 
security. Laking thought this minimum still necessitated New Zealand forces stationed on 
the ground in South East Asia for use in an emergency and that these forces needed the 
ability to be expanded quickly in the event of a more significant conflict. The forward 
deployed force needed to be of a scale that allowed for the development of useful expertise 
and, moreover, it needed to be big enough to permit separate political and military 
management by New Zealand. While suggesting that there was potential flexibility in New 
Zealand's Asian deployments, Laking was still concerned that a cut in defence spending 
would send a dangerous signal to New Zealand's allies and would in effect damage their 
commitment to New Zealand's interests in the region.621 
While Laking was suggesting that it could be possible to decrease the quantum of force 
deployed in Asia, the defence establishment was examining the expected roles for New 
Zealand forces given the perceived drop in risk from China and the decline in great power 
support. The 1970 ‘Size and Shape’ report stated that the missions of the armed forces were 
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firstly to maintain capabilities which could be deployed to assist Malaysia and Singapore 
against limited external attack or externally-promoted insurgency, or for similar emergencies 
in South East Asia; secondly, to maintain the ability to contribute to larger forces in 'the 
event of more extensive hostilities' including the defence of the air and sea approaches to 
South East Asia; and thirdly, to maintain the expertise of the armed forces.622 The threat of 
major hostilities was still present but it was not feared to the same extent it had been during 
the creation of the 1966 review. China had the potential to interfere through 'externally-
promoted insurgency' but even this threat was not taken with the same degree of seriousness 
that it had been previously.   
While the pessimism about the future of South East Asia that featured heavily during the 
defence review process in the 1960s had disappeared by the early 1970s, there was more 
uncertainty than optimism. Nevertheless, new possibilities were explored. For the first time 
in the defence review process it was acknowledged that South East Asia might offer a useful 
export market provided it could remain stable politically. More effort was made in the draft 
1970 review to link trade with security issues. The review pointed to statements made by 
Holyoake to President Nixon that without trade New Zealand would have been unable to 
take part in collective defence, and noted that the Americans correspondingly thought trade 
could be made possible by collective defence efforts.623 
5.3.2 Joint Intelligence Committee Assessment – October 1970 
The thinking of the defence chiefs had moved away from a strong focus on China by the 
time of the 1970 review process. Their requests for information from the Joint Intelligence 
Committee were no longer about China as they had been during the review processes of the 
mid-to-late 1960s. In 1970 they had begun to relate to more distant concerns like Soviet 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean.624 However, the JIC itself did not yet predict 
rapprochement between China and the US. Its October 1970 assessment for the period of 
1970-1975 foresaw three-way hostility continuing between Washington, Beijing, and 
Moscow. 
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Communist China, although preoccupied with internal problems and with 
the threat from the Soviet Union, will endeavour to expand its influence, 
making greater use of its diplomatic opportunities. It may make some 
limited response to moves by the Soviet Union and the United States to 
improve relations or to limit the risks in particular situations, but will not 
abandon its basic hostility to both. Peking will continue to support 
insurgency, particularly among the hill peoples of Laos, Thailand, Burma 
and, though with less success, Maoist movements in other parts of South 
East Asia.625 
Despite taking the view that three-way tensions would continue, the JIC did think that the 
deaths of Mao and Chiang Kai-Shek could lead to an accommodation between Beijing and 
Taipei.626 With or without a cross-strait accommodation the JIC thought that all the great 
powers would seek to avoid direct involvement in an Asian conflict, and a Vietnam-style 
war was unlikely. It believed the most likely source of conflict in Asia was on the Korean 
Peninsula, but in that case the Soviet Union and US would attempt to localise the conflict 
and try to avoid becoming involved themselves.627 The greatest threat to New Zealand 
becoming involved in a military clash was viewed by the JIC to come from 'communist 
terrorist operations' in northern Malaysia, but without any suggestion such operations risked 
escalation with China.628 The chiefs endorsed the JIC’s assessment on 23 October 1970.629 
The chiefs own report of that year added that the biggest threat to regional security was 
tension between South East Asian states and 'externally-promoted insurgency'.630 
Collectively, the chiefs and the JIC still saw China a threat through its promotion of 
revolutionary movements, but not as a direct military threat to South East Asia. 
5.3.3 The Chiefs Debate the Value of Forward Defence 
The missions outlined in the draft 1970 defence review were opposed by the Chief of Air 
Staff, Air Vice Marshal William Stratton, in a written dissent from the views of the other 
chiefs. He felt it was inadvisable for New Zealand to become involved in counter insurgency 
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on the Malaysia/Thailand border as it would be impossible to determine whether insurgent 
action was externally supported. He felt any New Zealand support for military action that 
could be construed as supporting Malaysian subjugation of ethnic Chinese would exacerbate 
tensions between Malaysia and Singapore, and would threaten Singapore's interest in 
hosting New Zealand forces. Stratton felt New Zealand should avoid any specific priorities 
and focus on maintaining a general set of expertise and capabilities to the level at which the 
Government could afford.631 The Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Lawrence Carr, wrote a 
similar memo arguing that the 'Size and Shape' section of the review had failed to 
adequately assess a range of issues including the Nixon doctrine, the extent of the British 
commitment in Asia, the position of the Australian Labor Party, and the JIC's view that all 
ANZUK forces were likely to withdraw from Asia by the end of the 1970s. Carr believed 
these factors required greater flexibility in defence policy and some preparations should be 
made for future withdrawal from South East Asia.632 
The Secretary of Defence wrote to the members of the Defence Council to rebut the 
statements of the CAS and CNS. The Secretary noted that the Stratton had a point that the 
shape of New Zealand’s forces did not exactly match the threat profile, but New Zealand’s 
forces were large enough for the roles provided to South East Asia to have political pay-offs 
even if the capabilities New Zealand provided did not exactly match the military need. 
It can hardly be contested that the political advantages to be gained justify 
a presence in South East Asia in some form, even if the resultant 
deployment is not always what might be regarded as sound militarily. 
Roles, missions and military effort in peacetime in a small country like 
New Zealand must in practice reinforce the political objectives of foreign 
policy, even if by doing so some combat readiness is lost. This is a 
legitimate risk to take in a period of negligible threat if it ensures national 
security is fully protected by collective defence arrangements at times of 
severe threat.633  
The Secretary’s language of ‘peacetime’ and ‘negligible threat’ is very different from earlier 
reviews which highlighted the risk from China and Chinese-supported insurgency. The 
Secretary did not list the specific political benefits he was alluding to other than the 
maintenance of the American security guarantee. He was also concerned that if defence 
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needs were determined by a measure of the direct threat to New Zealand then defence would 
be unable to argue for a significant portion of government expenditure. The defence force 
that resulted from such determinations would ‘be of little value, either for long term political 
objectives of collective defence or a nucleus for self-defence’.634 
The Secretary was still committed to the Forward Defence concept even if allies, the JIC, 
and the chiefs themselves were becoming wary of its practicality. He continued to state the 
importance of SEATO and the need to maintain American and British interest in South East 
Asia 'and in the containment of Communist China'.635 Nevertheless he felt changes such as 
ending the need for all three services to be stationed in Singapore at once and reducing 
specific declarations to SEATO could be made without damaging New Zealand's interests. 
5.3.4 Government Cuts to Defence Spending Growth 
In December 1970 Defence Minister David Thomson wrote to the Secretary of Defence 
warning that Cabinet was seriously considering large cuts in defence spending by removing 
major capabilities.636 Under consideration was keeping the defence budget to a 4% increase 
in real terms as opposed to the 11% necessary to maintain existing commitments.637 Such a 
restriction on spending would require the deferment of patrol craft purchases, 
discontinuance of Antarctic support missions, the reduction of Army manpower by 120 men, 
the shifting of national service and hydrographic research from the defence vote, and the 
mothballing of a frigate and two Orions. Thomson told the Secretary that he was strongly 
opposed to these cuts which he considered would have 'sweeping' and 'calamitous effects' on 
the morale and the effectiveness of the armed forces. Thomson was under considerable 
pressure from his cabinet colleagues and demanded that the Secretary of Defence produce a 
paper on the effects for Cabinet over the weekend. The chiefs agreed to a meeting of the 
Defence Council on the Saturday morning.638  
Understandably the Defence Council was deeply concerned about the possibility of cuts to 
its capabilities in South East Asia. The Council believed the proposed spending levels would 
limit New Zealand's presence in Singapore/Malaysia to one frigate for 60% of the year, a 
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reduced infantry battalion, approximately four aircraft, and a contribution towards logistics, 
headquarters, communication, and administration.639 In the view of Thornton, Chief of 
Defence Staff, this would 'certainly cast into doubt the continuing credibility of New 
Zealand's contribution to collective defence and reduced the degree of national 
independence of action'.640 At another meeting he said that any attempt to do away with the 
army's brigade group concept would make the armed services 'a scratch force, unable to play 
its part in the national security, with its consequential effect on relations with our major 
allies'.641 In his mind cuts would mean the end of the Forward Defence concept and would 
be, in effect, a shift to home defence. The minister explained to his Cabinet colleagues that 
savings would be particularly difficult given that Cabinet was not intending to make any 
changes to policy, and thus the forces would have to do more with less.642 He warned 
Cabinet that the cuts would have effects: 
...felt in every aspect of Service life, and they will further reduce our 
already limited operational capability to an extent which the Defence 
Council believes to be dangerous to the long-term security of the country 
and damaging to our relationships (in the defence field at least) with our 
principal Allies, both now and in the future.643  
Unlike in the review processes of 1966 and 1968, the chiefs could not claim that New 
Zealand was experiencing major strategic pressures or needed major capital equipment 
upgrades. This environment was distinctly different from that of the mid-1960s during 
which New Zealand's military had been transformed. It had received major upgrades of 
significant capital equipment. This level of spending could not continue as there was no 
longer the necessary threat perception or political will to support it. The Government’s 
reluctance to fund defence had overcome the pressures created by the threats perceived to 
South East Asia and the need for new equipment that existed in the mid-1960s. While New 
Zealand and Australia were being left to support Malaysia and Singapore the threats 
perceived by New Zealand officials were also falling. With the threat from China dissipating 
and direct British and American containment no longer possible, the Government felt it 
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could reduce the amount spent on defence without radically changing its publicly stated 
commitments.  
However, regardless of their thoughts on the suitability of the overall strategic direction, the 
chiefs understandably did not want to endure spending cuts. Thornton used the strongest 
language possible while still remaining committed to the military’s subordination to the 
elected civilian leadership. 
The Chiefs of Staff do not, of course, question the fact that the allocation 
of national resources must be decided by Government. However, the 
reductions now proposed will be so far-reaching in their effects on the 
Armed Forces that the Chiefs of Staff wish to record the strongest possible 
recommendation against the imposition of these cuts; they wish to place 
very clearly before the Government their considered view that if these 
reductions have to be instituted, our operational capacity and readiness, 
already at the minimum acceptable level, will be reduced to such an extent 
that recovery could not be effected for some years.644 
Savings were eventually found by returning the HMNZS Endeavour (A184) to the US 
Navy,645 reducing RNZAF flying hours, reducing the National Service Scheme, and 
eliminating the non-regular cadet forces and dental services for Territorial personnel.646 
While not as extreme as those first suggested by the Government, cuts like these were 
representative of a power shift between the defence establishment and Foreign Affairs. As 
Forward Defence had become an exercise of more limited means chasing more limited ends, 
the need for more direct diplomatic engagement with emerging South East Asian nations 
and China itself increased. Anglo-American withdrawal meant South East Asian nations 
needed to step up their own defences and New Zealand needed to work even more closely 
with them requiring more diplomatic effort. Diplomatic engagement with Malaysia and 
Singapore had been going on since their independence but this needed to increase with the 
withdrawal of the great powers. However, the bigger challenge was establishing a functional 
relationship with China itself. This would depend on how China was perceived in the new 
and rapidly changing environment. The JIC was called to update its strategic outlook just six 
months after the last report. 
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5.3.5 Joint Intelligence Committee Assessment – April 1971 
By April 1971 the JIC had changed its mind on the possibility of Sino-American 
rapprochement. 
The United States… will continue efforts to come to an understanding with 
Communist China. The Administration has for some time been trying to 
improve relations with Peking and has taken some limited steps in this 
direction. The current re-assessment of American policy may lead to more 
far reaching changes including most probably a different United States 
approach to the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. 
But in its overtures the United States will get little help from Peking itself, 
except possibly of a passive nature. The Administration will be subject to 
some pressures, both within the United States and from outside, that will 
tend to slow down any movement towards detente, though such pressures 
are not as strong as they have been in the past. And the position of Taiwan 
will remain a major obstacle to the improvement of relations between 
Washington and Peking.647 
The JIC made significant note of the changes in Chinese foreign policy which it attributed to 
the rising Soviet threat to China. These changes were seen as highly successful for Beijing 
with gains in diplomatic recognition, the possibility of UN membership, and greater 
influence in Africa and the Middle East. Hostility to the US would remain but the JIC now 
saw some possibility of Sino-American rapprochement. The major barriers were perceived 
as American opposition to Beijing's UN membership (which could change) and the 
American position on Taiwan (which it thought was unlikely to change). 
The JIC’s examination of China’s military effectiveness showed greater scepticism than 
earlier assessments. The JIC acknowledged efforts were being made in nuclear weapons and 
their delivery,648 but much less faith was placed in the fighting ability of the PLA than was 
evident in the New Zealand assessments of six years earlier. 
Although the Chinese military stance is basically defensive its forces could 
overwhelm its neighbours in South East Asia or Korea if not opposed by 
either American or Soviet forces. In conventional combat against a modern 
enemy, however, each branch of the PLA would have critical weaknesses. 
Army units are seriously deficient in motorized transport and heavy 
armament; the air defence system could not withstand a large scale 
sophisticated air attack; and the Navy, while growing and modernizing, is 
still little more than a coastal defence force. With its huge reserves of 
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trained or partly trained manpower the PLA could, however, sustain large 
scale guerrilla operations for a lengthy period.649 
The JIC’s faith in SEATO as a useful alliance had all but evaporated. SEATO’s importance 
was considered limited to its role as 'the basis of the American commitment to the security 
of the South East Asian area', as it had in earlier assessments, but the JIC now did not 
believe that it was capable of further development.650 With the US and others stepping back 
from South East Asia there was little faith that SEATO could be expanded or improved into 
a more effective collective security architecture. By 1971 it was very unlikely that the US 
would be interested in any new structure for the security of the region, regardless of the 
level of threat from China.  
The JIC's view of Chinese and SEATO weakness was set against a view that any kind of 
military conflict was becoming increasingly undesirable in capitals of the major powers. The 
US, China, and the Soviet Union were seen by the JIC as extremely reluctant to become 
embroiled in any kind of military adventure in Asia. Even smaller conflicts were, by then, 
thought by the JIC to be highly undesirable to the great powers, even between proxies. In an 
effort to reduce the chance of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the US and Soviet Union 
were thought to be reducing their supplies of offensive weapons to North and South Korea 
respectively.651 The JIC seemed to view the chances of great power conflict as lower than at 
any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
The risk of low-intensity conflict (outside Vietnam) was also perceived by the JIC to be 
lower than it had been in previous assessments and such conflict was now judged unlikely to 
demand assistance by New Zealand. Even with New Zealand’s potential combat operations 
limited to 'terrorist operations in northern Malaysia during disturbances elsewhere in the 
country', the government of Malaysia was expected to be reluctant to ask for ANZUK 
assistance in the event of such an emergency. The JIC considered interest by Malaysia and 
Singapore in retaining foreign forces on their territory would diminish and that the ANZUK 
presence may be terminated by the end of the 1970s.652 In short, not only was the threat to 
                                                 
649  'The Strategic Outlook for the Pacific Area 1971-76 and Beyond', Annex to JIC(NZ)(71)1, April 1971, 
MoD 1/1/1, New Zealand Defence Policy – General, 1968-1972 
650  'The Strategic Outlook for the Pacific Area 1971-76 and Beyond', Annex to JIC(NZ)(71)1, April 1971, 
MoD 1/1/1, New Zealand Defence Policy – General, 1968-1972 
651  'The Strategic Outlook for the Pacific Area 1971-76 and Beyond', Annex to JIC(NZ)(71)1, April 1971, 
MoD 1/1/1, New Zealand Defence Policy – General, 1968-1972 
652  'The Strategic Outlook for the Pacific Area 1971-76 and Beyond', Annex to JIC(NZ)(71)1, April 1971, 
MoD 1/1/1, New Zealand Defence Policy – General, 1968-1972 
  
188 
 
South East Asia from China and Chinese (or otherwise) inspired insurgent groups 
diminishing, but the need for Malaysia and Singapore to keep Australasian forces on their 
territory was also considered to be dropping. It was in this context that the new architecture 
for the New Zealand and Australian presence was created. 
5.3.6 The Five Power Defence Arrangements 
The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) were developed in the lead up to the British 
withdrawal from South East Asia. The FPDA came into effect on 1 November 1971 and 
replaced the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) and ANZAM agreements. The 
arrangements were designed to create a framework for a continued New Zealand and 
Australian presence in Malaysia and Singapore following British withdrawal. Negotiations 
began in June 1968 and were ramped up after Nixon announced his Gaum Doctrine.653 
Efforts to include the US in such arrangements came to naught and the UK would only play 
a minor role in any future structure. Britain indicated it would only deploy a significant 
force to the region in a crisis, but promised to continue to train in the area after withdrawal 
was completed in 1971. Once it was accepted that New Zealand and Australia would 
continue their presence in South East Asia without the UK, a structure had to be established 
that did not require a major power in a leading role. 
Malaysia and Singapore were committed to building up their own forces and becoming less 
reliant on foreign support. At the start of 1969 Wellington and Canberra announced that their 
respective battalions would move from their base at Terendak in Malaysia, to Singapore by 
the end of the year. Soon afterward, the announcement came that Australasian forces would 
remain in Singapore after 1971, with the New Zealand forces remaining at their existing 
strength.654 Not unlike Nixon's policy of 'Vietnamization' – turning over fighting of the war 
to the South Vietnamese – New Zealand's focus had shifted from defending South East Asia 
from China to ensuring that Malaysia and Singapore could defend themselves from less 
serious threats. Increased participation by Malaysia and Singapore was also desirable given 
the financial pressure being felt by the New Zealand military. New Zealand was not able to 
increase its role in the region to compensate for Britain's departure but by the 1970s New 
Zealand did not believe Britain’s forces needed to be replaced to the same level. New 
Zealand was trying to reduce its responsibilities without abandoning the region. 
                                                 
653  MoD, 1/1/9 Vol. 12, Talks and Arrangements with Allied Nations, October 1969-March 1970 
654  'Notes on Defence', 10 September 1969, MoD 1/1/1, New Zealand Defence Policy – General, 1968-1972 
  
189 
 
With the election of his Conservative UK Government in June 1970, incoming Prime 
Minister Edward Heath announced Britain would retain a small force in South East Asia 
after 1971. Nevertheless, Heath made it clear that the size of the remaining British force 
would not be sufficient to maintain the AMDA.655 By October the British commitment had 
been spelt out: five frigates, a battalion group (including an air platoon and artillery battery), 
and long-range maritime reconnaissance and helicopters. A Royal Navy submarine to be 
based at Sydney was later added.656 New Zealand was to provide a frigate, medium range 
transport aircraft, three Iroquois, one battalion, and periodic deployments of strike aircraft. 
Australia provided two squadrons of Mirage aircraft, one naval ship, and one battalion.657 
One of the major components of the new arrangements was the Integrated Air Defence 
System (IADS) which was commanded by an Air Defence Commander responsible to the 
five governments under the terms agreed by their ministers. Aircraft for the IADS were 
supplied primarily by Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore, with some periodic contributions 
by New Zealand and the UK.658 
Given the fast pace of change and the possibility that the Australasian commitment might 
not be long-lived,659 the FPDA was not implemented as a formal treaty.660 The only 
statement of intent in the original agreement is the agreement to consult in a crisis: 
The Ministers also declared, in relation to the external defence of Malaysia 
and Singapore, that in the event of any form of armed attack externally 
organised or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or 
Singapore, their governments would immediately consult together for the 
purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in 
relation to such attack or threat.661 
This consultative basis was meant to avoid a formal alliance.662 To that effect a formal 
secretariat was not created but instead a Joint Consultative Council was established to be 
attended by the Ministers of Defence from Singapore and Malaysia, and the High 
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Commissioners of New Zealand, Australia, and the UK. Day-to-day consultation would be 
at the service and official levels.663 The new framework kept New Zealand involved in 
South East Asia but with an assumption that Singapore and Malaysia’s reliance on New 
Zealand military assistance would decline. That decreased reliance would come from 
improvements in the capability of the Malaysian and Singaporean militaries, but also a 
declining risk of a major conflict with China or Indonesia requiring New Zealand and 
Australian support. The continued public political commitment to the defence of Malaysia 
and Singapore and the commitment to maintain force numbers belied more significant 
changes in defence policy. New Zealand would not give up on its allies in South East Asia, 
but the FPDA reflected a significant and continuing relaxation of the expectation that New 
Zealand would have to commit itself to a significant military conflict in Asia, especially 
against China.  
5.3.7 The Review of Defence Policy 1972  
Despite several abortive attempts, a fresh review of defence policy was finally published in 
1972. The differences between the Review of Defence Policy 1972 and the previous 1966 
review are striking not just for their statements on the threats faced by New Zealand, but 
also the intent of the two documents. Unlike the 1966 review, the 1972 review is ‘not 
intended to promulgate decisions already made’ about defence, but rather to ‘provide a basis 
for constructive public discussion’ which would facilitate future decision making.664  
The significant change in the international situation was noted especially the decrease in the 
importance of the Vietnam War. The worsening of the Sino-Soviet split was given as the 
major cause of the improving security situation in New Zealand area of interest. 
The Sino-Soviet schism has deepened and widened. The rivalry of these 
great powers in countries bordering our area of strategic concern… could 
have serious repercussions. China and the Soviet Union now confront each 
other militarily and compete with each other not only ideologically for the 
support of communist governments and revolutionary parties, but also 
diplomatically for influence with non-communist powers, especially in the 
development of relations with their main adversary, the United States. In 
other words, both the Soviet Union and China in the course of their 
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manoeuvring the one against the other, have become more flexible in their 
foreign policies towards many third parties.665 
The mutual antagonism between the two major communist powers was now seen as a 
benefit to New Zealand, as both wanted better relations with other countries. This is a world 
away from New Zealand’s perspectives on China in the mid-1960s which saw China’s 
growing hostility as paramount and the Sino-Soviet split being of little relevance. The 
‘diplomatic and new flexibility of China’ was only rivalled by Japan’s rapid economic 
growth.666 
While acknowledging that the UK and US were retreating from their overseas 
commitments, the review tried to emphasise the remaining British and American ties to the 
region such as aid, the British involvement in the FPDA, and the American nuclear 
umbrella. The positive spin on Anglo-American withdrawal was tempered with a warning 
that the Sino-Soviet competition was heating up just as the friendly great powers were 
disengaging from Asia and that further disengagement was still possible. 
But the possibility cannot be excluded that domestic, economic, and 
political pressures or political changes, in both the United States and 
Britain, could further affect them at the very time when China and the 
Soviet Union are becoming increasingly active in the competition for 
influence in the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and the 
Western Pacific.667 
The international climate described in the 1972 review is noticeable for its vagueness on 
how the changes in the international environment would affect New Zealand's defence 
forces. This vagueness was acknowledged by the Secretary of Defence and put down to the 
fluidity of great power relationships.668 The major variable identified in the review was how 
the states of South East Asia were going to respond to the slackening of engagement by the 
Western powers. Other variables identified were the ability of the smaller states of South 
East Asia to cooperate, and how the Vietnam War was to be settled.669 
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The theme of the Review of Defence Policy 1972 was uncertainty, but more importantly it 
marked significant changes in how Asia was perceived by New Zealand and how events in 
Asia had affected New Zealand security since the previous review was published. The 
changes were, of course, not all military. Parallel to the significant weakening of New 
Zealand’s defence role in Asia was a significant debate about how and when to engage with 
China diplomatically.  
 ENGAGING BEIJING: 1970-1972 
The rapid relaxation of New Zealand’s fears about China’s behaviour toward South East 
Asia and Beijing’s renewed diplomatic efforts gave new impetus to the questions of China’s 
UN membership and diplomatic recognition. By 1970 it was becoming clearer to New 
Zealand officials that the efforts to block Beijing from the UN would fail within a few years 
and that more and more states would abandon their diplomatic relations with Taipei in 
favour of Beijing. New Zealand officials realised they had to be very careful how New 
Zealand navigated these issues. Events were moving quickly. The New Zealand Government 
risked moving faster than domestic public opinion if it acted too hastily and risked 
becoming an international outlier if it moved too slowly as China worked to normalise its 
relations with the outside world. 
In November 1970, Laking became concerned about the tension between a domestic pro-
Taiwan lobby and the international tide turning towards Beijing. He thought support for the 
ROC had strengthened 'in key sections of the community' but the Government would have 
to be wary of 'being left behind in a general movement towards acceptance of Peking or of 
appearing simply to trail along behind the United States'.670 Gerald Hensley (the future 
Secretary of Defence) at the Washington Embassy wrote to Bryce Harland (the future New 
Zealand Ambassador to the PRC) that there was no reason for New Zealand to be a leader 
on the issue of China and that it was best if New Zealand moved with the herd.671 The 
general impression amongst senior officials at the start of 1970 was that New Zealand 
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should not lag behind Australia or the US but neither should it go too far ahead of them, 
especially if it meant cutting ties with Taiwan.672 
5.4.1 Holyoake’s New Zealand and China 
In May 1971 Holyoake commissioned an article to express his views on the need for change 
in New Zealand's China policy. He acknowledged that Beijing seemed to 'have turned a new 
leaf' and was 'taking a more friendly attitude to the outside world'.673 Yet he wasn't willing to 
see China and its goals as being fundamentally different. 'No useful purpose will be served 
by forgetting all we have learned about China in the past and imagining that everything is 
now different. It never is'.674 Holyoake noted the increase in China's power in the post-war 
era. New Zealand geography meant that it could not ignore China: 
One of the great events of our lifetime has been the re-emergence of China 
on the world scene. After a century of weakness and passivity, it has 
regained strength and begun to exert influence on others. This has changed 
the complexion of international politics and made the question of relations 
with China one of the chief issues of the day for governments all over the 
world. It has special importance for countries like New Zealand that are 
located in the Pacific area and are, actually or potentially, within the reach 
of China's power.675 
Holyoake's statement fudges an important question: to what extent did China threaten New 
Zealand’s interests in 1971? The use of 'actually or potentially' in a public document 
suggests that Holyoake was trying not to make a statement on China's level of threat. He 
may have been trying to strike a balance between a view of China as a continued threat to 
New Zealand interests in South East Asia and the idea that China was no threat at all. The 
article goes on to point to the right of the smaller nations of South East Asia to avoid 
Chinese hegemony and Beijing’s unwillingness to allow for such a right. Holyoake listed 
the hostile Chinese acts of the 1950s and early 1960s (attacks on Taiwanese held islands in 
1958, the crushing of the Tibetan revolt of 1959, and the Sino-Indian War of 1962) and its 
support for communist revolutionaries in South East Asia. The Cultural Revolution's 
exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet split was considered to be a lasting problem for China: even 
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if Holyoake thought the Cultural Revolution was now over, its effects would continue to be 
felt.676 
Holyoake felt the revival of Chinese diplomacy had much to do with Beijing’s interests in 
avoiding a war with the Soviet Union. Relationships that had survived the Cultural 
Revolution, such as with Tanzania and Pakistan, were used as a springboard to build new 
relationships such as with Canada and Italy. The latter two had recognised Beijing by the 
time of Holyoake's article, but, as he noted, diplomatic recognition had been possible on 
their part only at the cost of their official relations with Taiwan.677 Holyoake even admits 
surprise that the US and China had not already made an accommodation with one another, 
given Nixon's public desire for better relations. The lack of Sino-American rapprochement 
as of May 1971 suggested to the Prime Minister that Beijing’s return to the Warsaw Talks 
was entirely to unsettle the Soviets, rather than to reach a deal with the Americans.678 
Ping-Pong diplomacy was, in Holyoake's view, a positive sign. The previous month a US 
table tennis team visited China on the invitation of Mao. Zhou told the American players 
that the event signified the beginning of a new friendship between the US and China.679 
Nevertheless, Beijing’s insistence that sporting contact represented person-to-person rather 
than government-to-government contact suggested to Holyoake that Beijing was pushing 
American public opinion to accommodate China on its terms.680 This was in line with the 
attitude of the New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong which saw the sporting contact as a 
means to soften American attitudes to China.681 For the commission it represented an 
attempt by Beijing to improve its image, particularly in Japan, Australia, and the US. It also 
noted the tournament marked a return to the pre-Cultural Revolution levels of access for 
Western journalists.682  
Beijing's continued vocal support for foreign revolutionary groups was seen by Holyoake as 
an attempt to make it difficult for the Americans and the Soviets to come to an 
accommodation with each other against China.683 This is a strong sign that Holyoake did not 
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believe that Beijing was committed to promoting revolution in South East Asia and he saw it 
as something that could disappear in the future. At this time some South East Asian states 
were reassessing the level of support the PRC gave to revolutionary movements inside their 
borders. The commission noted not only that Filipino journalists who, on returning from 
Beijing, were reporting that the Chinese saw the Filipino insurgency as an internal matter 
but also that PRC support for the insurgency had been insignificant. At the same time the 
commission noted that Beijing was trying to reassure its communist friends (such as 
revolutionary groups and allies like North Korea684) that a softening of relations with the 
West did not mean it was going to abandon its revolutionary ideology.685  
While Holyoake had considered New Zealand's trade prospects with Taiwan to be greater 
than China's for some time, he insisted that this was not the sole factor in determining 
recognition: 
The thing that matters most, to us and to other countries, is the peace of the 
Pacific. It is important from this point of view that the countries of the area 
come to terms with Peking. It is even more important, especially for New 
Zealand, that a small country should not be abandoned in the face of the 
demands of a great power. This is why the government is resolved to 
maintain our existing ties with Taiwan and to uphold its right to its 
accepted place in the international community.686 
For Holyoake, the question of Taiwan was the real impediment to diplomatic engagement 
with China. However, in the shorter term he realised that it was in the United Nations that 
Beijing would seek legitimacy in the wider world.  He was still unprepared to give up 
Taiwan for Beijing to be seated in the UN, but did believe Beijing should take China's 
permanent seat on the Security Council if Taiwan was able to remain in the General 
Assembly.687 The Prime Minister considered the abandonment of Taiwan to be against New 
Zealand public opinion. Holyoake thought the New Zealand public had a high regard for the 
UN and that admission would raise the status of the PRC in the public mind and give rise to 
stronger calls for diplomatic recognition.688 He thought this high regard came from the 
mission of the United Nations to protect small and weak nations from the strong and that the 
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UN would fail in this mission if Taiwan were to be expelled from the organisation.689 Laking 
had noted a few months earlier that New Zealand's press agreed with a two-China policy 
and that editorials had argued Beijing should be recognised by New Zealand and seated at 
the UN without either cutting ties with Taiwan. 690 
When talking to the press in London at the time of his article, Holyoake was optimistic that 
both the PRC and the ROC would have to accept a two-China solution in the UN.691 He told 
reporters of his ideal scenario: that if a two-China solution became universally accepted then 
there would be a path open for the PRC's admission to the UN and New Zealand's 
diplomatic recognition of China. Beijing's UN admission and its widespread diplomatic 
recognition would also force the ROC to give up its seat on the Security Council. Holyoake 
may have understood this was not realistic but he felt the costs of abandoning Taiwan 
outweighed the gains from engagement with Beijing. The Prime Minister was not looking 
for immediate friendly relations with China. Holyoake still had deep concerns about 
Chinese designs on South East Asia. He noted that South East Asian nations had, at best, 
poor relations with China despite China's improving relations with nations in other 
regions.692 
On 18 May 1971 the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand spoke to Holyoake 
and told him that it was impossible for the ROC to accept a two-China policy. The Prime 
Minister replied that there was at that time no scope for negotiations with Beijing. Holyoake 
said New Zealand was still waiting for Nixon to make a statement, and that dual 
representation was the best means of preventing the adoption of the Albanian resolution to 
expel Taiwan in favour of the PRC.693  
While Holyoake had long made it clear he was willing to move on the issue of Beijing’s UN 
admission and New Zealand’s official diplomatic relations, the issue of Taiwan prevented 
either possibility. The diplomatic questions of admission and recognition were dealt with 
separately from the strategic questions over the threat posed, but Holyoake’s comments at 
SEATO suggest that Washington’s weakening commitment to South East Asia had a direct 
impact on the desirability of diplomatic engagement with China. Moves toward recognition 
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and diplomatic relations were not automatic signs of friendship but rather moves towards 
the discussion of differences through normal diplomatic practice. The decision to engage 
diplomatically with China was also an issue on which Holyoake could provide some 
leadership on an even footing with other leaders rather than being a junior partner in a wider 
security alliance. While Holyoake’s China policy was no longer dependent on American 
policy, Wellington nevertheless would be affected by Washington’s moves to engage with 
China and the effect of that engagement on foreign and defence policies in the region. 
5.4.2 Nixon Goes to China 
In July 1971 Nixon announced that he would visit Beijing the following year and this been 
arranged by Kissinger through secret meetings with Zhou. To some extent this came as a 
surprise to Wellington and to New Zealand diplomats around the world. While moves 
towards rapprochement were not surprising, there was little to suggest a visit would be 
announced. The New Zealand Embassy in Washington noted that the announcement of 
Nixon’s visit did not amount to the creation of formal relations between Washington and 
Beijing, nor was it a state visit. It was billed by the White House as a meeting of the leaders 
of two great powers to discuss important issues.694 New Zealand’s diplomats had only 15 
minutes prior warning of the announcement and the ROC ambassador to the US had 30 
minutes.695 New Zealand officials were quick to try and collect responses from Asian 
partners. The Taiwanese and South Koreans were surprised and unhappy about the 
announcement.696 New Zealand posts in Ottawa,697 Canberra,698 and Tokyo699 all reported 
that the governments there welcomed the news publicly but in private expressed a mixture 
of feelings. The Japanese were said to be confused and the Canadians were relieved that 
they had established recognition first. The New Zealand Embassy in Washington accurately 
predicted that the news of Nixon’s visit meant that the US would unofficially give up on 
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opposing China’s entry to the United Nations but would pass a losing vote against Albania’s 
resolution to the seat the PRC and expel the ROC as a necessary gesture to allies.700 
Holyoake issued a statement welcoming Nixon’s announcement and expressed hope that the 
visit would support China’s trend toward more relaxed relations with other nations.701 This 
sentiment seems to have been genuine. Laking wrote to the Prime Minister mentioning the 
desire to try and calm Japanese apprehensions about Nixon’s move during coming talks 
with Tokyo.702 Holyoake in turn wrote to Australian Prime Minister William McMahon that 
the pace of improvement in Sino-American relations would be slow and that Australia and 
New Zealand would have time to adjust to the change and ‘safeguard their own essential 
interests’.703 Holyoake told him that if improved Sino-American relations did emerge this 
would be beneficial to New Zealand. 
The commission noted the difficult balancing act Beijing was walking in inviting Nixon to 
Beijing. After the invitation was made Beijing again had to reassure its communist friends 
of its ideological commitment.704 At the same time Beijing's endorsement of the suppression 
of insurgencies in Ceylon and Pakistan did not go unnoticed by the commission.705 
5.4.3 The Commission’s View of China’s Changing Policy  
In August 1971 New Zealand’s representative in Hong Kong wrote directly to Holyoake and 
laid out the state of Chinese politics as the commission saw it.706 The Commissioner 
strongly emphasised the inward looking nature of Chinese governance and that periods of 
focus on international matters were a rare luxury allowed for when the political environment 
was free of crisis and the basic needs of the economy were being met. 
The Cultural Revolution was an extraordinary event, just as the Great Leap 
Forward before it had been. Both periods demonstrated the consuming 
preoccupation of the Chinese leaders with the internal affairs of their 
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country. The problems of governing China are immense, some would say 
too complex to be capable of solution, and governments in Peking have 
traditionally relegated foreign affairs to a secondary place. When the 
domestic front is quiet, with good harvests and no governmental crisis to 
preoccupy them, the leaders of China can, as they did in the fifties in the 
Bandung era and again now, devote a little more of their time to the world 
outside China's borders.707 
The commission saw that immense changes had occurred in Chinese foreign policy. 
Beijing’s support for revolutionary movements had become tempered by support for the 
suppression of revolutionary groups in Ceylon and Pakistan. China was actively seeking 
good relations with a Chinese foreign policy that was no longer ‘bound by the straightjacket 
of Maoist revolutionary ideology’.708 However, the Commissioner noted that this did not 
mean China was going to open itself to the world economically. Its return to the accepted 
rules of international behaviour were ‘narrowly political and tactical’.709 The shift in foreign 
policy was based on immediate security needs rather than ideological change.  
The commissioner highlighted for Holyoake the ancient problem of securing China’s 
borders from its neighbours. In 1971 China faced significant threats from the Soviet Union 
to the north, Japan and the US to the east, and India to the south. The construction of moral 
support in the third world and membership of the UN were described by the commission as 
tactical moves to offset these threats. The issue of Taiwan was bound up in this feeling of 
insecurity and need for limited openness. The commissioner warned that there was no 
indication that Beijing was willing to accept a separate ‘China’ in order to gain membership 
in the UN.  
In short, the commission’s view of Chinese policy was one of changing of methods but not 
of ultimate goals. Yet those perceived goals were not the same as those perceived by the JIC 
and other New Zealand officials just six years earlier. In 1965 officials saw China as looking 
to maximise its power by seeking to dominate South East Asia.710 By 1971 the commission 
was telling the Prime Minister that China was changing its foreign policy just enough to 
seek security and maintain its territorial integrity. The view of Chinese foreign policy 
presented by the Commission was not one that required the containment policies of the 
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1950s and 60s but it was also a view which indicated Holyoake’s vision of two Chinas 
would not be possible. 
5.4.4 China’s Admission to the United Nations  
By the time Nixon entered office in early 1969, US public opinion had shifted with a 
majority of Americans now saying they would accept Communist China in the UN if the 
member nations voted for it.711 By 1970 Washington’s goals in the UN had shifted to 
keeping Taiwan in the UN rather than Beijing out. This effectively meant a two Chinas 
policy – and aligning with Holyoake’s already stated position – but Nixon realised this 
would not be acceptable to either Chinese government. It wasn't until 1971 that the US 
formally dropped its opposition to the PRC entering the UN. 
New Zealand’s close involvement in blocking the PRC’s admission continued until the end. 
From a tactical point of view, New Zealand was attempting to make sure that 'The onus of 
rejecting a two Chinas policy should be made to fall squarely on the Communists'.712 
However, the chance of preventing the Albanian resolution from passing became all the 
more difficult on 15 July 1971 when the announcement came of Nixon’s planned visit to 
China. This was only a day before the Albanian resolution was again tabled at the UN with 
17 cosponsors. Frank Corner agreed with US Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green 
that new initiatives to keep Taiwan in the UN were now unlikely. Corner realised that the 
US would now probably vote against the Albanian resolution but not make any major effort 
to oppose it.713 The Canadians soon informed New Zealand that they would vote against an 
IQ resolution and any other move that would delay the admission of Beijing.714 
On 2 August US Secretary of State William P. Rogers made a statement that the US would 
support Beijing's admission to the UN but not any resolution that would expel the ROC. 
This was further confirmation of the two-China policy that Holyoake had long been calling 
for, but the Prime Minister pushed for Beijing to take the Security Council seat from Taipei 
as well. Discussions in August over the wording of a dual representation resolution were 
intense. During that month the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador spoke to Holyoake and said 
his Government was now willing to accept a dual representation resolution matched with a 
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non-expulsion resolution. However, he said that Taipei was not happy about New Zealand's 
vocal support of settling the issue of the Security Council seat.715 Taipei was clearly trying 
to protect its position as much as possible while the tide turned against it. 
On 9 September the Americans agreed to a 'complex' dual representation resolution with 
New Zealand as a co-sponsor. Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand also agreed to 
be co-sponsors over the next few days. However, New Zealand's Permanent Representative 
at the UN, John Scott, felt that Kissinger's statements on China were designed to undermine 
efforts to keep Taiwan in the United Nations. The announcement of Kissinger's second trip 
came as the UN was to begin its debate on the Chinese issue projecting an image counter to 
US Ambassador to the UN George H.W. Bush’s efforts. The debate ran from 18–25 October. 
Scott's recollection of the event was not one of excitement. 'It would be as tedious to 
recapitulate the debate as it was tedious to listen to it', he wrote.716 When it came to the vote, 
there was fading confidence in the Western camp. The New Zealanders met with the 
Americans and the Australians on fall back positions if the vote looked as though it was lost. 
Wellington initially told its representatives to vote for the Albanian resolution if it looked as 
though it would pass. Scott resisted on the grounds that the vote could be tight and New 
Zealand should not be the deciding vote in favour of a resolution it had tried to oppose. 
Wellington agreed and told Scott only to vote for the Albanian resolution if all hope was 
lost.717 
On Monday 25 October the US was still expecting to win the IQ vote, but an unexpected 
motion from the non-aligned states brought forward the voting one day to that evening. A 
flurry of procedural motions followed. The US was able to get the IQ motion voted on prior 
to the Albanian resolution but the IQ motion itself failed. This meant that the Albanian 
resolution could pass with a simple majority. At this point the ROC delegation refused to 
take further part in the proceedings and left the chamber.718 American efforts to separate out 
the expulsion of the ROC from the admittance of the PRC failed and the Albanian resolution 
passed 76-35-17, with New Zealand included in those voting against the measure.719 With 
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Taiwan's representatives expelled, there was no longer the possibility of dual representation 
and resolutions to that effect were withdrawn. 
In Scott's view it was a lack of effort on the part of the White House which led to the 
passing of the Albanian resolution.720 Nixon and Kissinger had decided that relations with 
Taiwan were a necessary sacrifice for better relations with Beijing. They made little effort to 
keep Taiwan in the UN and left the US permanent representative (later president) George H. 
W. Bush with little ability to lobby for greater support for Taipei's cause. New Zealand stuck 
to its position of keeping Taiwan represented but once the momentum swung both towards 
Beijing’s entry and Taipei’s expulsion the resolve of the Government wavered. Once the 
ROC had been displaced at the UN, the pressure shifted globally to the question of 
diplomatic recognition. 
5.4.5 Recognition, Kirk, and a New Foreign Policy 
On 11 May 1971 Australia announced that it would seek to normalise relations with Beijing, 
but no obvious effort was made until the PRC entered the UN. Once the PRC was seated in 
the United Nations the global shift towards recognising China gathered pace and New 
Zealand and Australia made greater efforts to engage with Beijing. Holyoake realised that 
public opinion would shift towards recognising China at the expense of Taiwan once the 
battle to keep it in the UN had been lost.721 Canberra told New Zealand privately that its 
diplomats in Paris had been instructed to make contact with Beijing's ambassador in Paris in 
order to open a dialogue.722 Holyoake also began working on establishing links with the 
Chinese government. 
Some effort was made to establish a dialogue with Beijing through Auckland businessman 
Ramon La Varis who claimed to have significant contacts in Communist China. La Varis 
had been exploring the possibility of business and political connections with China on 
behalf of the government since 1970, but officials quickly lost confidence in La Varis as he 
lacked the discretion necessary for diplomatic work. Other New Zealand business people 
working in China warned against using La Varis. The Joint Intelligence Bureau did not 
consider him a reliable reporter of events in China, and the Commission in Hong Kong was 
                                                 
720  Scott, 1991, p. 246 
721  Barry Gustafson, Kiwi Keith: A Biography of Keith Holyoake, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2007, 
p. 275 
722  Scott, 1991, p. 241 
  
203 
 
concerned he could not separate his diplomatic work from his business interests.723 Despite 
the serious misgivings of officials, Holyoake continued to use La Varis as an intermediary 
and little was achieved before the National Government was defeated in the election of 
November 1972. It could be questioned how serious Holyoake was in establishing relations 
with Beijing given his use of La Varis, but by then Holyoake nevertheless understood by this 
time that such relations were in New Zealand’s best interests and Taipei’s cause had 
effectively been lost. 
The election of Norman Kirk's Third Labour Government made recognition of the PRC 
possible. Kirk was unencumbered with the decisions of the past and wanted to set a new 
tone for New Zealand foreign policy. Labour, like the Australian Labor Party elected at the 
same time, had made recognition of China an election issue. Frank Corner, as incoming 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, briefed the new Prime Minister on the international issues of 
the day and suggested recognising the PRC and reopening the New Zealand Embassy in 
Moscow. This suited Kirk's desire for a more open and independent foreign policy but he 
was concerned about being too quick to recognise China. Kirk suggested that the 
government leave recognition until its second term,724 but Corner persisted and convinced 
him to move quickly towards recognition.725 New Zealand changed its official recognition 
of the Government of China from the ROC to the PRC on 23 December 1972, the same time 
as Australia. The ROC ambassador and his staff quickly left Wellington but the 
establishment of relations with the PRC took a few more months. The following April the 
new Minister of Overseas Trade Joe Walding met Zhou. In July Walding’s counterpart Pai 
Hsiang Kuo visited Wellington and in September Bryce Harland was appointed New 
Zealand’s first ambassador to China.726  
By 1972 recognition of Beijing and the severing of official ties with Taipei was not a radical 
act. After 23 years of debate, views on China inside New Zealand, as well as in global 
public opinion generally, had shifted dramatically in only a few years. China was no longer 
the enemy it had been in the Korean War, nor was it perceived as the growing hostile threat 
to South East Asia as it had been in the mid-1960s. Radical Maoism was still the political 
force dominating Chinese politics but its enmity had been directed northward to the Soviet 
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Union. China’s growing goodwill to countries outside the Soviet-bloc also reinforced the 
notion that it was a country that could have constructive relations with the outside world.  
The election of the Kirk government heralded more than the recognition of China. Kirk's 
views on international relations were fundamentally different from those of Holyoake. Kirk 
had long demanded a more independent, moral, and principled stance in foreign policy,727 
but by 1972 National and Labour had moved much closer on China and defence policies. 
Significant change had occurred before the Labour Government's election. Western 
participation in Vietnam was ending, cuts in New Zealand defence spending had been made, 
Forward Defence was no longer aimed at containing China, and efforts were being made to 
establish relations with Beijing. Therefore, by the time Kirk entered government the 
differences in these areas were more in tone and rhetoric than in policy. 
Kirk did not withdraw New Zealand forces from Singapore and he kept New Zealand in the 
ANZUS alliance. However, he did not subscribe to Holyoake's quiet diplomacy and 
reluctance to publicly criticise friendly powers. Kirk drew support from those that had 
opposed the Vietnam War and promoted a more distinct sense of national identity.728 When 
in December 1972 Nixon resumed the bombing of North Vietnam to force the North 
Vietnamese to resume peace talks, the new Prime Minister sent Nixon a telegram to protest 
the bombing.729 There was a similar discomfort with the region's defence organisations, an 
attitude made clear in the extensive 1974 'Basis of Defence Policy, Planning, and 
Programming' report. 
[The Government] has lent encouragement to the development, in the 
longer term, of a new, comprehensive forum for regional cooperation to 
replace the old, cold-war institutions that have perpetuated divisions 
among the countries within the region, to bring the large northern powers 
of China and Japan into fruitful contact with the smaller countries of 
South-east Asia and the Pacific.730  
While the report accepted that it was still premature to create such a forum, this attitude 
represented a Labour Government that had determined it could and should try to break with 
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the divisions of the Cold War and foster communication between all of the states of Asia and 
the Pacific. Emphasis would be placed on confidence building measures, 'stability, 
cooperation, and partnership, rather than... military commitments in security treaties which 
were established during the period of Great Power confrontation'.731  
Kirk's desire for change mirrored the rapidly changing global environment. Britain's 
admission to the European Economic Community, the end of Bretton Woods, and (later) the 
oil shock all brought significant economic change. These social, economic, and political 
changes of the early 1970s had an impact on the ability of officials to make assessments for 
foreign and defence policy planning. When asked to produce a report on the global 
environment into the 1980s, the JIC produced a wide ranging and vague report.732 China 
was now assessed much more in terms of its role as a great power, but it was not the 
growing threat that it had been portrayed as in the mid-1960s. Its interests were still 
considered by the JIC to be counter to those of New Zealand, but the problem of China 
seemed further away than it did in the 1960s and it was described much more like the Soviet 
Union had been during that period. 
It is unlikely that either of the communist Great Powers will be able to 
establish itself sufficiently in either Asia or the Pacific to put our economic 
interests and communications routes at its mercy. It is quite possible, 
however, that the Soviet Union could develop contact in the Pacific which 
would be contrary to our interests. The growth of Chinese influences in 
South East Asia and possibly the Pacific would also be detrimental to us, if 
less immediately close at hand. They could both be expected to exploit 
divisions and tensions between developed and developing countries.733 
The potential for major conflict between China and either the Soviet Union or the United 
States was by 1973 seen as part of the superpower strategic balance, despite 
acknowledgement that China's military and nuclear capabilities would be inferior to those of 
the US and Soviet Union for some time. The rise of Japan's economic power was noted by 
the JIC but it was considered to be oriented towards self-defence.734 
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The problem of China's desire to seek influence in South East Asia was not moderated by 
greater faith in the stability of South East Asia. The JIC believed Thailand would to come to 
an accommodation with China, Singapore's economic success would warm its relations with 
its neighbours, ethnic division would limit Malaysia, the Philippines would be beset with 
'political anarchy', and Indonesia would be challenged by Java's social and economic 
problems.735 China would continue to (at least) inspire insurgencies in South East Asia and 
these would continue through the 1980s.736 In general, the JIC thought the southern half of 
the region had better prospects for stability than the northern half. Despite noting these 
significant challenges, the JIC no longer considered instability in South East Asia to be a 
threat to New Zealand's interests in the way it had been in the 1960s. With instability in the 
region less of a concern, the influence of China was also less of a concern, especially as 
Beijing was thought to have moderated its policies in the region. 
 CONCLUSION 
The period between 1969 and 1972 saw the focus of New Zealand’s China policy shift from 
the realm of defence to that of foreign affairs. When the focus was on containment there 
were few political decisions relating directly to China that needed to be made; diplomatic 
effort was exerted on the allies, especially the powerful ones. External Affairs kept watch on 
events in China, but it was in defence policy where China policy was made. Trade was 
limited and while the Government made no effort to restrict trade with Communist China, it 
did little to encourage it either.737 With Chinese containment no longer possible, the focus of 
China policy shifted to the more diplomatic concerns of UN admission, diplomatic 
recognition, and the thorny issue of Taiwan. 
Finding a solution to China’s diplomatic isolation became all the more desirable as China 
emerged from the difficult period of the Cultural Revolution. While the initial period of the 
Cultural Revolution put paid to the view China was a growing and expansionist power, its 
decline made diplomatic dialogue possible and a desirable strategy for managing China’s 
power. Opening a dialogue with China was not desirable or easily achievable when the 
revolution was at its xenophobic height, but thinking changed rapidly as soon as Beijing 
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transformed into an active participant in international diplomacy. In the absence of a serious 
containment strategy there was little reason not to attempt a dialogue with Beijing. This is 
not to say diplomatic engagement during the period of containment would have been 
impossible, but the perception China was a significant threat to Western interests in South 
East Asia was still a significant impediment to diplomatic recognition. 
The context of Forward Defence may have been specific to New Zealand and Australia, but 
the move toward diplomatic recognition of China was global. New Zealand’s view of China 
changed radically between 1965 and 1971 but unlike Australia, the US, and Japan, New 
Zealand did not have to move its official stance as much. Holyoake’s position of making the 
status of Taiwan the only stumbling block made New Zealand’s position less hostile to 
Beijing when UN admission and widespread diplomatic recognition became likely. 
Nevertheless, Holyoake’s commitment to Taiwan meant official relations with Beijing were 
unachievable while he dominated New Zealand foreign policy.   
It is not easy to judge whether Holyoake believed genuinely that any kind of two-China 
solution could have been possible. His feeling that public opinion would not support the 
abandonment of Taiwan was at least supported by the attitude of the New Zealand press. 
The commission and others warned that neither the PRC or ROC would accept dual 
recognition but, despite Holyoake738 making moves toward recognition, it would take a new 
government to make a break with Taiwan. Kirk did not enjoy breaking ties with Taiwan; he 
had a good relationship with the Konsin Shah, the ROC ambassador to New Zealand.739 
However, unlike Holyoake, Kirk was willing to sacrifice New Zealand’s ties with Taiwan in 
order to normalise relations with Beijing. 
The shift towards normalising relations with China was not helpful to the bureaucratic 
interests of the defence forces. While the shift in popular opinion against the war in Vietnam 
and the growth in the peace movement had undoubtedly an effect on the Government’s 
defence policies, the lowered level of perceived threat helped move the hand of the 
Government, which had always looked for ways to reduce defence costs. Without China to 
provide a central threat, or SEATO providing a framework for capability choices, New 
Zealand no longer had obvious goals for its defence spending. Uncertainty came to 
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dominate the strategic policy-making apparatus and this allowed the Government to keep 
firmer control over government expenditure. 
The most assuring event in this climate of uncertainty was the finalisation of the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements as the successor to AMDA following British withdrawal. The FPDA 
in one sense was the result of British imperial decline, decolonisation, and the emergence of 
Singapore and Malaysia as successful independent states, but it also was the result of a 
decreased threat from China. New Zealand responded to the challenge of British withdrawal 
not by increasing deployments to Asia, but by decreasing them. While abandoning South 
East Asia had been a possibility, New Zealand remained committed to Forward Defence but 
it could only do so because the goals of Forward Defence had narrowed. While Australasian 
forces are no longer deployed in Asia the FPDA continue today as the basis of defence 
cooperation between its Australasian and South East Asian members.740  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The period between 1965 and 1972 saw dramatic changes in New Zealand’s foreign and 
defence policies. This thesis has demonstrated that New Zealand’s understanding of China 
was a crucial element in that change. In 1965 New Zealand’s defence community saw itself 
facing the threat of conflicts in Indonesia and Vietnam with a risk of the latter conflict 
escalating to involve China. Much of New Zealand’s capital equipment (especially the 
aircraft) was obsolete and significant funds were deemed necessary to equip New Zealand’s 
forces to defend South East Asia. By 1972 most of the upgrades had arrived but the strategic 
situation had changed significantly. The Vietnam War had killed the public appetite for 
military engagements in South East Asia, but many of the influences on New Zealand’s 
grand strategy and decisions taken were unrelated to public opinion. The primary 
justification for Forward Defence – the containment of China – had disappeared in favour of 
a number of more limited goals.  
These limited goals were the direct result of the loss of the means of providing containment 
and the reduction in the perceived level of threat from China. In 1965 Forward Defence was 
an all-or-nothing concept: permanent deployments to South East Asia were seen as pointless 
without great power support. By the end of 1968 that view had disappeared as the threat 
level had declined. Forward Defence without major British or American support became 
tenable because the containment of China was no longer its objective, as China was not 
perceived to be the threat to the region it had been. Forward Defence continued, but its goals 
had changed. The primary focus had shifted to developing the Malaysian and Singaporean 
militaries and providing training opportunities for the New Zealand forces, not deterring 
China. The establishment of relations with China did not mean that the perceived threat 
from China had vanished completely. There were still lingering concerns, but given the 
changes in Chinese foreign policy and the inability of New Zealand to maintain a serious 
containment policy, there was no longer a good reason to withhold diplomatic recognition. 
Diplomatic engagement with China had become the best method of working through 
differences.  
New Zealand’s officials saw the China of 1965 as a state using its increasing power to 
dominate South East Asia and expel Western influence. In 1972 New Zealand officials still 
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felt China desired to expand its influence in the region but Wellington was now much more 
sceptical of China’s potential power and much more confident of Chinese restraint.  
 THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 
The basic premise that drove New Zealand strategic thinking between 1945 and 1972 was 
the need to avoid a repeat of the Second World War. The fear was that an alien and hostile 
power could quickly dominate all of South East Asia (as Japan had done) and thus place 
Australia and New Zealand in peril. Initial post-war fears of Japanese rearmament were 
displaced by fears of China by the middle of the 1950s. From the Korean War to the peak of 
American involvement in the Vietnam War, New Zealand officials believed South East 
Asia’s security was threatened by China both directly, through the PLA, and indirectly, 
through the support of revolutionary movements. Indonesia provided another source of 
threat, especially during the Confrontation period of 1963-1966. However, while Indonesia 
was the immediate danger in 1965, officials correctly believed that Confrontation was 
unlikely to continue, but incorrectly believed China would continue to increase in both 
power and hostility. 
The term 'domino theory' never appears in any of the documents examined for this research. 
Such a description belies the more complex lens through which New Zealand officials 
examined the security problems of South East Asia. The fall of one Asian state to 
communism was not seen as automatically making it more difficult to prevent communism 
spreading or coming under the influence of China. The important element for officials was 
commitment. If Western powers, including New Zealand, could stay committed to the 
defence of South East Asian states, then those states would be unlikely to turn towards 
China. In turn, New Zealand needed to show commitment to South East Asia in order to 
maintain the British or American military presence thought vital to containing China. 
The downfall of these perspectives came with the downgrading of China as a threat. Once 
the Cultural Revolution was in full swing there was no longer any real or potential ‘first 
class Asiatic power’ on the horizon that was likely to have the ability or the desire to control 
the approaches to Australia and New Zealand. China was still hostile but it was not a threat 
that looked as though it was likely to be able to dominate the region. Soviet power was 
distant, Japan was re-emerging but aligned with the Western bloc, and Indonesia had 
become strongly anti-Chinese, anti-communist, and somewhat pro-Western. Nuclear 
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weapons, especially via improvements in Soviet and Chinese capability, were also changing 
New Zealand’s assumptions but there is little specific detail on the role of nuclear weapons 
in the files examined for this research. These forces affecting New Zealand policy were also 
part of the much wider emergence of détente in the 1970s which reduced tensions and 
changed the way the Cold War was conceptualised. The notion that New Zealand’s security 
interests were tied to avoiding a repeat of the Second World War in South East Asia waned 
but there were no new frameworks for understanding international security and its 
ramifications for New Zealand. 
 THE LOSS OF ALLIANCE STRUCTURES 
The process that produced the Review of Defence Policy 1966 highlighted New Zealand’s 
utilisation of, if not reliance on, the structures created by the Western alliances and 
partnerships that were involved in South East Asia. ANZUS provided New Zealand’s 
ultimate security guarantee but it provided nothing in terms of day-to-day military planning. 
SEATO provided the important link to American military planning. Its war plans were 
useful for New Zealand to help it determine where it should spend its limited defence 
resources as New Zealand could fill small gaps in capability amongst its partners. SEATO 
also gave New Zealand confidence that its interests in the region were being protected by 
major Western powers and that preparations were made in case of a number of contingencies 
including a major invasion of South East Asia by China. Correspondingly, ANZAM and the 
AMDA provided the basis for the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve and day-to-day 
organisation and logistics. This was not an ideal setup for New Zealand planners but it 
covered all of New Zealand’s needs for South East Asian security. 
The period between 1965 and 1972 saw the breakdown of all these structures and their 
partial replacement with new frameworks. SEATO was already suffering in 1965 from the 
effective loss of France and Pakistan and the alliance would lose much of its relevancy after 
the United States’ unilateral intervention in Vietnam. It would continue to weaken until its 
dissolution in 1977. The replacement of the CSR, ANZAM, and the AMDA with the FPDA 
took many years of negotiation and was only successful – at least from New Zealand’s 
perspective – due to the decline of the threat from China.  
At the same time New Zealand’s limited participation in the Vietnam War provided the 
greater cooperation with the United States that New Zealand defence officials were seeking, 
  
212 
 
but it seems to have done little to improve the security of Malaysia or Singapore in the 
minds of New Zealand officials. By 1968 the war was seen as a significant strategic problem 
in its own right and not an extension of the containment of China as it had been in 1965. In 
fact, New Zealand officials blamed the Vietnam conflict for the loss of American interest in 
actively defending the region generally. While New Zealand had reluctantly joined the 
Vietnam War in order to shore up American support for the region, the war had the opposite 
effect of exhausting American interest in fighting conflicts on the Asian mainland.   
The period between 1968 and 1971 were especially difficult for officials as the old security 
structures were failing but new ones had not yet been developed. Even with the 
establishment of the FPDA the Review of Defence Policy 1972 is marked by its uncertainty. 
New Zealand in 1965 was sure of its defence needs and what was required to maintain its 
interests, but by 1972 those certainties had disappeared. There was no major significant 
threat on the horizon, but there was also no real architecture in the Western Pacific to meet 
such a threat if it did emerge. New Zealand had to find its own way in terms of capability 
development and that meant a continued commitment to Forward Defence but a detuned 
version of Forward Defence connected to much more limited goals. 
 CATEGORISATION OF THE CONFLICT 
Wellington’s relative confidence in the alliance structures of 1965 allowed for clear 
categorisation of armed conflicts that might appear in South East Asia and the circumstances 
in which New Zealand could take part. This clear taxonomy would be lost with the 
breakdown of South East Asian alliance structures during the late 1960s. Clear distinctions 
between global, limited, and low intensity warfare allowed for predictions on the likelihood 
of each of these types of warfare which, in turn, allowed for recommendations for capability 
development. With global war considered highly unlikely, the focus was placed on the 
somewhat higher possibility of limited war with China and the ongoing high level threat of 
low-intensity conflict. While China in 1965 was thought to be at least partially responsible 
for the low intensity conflict in South East Asia, it was the threat of limited war that drove 
the policy level discussions of the threats New Zealand forces should be designed to meet.  
With the drop-off of the threat from China, prospective British withdrawal, American 
fatigue, and the Vietnam quagmire, the categories of conflict were replaced by a mission-
based approach. This focused on what the defence force needed to do in South East Asia 
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rather than the types of conflicts that New Zealand might find itself involved in. By 1968 
the focus was on Vietnam and similar emergencies and defence cooperation with Malaysia 
and Singapore. Limited war was now much less likely and less of a priority for defence 
officials. In reality this meant that from 1968 New Zealand considered itself far less likely to 
enter into an armed conflict in South East Asia once the Vietnam conflict had concluded, 
despite Forward Defence continuing. 
 RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES 
The driving force behind New Zealand’s Forward Defence strategy was the country’s 
relationship with its allies, especially the UK and the US. The English-speaking great 
powers were, in New Zealand’s mind, vital to the containment effort, but both lost interest 
in active military support for South East Asia during the 1965-1972 period. New Zealand 
had to navigate the very different China policies of the UK and US. The UK’s diplomatic 
presence in Beijing was an important source of information for New Zealand even if New 
Zealand was closer to American policy on China during this period. New Zealand’s day-to-
day military needs were met with the cooperation of the UK while the ultimate security 
guarantee was provided by the US. Once British withdrawal was confirmed attention moved 
to gaining American support for New Zealand’s efforts in Malaysia and Singapore, 
something that New Zealand and Australia failed to achieve. 
Willingness to support major allies defend their vital interests was an important element of 
New Zealand’s foreign policy. This was considered necessary if New Zealand was to expect 
the protection of great powers in an emergency. However, the difference between supporting 
the interests of allies and convincing allies to support New Zealand’s own interests was not 
always clear. Often great power support was seen as an end in itself and not a means to 
furthering New Zealand’s own interests. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that during 1965-
1972 New Zealand’s Forward Defence strategy was solely or even primarily about 
maintaining the ANZUS alliance security guarantee. New Zealand needed the great powers 
to further its own interests in the region much more than Britain and the United States 
needed New Zealand’s assistance. Officials in Wellington, especially in the years 1965-
1968, were deeply concerned about the loss of British and American support and the effect 
that would have on New Zealand’s interest in maintaining the security of South East Asia. 
The relaxation felt by New Zealand officials after 1968 was due to the decrease in perceived 
threat from China not because of reduced British and American interest in the region. 
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 DECOLONISATION 
Forward Defence was a strategy that facilitated, but was also undermined by, the process of 
decolonisation. New Zealand wanted South East Asia to be secure from domination by a 
hostile power. In the early years of Forward Defence this meant protecting Britain’s colonial 
possessions, and to a somewhat lesser extent the SEATO members and protocol states of 
South East Asia. As time went on, Forward Defence became about supporting the defence of 
Malaysia and Singapore. This meant significant engagement with the new states and 
assistance to help build their own defence capabilities. Optimism among New Zealand 
officials on the prospects for Malaysia and Singapore as independent states was never high 
during the late 1960s, but by the early 1970s the reality of Anglo-American withdrawal 
demanded greater confidence. Such confidence was also sounder due to the reduction in 
threats from both China and Indonesia. However, the files examined for this research do not 
give a clear sense that officials believed Singapore and Malaysia were ready to pick up their 
own defences. It was simply the political reality of the situation. The lack of support from 
the great powers meant that the young states had to put more effort into their own defences 
whether they were capable or not. 
Forward Defence had value when the states of South East Asia were weak and the threats to 
those states were high. As Malaysia and Singapore became somewhat stronger and the 
threats receded, Forward Defence lost its importance. British withdrawal and the Guam 
doctrine may have forced New Zealand and Australia to do without great power support but 
it also meant Malaysia and Singapore needed to set up their own defence independence. In 
this sense Forward Defence was a successful strategy. The states of South East Asia became 
strong enough that they no longer required a significant injection of foreign military support. 
 THE NZ COMMISSION IN HONG KONG AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
The New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong was instrumental in providing sound analysis 
during the Cultural Revolution. Unlike defence officials, the officials of External Affairs 
acknowledged the sources that informed their opinions when writing to Wellington. This 
gives a clear picture of the connections New Zealand diplomatic officials utilised to 
understand events in China. New Zealand did not have officials on the Chinese mainland, 
but it did have friends such as the British and the Indians who had posts in Beijing. Critical 
analysis of press reports and utilisation of the few New Zealand business people trading 
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with China also provided important information. However, the view from Hong Kong could 
skew knowledge in favour of events in Hong Kong and Guangdong. The danger to Hong 
Kong may have dominated the perspective of the commission in 1967 but it also built a 
picture of the Chinese leadership that was still in charge of foreign policy and could restrain 
revolutionaries. This was not a view of irrational leadership and uncontrolled chaos, but a 
view of a leadership where there was hope of engagement and diplomacy. This perspective 
only became stronger in the years before New Zealand established relations with China.  
It was the commission that drove changes in External Affairs’ (and perhaps Wellington’s) 
thinking on China and provided the analysis of the Cultural Revolution. It was the 
revolution that broke the notion that China was an uncompromising expansionist power 
which was willing and would eventually be able to push away Western power and influence 
in South East Asia. This breakdown came in two phases. The first phase was brought about 
by the tumultuous period of the revolution from 1966 to 1968. In this period China may 
have become even more belligerent to the West but it also became more isolationist. The 
breakdown of social order in China and that breakdown's perceived (but in reality minimal) 
effects on the economy tore away at the idea in New Zealand officialdom that China was a 
unified force capable of significant economic growth which would eventually be directed at 
dominating South East Asia. The chaos of the revolution and the internal conflict made 
external adventures or meaningful direction of external revolutionary groups unlikely. A 
China at war with itself was unlikely to be able to create or muster the hard and soft power 
necessary to dislodge the Western powers from South East Asia. 
The second phase was brought on by Beijing's change in foreign policy after the dampening 
of the social disorder and the suppression of the Red Guards. The growing hostility between 
China and the Soviet Union seeded the idea in Wellington that a three-way Cold War 
between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington was unsustainable. That idea took some time to 
grow but by the middle of 1971 it was looking likely that Mao would reciprocate Nixon's 
offer of improved relations. China was still seen by officials as actively hostile, but by then 
it was not only working within the norms of accepted international behaviour but also 
heading towards some kind of accommodation with the US. China had become a country 
with which New Zealand and other Western countries could have meaningful diplomatic 
relations. The violent demonstrations that had targeted foreign – especially Soviet and 
British – diplomats in Beijing had ended and the Chinese Government’s fiery international 
rhetoric had been toned down significantly. 
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With the decline of the Cultural Revolution, New Zealand officials saw the multiple difficult 
lines Beijing had to walk. China’s leadership had to maintain a balance between the 
revolutionary hard-liners and the more moderate influences of Zhou. Beijing also had to 
walk a line between easing tensions with the West and abandoning the leftist revolutionary 
movements around the world which Beijing claimed to support spiritually if not always 
materially. Chinese foreign policy had shifted from hostility to the outside world to a 
mixture of ideological pronouncements, a charm offensive, and a moderation of its support 
for revolutionary movements. Beijing’s emergence from isolationism after 1969 meant that 
it placed more effort in seeking favour amongst the states of South East Asia rather than 
seeking to undermine them. All of this amounted to a view of China that required diplomatic 
engagement and not active military containment. 
 THE ROAD TO DÉTENTE: ADMISSION AND RECOGNITION 
The existing literature on New Zealand’s China policy places significant emphasis on issues 
of UN admission and diplomatic recognition. This is understandable given these issues 
dominated public discussion of New Zealand’s China policy during the period and the 
paucity of open sources on defence policy. However, with access to the documents used for 
this research it is clear that there were significant changes in the defence establishment’s 
perception of China around 1968. At this point China ceased to be the primary strategic 
concern to the defence establishment, a change in attitude probably driven by the 
information flows coming from External Affairs. This moved the debates about China policy 
out of the defence realm and added importance to the debates about China policy occurring 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1969 China was primarily a diplomatic issue rather 
than a military one. This brought the issues of admission to the UN and recognition to the 
fore for New Zealand policymakers. China’s re-entry into international diplomacy from 
1969 added impetus to calls for Western countries to normalise relations with Beijing.  
New Zealand was not a leader in recognising China. It voted against General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 which admitted Beijing to the UN at Taipei’s expense and New Zealand 
kept to the middle of the pack of Western countries recognising and establishing relations 
with Beijing. Yet, at the same time, New Zealand was in a much better position to establish 
diplomatic relations having given up on a strategy of containment. Direct engagement with 
Beijing had become the obvious strategy furthering New Zealand’s interests, but for 
Holyoake dual recognition continued to be a significant stumbling block. If Beijing and 
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Taipei had been willing to compromise on the issue of dual recognition, then New Zealand's 
recognition of Beijing would have occurred sooner. Only when a move at the cost of Taiwan 
became acceptable domestically did Holyoake begin to move towards recognition. The new 
Labour Government had the advantage of not being tied to previous decisions and thus 
could more easily make the decision to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing. 
This research found little evidence to support the notion that New Zealand’s China policies 
were a direct result of Washington’s position on China. That is not to say the American 
position was irrelevant, but it was only one of several considerations the Government had to 
weigh in managing China policy from 1969. Certainly there were misgivings about Nixon’s 
lack of consultation with his allies before announcing his trip to Beijing. However, this does 
not mean New Zealand was simply being led by Washington on China policy. Holyoake 
genuinely welcomed the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement as the United States 
appeared to have moved closer to Holyoake’s position of dual recognition. New Zealand 
was not looking for American approval to recognise the PRC but Nixon’s visit was part of a 
wider international swing towards Beijing that would isolate New Zealand should it fail to 
make the transition.  
The transition of China policy from the Defence realm to Foreign Affairs placed more 
emphasis on Cabinet to make decisions. In the mid-1960s the defence review process 
dominated China policy with officials making sober judgements based on detailed 
intelligence to plot the strategic direction with the supervision and endorsement (but not the 
complete financial backing) of the political leadership in Cabinet. With the decline of China 
as a threat, Holyoake became more directly involved as a solution to the PRC’s diplomatic 
isolation became more feasible. The power shift of China policy away from the defence 
establishment was part of a wider decline in influence of the military in the early 1970s as 
Cabinet cut funding increases in the midst of significant anti-military public sentiment.  
Vietnam, the end of containment, and the emergence of détente weakened the defence 
element of New Zealand foreign policy. This in turn allowed a more openly independent 
foreign policy. While Kirk had long held that open disagreement with American policies did 
not imperil the alliance, the breakdown of American interest in active military participation 
in Asia and the drop-off in threat from China provided greater opportunity for dissent. By 
the 1970s New Zealand had no hope of the US underwriting the defence of Malaysia and 
Singapore and given the change in attitudes towards China, New Zealand had little to 
bargain with the Americans on defence policy. The Americans no longer needed New 
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Zealand for support in Vietnam and New Zealand no longer needed the US for the 
containment of China. The criticisms of White House policy that Kirk made upon entering 
office could do far less damage to New Zealand’s defence interests in the 1970s than it 
might have done in the 1960s. 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 
This work has utilised newly declassified policy documents from the defence review 
processes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. These documents have generated new 
knowledge about the assumptions about China and New Zealand security that drove defence 
and foreign policy during this period. What is innovative is the insight into the interface 
between the top military leaders and senior bureaucrats on defence and foreign policy in this 
period. There are, however, some limitations in this material. There is little discussion in this 
material about Australian policy. This is not limited to defence matters. There is very little 
material from the Canberra High Commission in the files relating to China and Hong Kong 
in the 1960s. This changes in the 1970s, especially during the lead up to Beijing’s admission 
to the UN. At that time Australia shared a significant amount of material with New Zealand 
officials. 
It is very clear that New Zealand independently assessed the international situation and 
determined how best to pursue its interests with the resources it had available. What is less 
clear is how distinct New Zealand policymaking was from its allies, especially Australia. In 
many ways New Zealand’s strategic problems were the same as Australia’s. New Zealand’s 
Forward Defence strategy was as reliant on Australia as it was the UK or the US. It is clear 
that New Zealand was not simply imitating the strategic policy of Australia or any other 
country, but more work is required to determine how Australian thinking on China moved 
during this period in comparison with New Zealand. A comparative study of official New 
Zealand and Australian attitudes towards China during this period would be useful. 
Where New Zealand policy did to some extent imitate other countries was on the timing of 
recognition of the People’s Republic. Like many other capitals, Wellington established 
relations with Beijing following the PRC’s admission to the United Nations. There is no 
doubt that Marshall’s government (with Holyoake still serving as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) was heading towards recognising Beijing before its election loss. Kirk’s initial 
reluctance to recognise Beijing immediately is hard to explain. It is possible that Australia’s 
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decision to establish relations with Beijing played a part in changing the new prime 
minister’s mind. The opening of more files related to the decision to recognise Beijing 
would shed more light on the matter. 
What is striking about the discussions in defence policymaking bodies during this period is 
the lack of discussion of public opinion. References to public views are rare in the files 
examined for this research and evidence of significant linkages between defence officials 
and civil society is weak. Certainly the public criticisms of the Vietnam War seem to have 
had little impact on the recorded debates of the Defence Council or the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee. This makes it difficult to ascertain the extent to which public opinion influenced 
the thinking of defence policymakers. A study comparing public attitudes towards China and 
those of government officials would be valuable. The linkages between Cabinet and the 
officials is not always clear either. Certainly Defence Minister David Thomson was a strong 
advocate for the military in Cabinet but the relationship with other Cabinet members is not 
always clear. Holyoake had a significant interest in China policy but his relationship to the 
defence side of China policy is less clear. Nevertheless, the defence reviews were accepted 
by Cabinet with only the financial implications being a point of contention. 
Undoubtedly, the New Zealand Commission in Hong Kong played a crucial role in New 
Zealand’s understanding of events in Communist China. The challenge of assessing events 
in China was felt in many, if not all, foreign capitals. The initially inexplicable chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution was a particularly difficult puzzle for outside observers to decipher. 
New Zealand’s partners shared what little information they had. Nevertheless, it would be 
possible to conduct a much wider analysis of Western assessments of the Cultural 
Revolution. Understanding how Western capitals built a picture of the Cultural Revolution 
would be valuable in assessing how governments make foreign policy with limited 
information.  
 FINAL THOUGHTS 
This work has added significantly to the academic literature on China and New Zealand 
grand strategy. For a small power like New Zealand, grand strategy is more than simply 
seeking alliances. New Zealand had limited resources and had to place them in the best 
position possible to maximise their value in protecting New Zealand’s interests. This work 
has showed that such strategic calculations are possible for smaller actors, albeit with a 
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narrower range of options. The declassification of the files relating to the defence review 
processes of the late 1960s have provided new insight into New Zealand’s strategic 
assumptions that had not previously existed in the literature. The role of China as a strategic 
threat has been mentioned by authors such as Rabel741 and Dickens.742 Their work provides 
the strongest statements about the role of China in New Zealand’s thinking on the Vietnam 
War. However, the documents of the defence review process provide a much clearer picture 
of New Zealand’s overarching strategic thought. China is the clear long-term strategic threat 
to New Zealand’s interests in 1965. It was not a direct threat to the New Zealand area but 
any threat to Western interests in South East Asia was considered an unacceptable risk to 
New Zealand security. The change in New Zealand’s thinking on China during and after 
1965 is the crucial element in the country’s strategic thinking that has been previously 
underestimated by scholars.   
Brady’s assertion743 that New Zealand governments were unconcerned about China as a 
threat (until at least 1968) is untenable. While this study has not examined the person-to-
person links explored by Brady, this research demonstrates clearly that China was 
considered by policymakers to be the significant external security threat to New Zealand. 
Brady’s proposition may still hold if her conclusion is narrowed to argue that China was not 
thought to be a significant internal security threat. Internal security was not the subject of 
this research, but it has not uncovered any information that would suggest that China posed 
a risk to internal security in New Zealand. 
The fear among New Zealand officials of South East Asia being dominated by an alien great 
power was forged from Japan's sweeping occupation of South East Asia. By 1970 that 
memory had begun to fade. The need to expend significant national resources to defend the 
Malay Peninsula was looking less and less like an essential element of New Zealand's 
defence. With the failure of New Zealand's attempts to keep the friendly great powers 
involved in the region, New Zealand was faced with a situation where the only option was 
to reassess its interests. With the loss of the means of the strategic equation the ends had to 
be re-evaluated. 
                                                 
741  Rabel, 2005 
742  Dickens, 1995 
743  Brady, 2005, pp. 131-153; and Brady, 2008, pp. 1-20 
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Gustafson744 and Pugsley745 have noted that New Zealand's military contributions to Asia 
were not meaningful in determining the outcome of conflicts or potential conflicts in the 
region. For that reason, Gustafson and others saw Holyoake's defence policy as being 
simply an element of foreign policy: a strategy that provided small contributions to conflicts 
that were timed to have the biggest impact on foreign policy goals. However, this view 
forgets the nature of strategy and Clausewitz's dictum that 'war is a mere continuation of 
policy by other means'.746 Defence policy always serves foreign policy. It is correct to say 
that New Zealand's efforts were designed to maintain the alliance with the US but this view 
is as simplistic as it is incomplete. It is incorrect to state New Zealand sent forces to distant 
shores of little interest to itself in order to maintain a security guarantee just in case of an 
unlikely invasion. The reality is the reverse. New Zealand determined that the stability of 
South East Asia was vital to its national interests, determined China was the biggest threat to 
that stability, and used the few tools it had at its disposal to try and keep the English-
speaking great powers involved in the region. Wellington feared – with good reason – that 
the US and UK would tire of the South East Asian entanglements. From Wellington's 
perspective it was the Americans and the British that were being dragged to distant shores 
where their interests were fading, not the other way around. 
  
                                                 
744  Gustafson, 2007, p. 212 
745  Pugsley, 2003, p. 336 
746  von Clausewitz, 1997, p. 22 
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